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Abstract  
 
Until modernity, the word ‘sculpture’ was used to denote mimetic representations of 
the human form. From modernity on this term was extended to include new and 
unusual works that often do not share obvious features with traditional sculpture or 
even with what we know as art. This thesis is placed in the chronological frame of 
modern art and examines the meaning and truth of modern sculpture and the ways it is 
to be understood as a work of art.  
 
The thesis is separated into three parts. The first and introductory part explores the 
way modern sculpture has developed and redefined its status and meaning in the 
history of art from Rodin until Duchamp and the movements of found art and 
conceptual art. The aim of the first part is to specify the issue of perception and the 
function of phenomenology in the understanding of modern sculpture. The second and 
third parts aim to specify the validity of modern sculpture as art, considering 
particularly Heidegger’s thinking on the nature of art and the truth of art in the post-
religious age of modernity. Specifically, the second part examines Heidegger’s 
position on the meaning of art after the ‘death of art’ and moreover the place of 
sculpture in modernity focusing on the theme of homelessness in Rodin’s and 
Giacometti’s sculpture. The third part examines more closely the way abstract art and 
specifically the work of Barnett Newman could be seen as a truth revealing, following 
Heidegger’s criticism of the metaphysics of symbolic and representational art.  
 
The thesis argues that the validity of modern sculpture and generally modern art lies 
in its acknowledgement or, in Heidegger terms, thinking of the homelessness of the 
human being in modernity and the destitution of modernity, and hence in its revealing 
of the aspect of the truth and being that has been forgotten. 
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Introduction 
 
‘The statues of Maillol insolently fling in your eyes their heavy eternity. But the 
eternity of stone is synonymous with inertia; it is a forever frozen now. Giacometti 
never speaks of eternity, never thinks of it’. As Sartre points out, one day after 
Giacometti destroyed some statues he said to him that even if he was satisfied with 
them they were not made to last more than few hours. As Sartre writes, a few hours 
are ‘like a dawn, a distress, an ephemera’. ‘Never was matter less eternal, more 
fragile, nearer to being human’.1 
 
Alberto Giacometti was in a continuous exploration and quest for the form that would 
liberate sculpture from the ‘heavy eternity’ of traditional sculpture and at the same 
time bring it closer to the human being. This task to liberate sculpture from the 
‘eternity of stone’ and to approach the truth of the world and its object and of art itself 
is what characterises the emergence and development of modern sculpture.  
 
This quest emerged primarily with Auguste Rodin who seeks to liberate sculpture 
from the strict mimetic representation of human body and give back to it its 
expressivity and feeling. Constantine Brancusi, by abstracting the details from his 
objects, manages to isolate their essence. Furthermore, Barnett Newman through the 
repetition of vertical concrete stripes succeeds in isolating an instant of ‘total reality’ 
to create a language that refers to existence and being itself. 2 
 
Sculpture in relation to other kinds of art is considered to be the art that more closely 
approaches the being of the things that it presents. And this because it gives to its 
subject matter a concrete and three dimensional form. For Hegel sculpture succeeds in 
representing the perfect unity between subject matter, idea and form. But the 
development of sculpture in modernity appears to challenge this perfect unity between 
idea and form. This unity is challenged especially with the readymades of Duchamp 
and the movements of found art and conceptual art. Duchamp manages with his 
readymades to question in a provocative manner the same being of art. Later found art 
                                                
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Search for the Absolute 1948’, in Modern Sculpture Reader, ed. Jon Wood, 
David Hulks and Alex Potts, (Henry Moore Institute), pp. 180-188, (p. 183). 
2 David J. Glaser, ‘Transcendence in the Vision of Barnett Newman’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, vol. 40, no. 4 (Summer, 1982), pp. 415-420, (p. 418). 
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and conceptual art provoke the role of form and, correspondingly, concept in 
sculpture and generally in art.  But for Hegel the unity between idea and form can 
never be cancelled. What modern sculpture seeks to do is to redefine and re-designate 
the relation between form and content in favour of its status as a work of art. 
 
The aim of the first and introductory part of the thesis is to present and discuss the 
main issues that have emerged through the development of modern sculpture and that 
concern its status, identity and autonomy as art. Furthermore it examines the 
importance of phenomenology in the meaning and identity as art of modern sculpture. 
The examination begins with a presentation of the history of Western sculpture from 
antiquity until modernity and develops through a discussion of the development of 
modern sculpture from Rodin, via Duchamp, to the movements of found art and 
conceptual art. The development of modern sculpture seems to progress towards its 
autonomy in the sense of liberation from past cultural, public and social functions and 
from its architectural and public setting.  
 
But for Heidegger this liberation constitutes a loss of the capacity of art to be a mode 
of truth, to present the holiness of the world, the divinity of the gods and to allow 
humans to truly dwell. The second and third parts of the thesis are focused on the 
matter of the truth of art after the ‘death of art’, or otherwise of its validity in 
modernity as art following Heidegger’s philosophy of art.  
 
The aim of the second part of the thesis is to examine the notion of art in Heidegger’s 
philosophy of art and the way Heidegger designates art in the post-religious era of 
modernity. For Heidegger art in the past reveals the community in which it is placed, 
their gods and the human’s fate. But modernity is an age without gods and art no 
longer reveals their history and fate to the community. What is the place of art in an 
era where gods are absent? Can sculpture overcome its ‘unplaceability’ and 
homelessness?3  The second part is developed through a discussion of the relation 
between sculpture and place. Particularly it considers Rodin’s and Giacometti’s 
sculptures and investigates the way their work overcomes the homelessness of 
modern sculpture. 
                                                
3 Guenther Stern, ‘Homeless Sculpture’, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 
A first Symposium on Russian Philosophy and Psychology (December, 1944), pp. 293-307, (p. 296). 
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The notion of homelessness in sculpture is examined in a more literal sense as the loss 
of the place and space of sculpture and its inability to function in a cultural, public 
and social manner on its setting. In the third part of the thesis the notion of 
homelessness is examined in a more metaphorical sense as the condition of the human 
in ‘the destitute days of modernity’. The third part of the thesis focuses on 
Heidegger’s criticism, particularly of the metaphysics of art. Heidegger’s criticism of 
the metaphysics of art is divided into two arguments, referring to two kinds of art, 
Christian and post-Christian art, that is, symbolic and representational art. The 
argument firstly examines this criticism considering examples of symbolic and 
representational art that could still be considered as valid forms of art. I propose that 
Byzantine art and the work of Giotto could be seen as non-metaphysical forms of art 
despite the fact that they fall into the category of art that Heidegger rejects. Byzantine 
painting and the painting of Giotto manage to bring forth a world, but not through the 
means of symbolism or representation. Rather they establish a place in the way in 
which they engage the viewer into their meaning.  
 
Abstract expressionist art succeeds in bringing forth a meaning by the way it 
generates a place and makes it part of it in order to engage the viewer in the process of 
understanding it. Particularly, the study focuses on the work of abstract expressionist 
artist Barnett Newman and examines the way symbolism and representation and 
furthermore abstraction is to be understood in his work.  Considering Newman’s The 
Stations of the Cross and Here and Broken Obelisk the study examines the way the 
symbol of the cross and the representation of being are to be understood in his work. 
The chapter aims to show how truth is to be understood in modern abstract art and if it 
can help humanity surpass its homelessness. The key matter of this discussion is 
Heidegger’s notion of authentic anxiety in the work of Newman and the way it could 
bring together an authentic and inauthentic understanding of our being.  
 
This thesis is an examination of the meaning and understanding of modern sculpture. 
The examination is developed in the context of Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
existentialism, considering specifically his position on poetry and painting in 
modernity, his thinking on sculpture, and the relation between art, place and space, as 
well as his designation of the notion of Being,  modernity and metaphysics. The thesis 
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considers also other theories from the field of aesthetics, particularly Hegel’s 
Aesthetics and Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory as well as philosophical discussions on 
particular artists such as Sartre’s discussion on the sculptures of Giacometti and 
Rilke’s account in the work of Rodin. Furthermore the thesis considers theories from 
the conceptual framework of modern art and modern sculpture, particularly Fowkes’s 
account ‘A Hegelian Critique of Found Art and Conceptual Art’, Seamon’s account 
‘The Conceptual Dimension in Art and the Modern Theory of Artistic Value’, 
Danto’s institutional theory of art, and Krauss’s and Tucker’s writings on sculpture. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the way modern sculpture has developed and 
redefined its status and meaning in the history of art, and in addition to examine the 
way sculpture could gain its validity after the ‘death of art’, and whether this validity 
could be seen to preserve the function of the art of the past to reveal the world as a 
holy place. Following Heidegger’s thinking of the meaning of art in modernity as well 
as Adorno’s position on the negative truth of modern art, the thesis concludes that art 
in modernity is aware of its death and its inability to be the kind of art that it was in 
the past. But in acknowledging and thinking its own lack, the destitution of 
modernity, the absence of gods and the homelessness of the human, it manages to 
reveal the other side of truth: authenticity and the human’s need for dwelling.  
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I. The modern object sculpture 
 
The modern is abstract by virtue of its relation to what is past.4  
 
Art that is simply a thing is an oxymoron. Yet the development of this oxymoron is 
nevertheless the inner direction of contemporary art. Art is motivated by a conflict: 
Its enchantment, a vestige of its magical phase, is constantly repudiated as 
unmediated sensual immediacy by the progressive disenchantment of the world, yet 
without its ever being possible finally to obliterate this magical element.5 
 
Introduction  
 
Until modernity, the term sculpture in the Western history of art was used to denote 
truthful mimetic representations of human form. From modernity on this term was 
extended to include new and unusual works that often do not share any features with 
traditional sculpture or even with what we know as art. The main purpose of the first 
part of the thesis is to present and discuss the main issues that have emerged on the 
meaning of modern sculpture and its identity as art. Furthermore, it examines the 
contradiction between formalism and conceptualism in art as well in philosophical 
approaches on modern art.  
 
The first chapter follows the development of modern sculpture in relation to the other 
arts of its time and examines its progression towards the condition of the object. 
Sculpture with Rodin and his tendency to move from representation and naturalism to 
abstraction was to be developed in the history of modern sculpture with Brancusi and 
Picasso towards the ‘condition’ of the object and with Duchamp to the object itself.6 
The development of art towards the status of the object reflects the same ambition of 
modernism, and characterizes painting, poetry, music and architecture.7 But in 
opposition to the ‘object-status’ of a painting, poem, musical score or architectural 
                                                
4  Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert 
Hullot-Kentor, (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 28. 
5 Ibid., p. 75. 
6 William Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974), pp. 23, 114.  
7 However, in the case of modern architecture the notion of object refers to the absence or elimination 
of decorative elements in favour of pure form and structure. Movements such as the futurism, 
constructivism and expressionism are characterised by an expression of structure and carry 
architectural elements that refer to the function or expression of the building. Also in the case of music 
the shift towards the condition of the object is to be seen as a shift from the expression of the 19th 
century Romanticism to pure contraction with movements such as with serialism and some neo-
classicism. 
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building which comes to sustain its meaning and its status as art, the  ‘object-status’ of 
sculpture comes to challenge its meaning and in the case of Duchamp’s readymades 
its status as a work of art. The problem with modern sculptures is that the more the 
work approaches the condition of objects the more the distinction between work of art 
and artifact as well as between art and life disappears. Modern painting, poetry, music 
and architecture were still confining themselves within the boundaries of art. 
Duchamp’s readymades and later found art and conceptual art seek to ‘expand’ the 
notion of art to include objects that not only do not share any aesthetic features of 
what we know as art, but as such do not have any ontological differences from 
everyday objects.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the emergence and development of modern 
sculpture with Rodin, in relation with the arts of its time. Also, it aims to present the 
way sculpture progressed towards the condition of the object and extended to include 
works that make reference to everyday objects and readymade forms and works such 
as readymade objects. This study examines the notion of object in the work of Rodin, 
Brancusi, Picasso and Duchamp and arrives at the problematic notion of art that 
emerged with the readymades of Duchamp. 
 
The second chapter aims to examine more closely the understanding of readymade 
forms in the art world. Particularly, it focuses on two art movements that come to 
challenge the notion of art: found art and conceptual art. Both conceptual art and 
found art challenge the unity between form and content in art. Both seek the 
superiority of the one in opposition to the other, that is, form in found art and content 
in conceptual art.  But could art survive merely as form or concept? According to 
Danto, the meaning of these works and their art identity does not depend on their 
formal properties but comes through an interpretation or theory.  The problem with 
Danto’s approach is that it marginalises the role of the perceptual and of the 
experience of art. The chapter considers Seamon’s thesis on the modern theory of 
artistic value and Fowkes’s discussion of found art and conceptual art. Both suggest 
an understanding of these movements in terms of the internal or conceptual dimension 
of art, that is, the metaphorical function of art. This study aims to examine the notion 
of the conceptual in found art and conceptual art and the art identity of these works.  
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1. The emergence and development of the new sculpture 
 
1. 1.  Sculpture in history of art and philosophy 
 
Of all the kinds of art, sculpture is the art that represents in a more complete manner a 
subject matter, an idea. Sculpture represents through concrete materials its subject 
matter. In the Western tradition of art, sculpture especially until the Renaissance has 
been extensively practiced.8 But sculpture after the Renaissance did not follow the 
growth and innovation of painting and also did not attract the same aesthetic interest 
and philosophical and critical thinking as painting did.9 Until modernity its 
development was bound with the style of ancient Greek statues. In France until the 
19th century and the work of August Rodin painting was regarded as the superior art 
form.10 In the words of the art critic Octave Mirbeau, Rodin ‘rediscovered an 
admirable and forgotten art’.11  
 
In Hegel’s philosophical classification of arts sculpture is considered to be the 
perfection of art and this because ‘Idea and its reality’ are unified in a higher 
manner.12 Even if Hegel considers painting to be superior to sculpture, he sees 
sculpture as the only kind of art that succeeds in unifying the form and its content, the 
idea which is for Hegel, the spirit, ‘the spiritual inner life’.13 Art for Hegel is the 
manifestation of absolute sprit through form, through stone and marble in architecture 
and sculpture, colour in painting, sound in music and language in poetry. Art 
represents the struggle for unity of spirit and form. However, each kind of art for 
Hegel represents a different stage of this unity. In each kind of art the form manifests 
in a different manner the content of the absolute. Sculpture for Hegel surpasses the 
superiority of form over spirit of architecture in order to find its total harmonization. 
 
                                                
8 David F. Martin, Sculpture and Enlivened Space, (The University Press of Kentucky:  Lexington, 
Kentucky, 1966), p. 2. 
9 Ibid., and Vance D. Robert, ‘Sculpture’, in British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 35, no. 3, July, 1995, pp. 
217-226, (p. 217). 
10 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture,  p.15 
11 Bernard Champigneulle, Rodin, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), pp. 90-91. 
12  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 2 vols. trans. T.M. Knox, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 79.  
13  Ibid., p. 85. 
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The move from architecture to sculpture is for Hegel a move towards the liberation of 
spirit from mass and volume. In sculpture the spirit is the form. Sculpture ‘is the free 
and adequate embodiment of the Idea in the shape peculiarly appropriate to the Idea 
itself in its essential nature’.14 Its form does not indicate or imply the idea of the work 
but it is directly consubstantial with its idea. On the other hand the spirituality of the 
content will give to the spirit of art a physical appearance and existence. Through 
sculptural shape the idea can come ‘into free and coherent harmony’.15 
 
For Hegel, sculpture finds its perfect form in ancient Greek sculpture, and this lies in 
the fact that it presents in a concrete and three dimensional form the unification of 
‘divine and the human nature’.16 The primary aim of art is to present in a physical 
manner the spirit. According to Hegel ancient Greek sculpture succeeded in achieving 
the ultimate unity of form and spirit and this is because the spirit, as that stage in its 
development, takes the form of the human body. The human form, Hegel argues, is 
the only physical appearance that is appropriate to the spirit. In sculpture the human 
body is not to be seen as a physical, ‘sensuous existence’ but as the shape and 
existence of the spirit.17 The spirit of life finds its home in the physical shape of 
sculpture.18 As Hegel writes, into the temple ‘the god enters himself as the lightning-
flash of individuality striking and permeating the inert mass, and the infinite, and no 
longer merely symmetrical, form of spirit itself concentrates and gives shape to 
something corporeal.’19 (For a further discussion on Hegel’s account on art see pp. 
40-42 and 59-60). 
 
Sculpture in Greece, however, did not continue to be the representation of the god and 
the holy in Byzantine times. Even if Byzantine art preserves a number of 
characteristics from ancient Greek art it found its ideal form in the art of painting. In 
                                                
14  Ibid., p. 77. 
15  Ibid., p. 77. 
16  Ibid., p. 80. 
17 Often, Hegel argues, the form of the human body is seen in a negative manner when it regards the 
spiritual. However, art passes necessarily through anthropomorphism in order not to glorify the human 
but to embody the spiritual, the divinity of gods. As he writes, ‘personification and anthropomorphism 
have often been maligned as a degradation of the spiritual, but in so far as art’s task is to bring the 
spiritual before our eyes in a sensuous manner, it must get involved in this anthropomorphism, since 
spirit appears sensuously in a satisfying way only in its body ’. Ibid., p. 78. For his discussion on Greek 
art and the unity of the divine and the human see also, p. 719. 
18  Ibid., p. 85. 
19  Ibid., p. 84. 
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Byzantine art sculptures were considered to be idolatrous objects and were neglected 
as a practise. On the contrary in the western Middle Ages sculpture continues to 
represent the holy and the divine. Sculptures during this period continued the Roman 
tradition and they were used for the decorations of the temples and other sacred 
places. Often sculptures represented saints or imaginary creatures decorated the 
interior and exterior of churches. The subject matter of Renaissance sculpture was 
often taken from the bible or ancient Greek mythology. But what characterises the 
Renaissance sculpture is representation of the naked human body. In 16th century 
Michelangelo’s oversized human sculptural representations turned sculpture from a 
religious object into an aesthetic one. The sculpture becomes now the representation 
of the beauty of the human body. Michelangelo offers, Stokes remarks, to beauty ‘the 
ideal settlement’ through his petrification of the dynamic and the beauty of the nude 
body in the block of marble.20 
 
The beauty of the ancient Greek sculpture derived from the human body but primarily 
from the human face. The ‘facial formation’, according to Hegel, ‘is the model of the 
genuine beauty’.21 Faces are for Michelangelo of less importance than the bodies of 
his sculptures. Faces are not dominated with expressions of suffering or effort.  The 
person is represented through the human frame rather than facial features.22 It is the 
human frame and structure that liberates the energy of his work. ‘Michelangelo 
transformed oppressive weight into the breadth and pumping power of the thorax 
especially, into muscles that renew themselves by partaking of bulk’.23 
 
One of the major works of Michelangelo that has survived is the series of Slaves or 
Captives (figure 1) exhibited in the Louvre. These sculptures were planed to be placed 
in the Julian tomb and according to the primary plan of 1505 there were to be 
displayed sixteen of these sculptural prisoners. These figures, Stokes remarks, ‘are 
figures of passivity or suffering, and also of unusual strength’.24 Still the viewer does 
not feel that it is strength that evaporates. ‘Though death will overcome it, the strength 
                                                
20 Adrian Stokes, The Image in Form: Selected Writings of Adrian Stokes, ed. Richard Wollheim, (New 
York, Evaston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 211. 
21 Hegel, op.cit., p. 730. 
22 Stokes, op. cit., p. 205.  
23 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
24 Ibid., p. 205. 
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still shows, or, rather, the vision remains, as if coming from profound sleep’.25 
Michelangelo’s captives are beautiful, idealized and at the same time naturalistic 
forms. ‘These beautiful forms, foreign to self pity or to sentiment, are the product of 
deprivation, surrender, revolt, enlisted by the idealizing yet naturalistic art’.26 
However, the representation of the captives is not completed and totally finished. The 
sculptures appear unfinished, works in progress and happening rather than being.  
 
The unfinished character of Michelangelo’s sculptures is what characterises Rodin’s 
work. Rodin was influenced by the unfinished element of Michelangelo’s sculptures.  
Although Rodin’s works remain within the area of representation he brings a new and 
higher form of naturalism, ‘an illusion of reality, of the living body’. Thus, as Tucker 
remarks, Rodin has rejected three hundred fifty years of western tradition of sculpture 
in order to choose Michelangelo’s’ Dying Slave as his model for the pose in the Age 
of Bronze. The ‘flat’ and ‘languid’ element of Michelangelo’s Dying Slave is what 
dominates Rodin’s first work the Age of Bronze (fig. 2).27 
 
In Hegel’s aesthetics sculpture obtains a superiority in comparison to the position 
granted to sculpture in other philosophical discussions of art.28 Philosophers and 
critics who had engaged with the understanding of the system of the arts discussed 
sculpture but rarely proceeded to a close examination of it or saw it ‘with the eye of 
the lover of painting’.29 Sculpture was examined as a kind of art that projects the 
novelties of painting into a three dimensional form.30 There are some systematic 
examinations that study and discuss sculpture. However, these examinations are 
focused more on the history of sculpture and the technical skills of the sculptor rather 
than the way sculpture is, the way it appears and is understood and the special aspects 
of this art form. As Martin writes, these examinations concern merely the when and 
what of sculpture; they are not ‘about the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of sculpture’ and 
because of that they fail to clarify the nature of sculpture and its autonomy.31 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 206. 
27 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p. 27. 
28 However, Hegel’s discussion on sculpture and art in general is developed in terms of his examination 
of the philosophy of history. Art represents a stage of Hegel’s history and is examined in terms of what 
Hegel designates as the historical development of spirit. 
29 Martin, op. cit., p. 1. also Vance, op. cit., p. 117. 
30 Martin, op. cit., p. 1.  
31 Ibid. 
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According to Vance, the avoiding of the philosophical examination of sculpture was 
due to the fact that sculpture through the history of art was related to a wide diversity 
of things in comparison with other forms of art.32 On the one hand, sculpture as well 
as painting differs from music and literature in the sense that sculptures are objects, 
physical things in themselves.33 On the other hand, sculpture as a thing, as ‘a three-
dimensional object among other objects of the world claims its place’ in a manner that 
painting cannot, at least until the emergence of minimal and non-representational 
painting.34  In painting the representation and impression of a three dimensional world 
does not reside in a real space but a fake and illusory space which is defined by the 
limits of the painting.35  
 
Sculpture from primitive times and antiquity up until modernism has not been 
developed following a set of common characteristics in terms of its materiality, size 
and technique or in terms of its subject matter and function. There is a variety of 
materials that sculpture is made of, a variety of sizes, representational subject matters 
and purposes that sculpture was created for. We call sculpture not merely three 
dimensional human representations but also primitive, Paleolithic and Neolithic 
figurines or three dimensional representation of animals, non representational Islamic 
works of art, architectural decorations and votary statues.  
 
The meaning of sculpture, in opposition to the meaning of painting, does not refer to 
the work as an object or merely to its representation. The meaning of sculpture comes 
forth through the work as whole, its position, cultural or religious functions. Sculpture 
was not a fully autonomous art. Its representation, symbolism and status are gained 
through its position within the temple or its location. The world that is enclosed in the 
two dimensionality of painting, in sculpture is revealed in relation to its place. In 
Hegelian terms the sculpture embodies spirit, divinity, and holiness and allows it to be 
                                                
32 Vance, op. cit., p. 217. 
33 William Tucker , ‘Modernism, Freedom, Sculpture’, in Art Journal, vol. 37, no. 2, (Winter, 1977-
1978), pp. 153-156, (p. 154). 
34 This distinction between sculpture and painting regards traditional painting. With modernity painting 
inclines towards the form of the object, by abandoning elements of representation and furthermore by 
becoming a physical thing, expanding its size, volume, and thus by redefining the place that it 
occupies. Stern, op. cit., p. 294. 
35 For Hegel is the reduction of art into a two dimensional image that gives to painting a superiority.  
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presented in the temple. In opposition to painting where through color it encloses the 
world, its motion, volume, atmosphere, darkness and light, sculpture exists in a real 
three dimensional world. Sculpture with its volume, physicality and worked matter 
becomes itself part of the world. It obtains light and motion through its relation with 
the world. It does not represent or enclose the divinity and holiness of gods but 
obtains its divinity and holiness through its place and stands as an essential part of the 
godly.  
 
As Krauss writes, sculpture is a historical category rather than a universal category or 
term. In the history of art sculpture developed ‘its own internal logic, its own set of 
rules’ to include a diversity of cases.36  Thus, it is difficult to designate and define 
what sculpture is in such a way that it could encompass all things called sculpture 
from antiquity until nowadays. However, Martin argues, even if there is not an 
accurate definition of sculpture the question about its nature does not call for a 
definition or a classification of its necessary and sufficient features and properties.  
What is important is to characterise its autonomy and seek the reasons for its 
existence37 or, in Krauss’s words, its ‘internal logic’.  
 
1. 2. The term sculpture in modernity 
 
However, it is the same term ‘sculpture’ through the history of art that came to 
distinguish modern sculptures from classical and renaissance sculptures. Since 
Rodin’s works, we do not use the terms sculpture and statue interchangeably. The 
word statue has been restricted to mean usually Western, pre-modern public and 
figurative sculptures. It denotes the way the work is indicating a representation of a 
human standing figure. We have no word, Tucker argues, that describes the modern 
sculpture, ‘its standing, its being rather than its becoming, how it is rather than how it 
got to be there’.38  
 
                                                
36 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’, in The Originality of the Artifact –and Other 
Modern Myths, pp. 277-290, p. 280.  
37 Martin, op. cit., p. 16. According to Martin it is important to seek the autonomy of sculpture to 
understand what sculpture is. However the notion of autonomy and art, especially of sculpture is a 
recent one as it emerges with modernism. Traditional sculpture is not completely autonomous as it 
functions in a social and political manner.  
38 Tucker, ‘Modernism, Freedom, Sculpture’, p. 156 
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The word sculpture does not denote the work’s standing and the way it is; rather it 
signifies the process of the artist, the way that the artist brings about the being of the 
work. It reflects, for Tucker, not the technique of the artist of modernity but his 
freedom of creation and his attention to the artificial and physical form of the work, 
on sculpture as ‘the making and the thing made’. 39  The word sculpture became a 
universal term to include modern sculpture ‘even when the kind of making-carving-
had no relation by the actual process implied by the word’.40 What sculpture is as a 
procedure is completed by the process of experiencing the work. As Tucker writes, it 
‘can and must be identified in terms of human experience’.41  
 
And this is what Rodin and his followers achieved, to bring the viewer closer to the 
work. Rodin cancels the traditional connection between the work and its place, the 
architecture of the temple or the public place. He abandons any attempt to relate the 
work to a world in order to allow the viewer to come nearer to the work and make his 
experience part of the meaning of the work.42 
 
However, the new sculpture did not bring radical changes and did not emerge, as 
William Tucker writes, ‘with the directness, simplicity and objectivity of the new 
painting’.43 Early modern sculpture continued to express traditional characteristics, 
particularly romantic and dramatic elements that function in a moral and public 
manner; characteristics that its contemporary impressionist painters had abandoned in 
their works.44 Rodin’s The Age of Bronze was accepted by the Salon in 1877, a year 
by which the impressionists artists, contemporaries of Rodin were having their third 
exhibition. Rodin’s work appears at the art scene when the impressionists had already 
                                                
39 Ibid., p. 156. The Greek world for sculpture, glypto (etymology: glyfo, carve, sculpt) signifies also a 
sculpt or carved work. It refers to the process of the work in opposition to the word statue, agalma, 
(etymology: aggalome, I am happy, exulted) which signifies a three dimensional work that could be 
made of a any kind of materials and could represent any kind of subject matter. Specifically, the world 
agalma, in ancient Greek was used for any precious object that brings joy and delight (aggaliasi, 
elation, exultation). The world that was signifying the sculptural human representation was andrias 
(etymology: anir, man). 
40 Tucker, ‘Modernism, Freedom, Sculpture’, p. 156. 
41 Ibid., p. 156.  
42 Stern, op.cit., pp. 295-296. 
43 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p.15. 
44 Ibid., pp. 15-40, (p. 15). 
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been known to the public and had already constituted the major concepts and features 
of their art.45  
 
The reason for the ‘late arrival’ of modern sculpture, according to Tucker, lies on the 
one hand in its late growth since the Renaissance and in the specific circumstances of 
public taste in Europe and especially France.  These circumstances were formed by 
the tradition of French painting which was seen as the representative art of the 
Revolution.46 Most of the important artists of the 19th century such as Delacroix, 
Corot, Courbet, Rousseau, Boudin prepared with their work the conditions for the 
emergence of impressionist art. Géricault, Préault, Daumier did make sculptures. 
However, their work remained, until the development of artistic modernism, 
unknown. It is only now, Tucker remarks, that these artists are considered to be the 
pioneers of modern sculpture, identifying in their works modern elements and 
tendencies.47 
 
On the other hand, the late emergence of modern sculpture lies in the same physicality 
of sculpture. Sculpture as such could not offer the realization, flexibility, and 
directness of impressionist painting.48 Impressionist painting concerns the experience 
of color and visual perception. In contrast, the physicality of sculpture, its mass, 
volume and materiality could not treat visual perception as impressionists did with 
their paintings. It is the same physicality of painting that allows the artist to capture 
the illusion of space and atmosphere and to create the visual perception of volume and 
depth, light and motion.49 In order for sculpture to thematise visual perception, to 
bring about the realization of space and atmosphere it should put a great ‘effort of 
organization’ into form.50 This difficulty was precisely what used to characterise the 
skills of the traditional sculptor, and since Michelangelo it became the measure of 
artistic success.51 But sculpture in the 19th century academies of art, as Tucker writes, 
‘with its appalling virtuosity, the vulgarity of its subject-matter, its total lack of real 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid., pp. 15-40. 
49 Ibid., p. 17. 
50 Ibid., p. 18. 
51 Ibid., p. 19 
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feeling, intelligence or sensitivity, was as much the prisoner of conditions established 
centuries earlier’.52  
 
What was to change with Rodin’s sculptures was the ‘freedom of handling’ of clay or 
stone in favor of the expression of the figure rather than the figure as a representation 
of the human body.53 From this perspective Rodin seems to move his work towards 
the physicality and flexibility of painting and specifically the post-impressionist work 
of Cézanne or Van Gogh. Rodin’s focus on the materiality of his figures appears to 
overlay the predominance of the mimetic and naturalistic of traditional sculptures. 
Although his work is often placed in the sphere of representation his work is not to be 
seen in terms of mimetic representation but rather in terms of plasticity and flexibility 
of form. Rodin follows the ambition of impressionist artist to create the atmosphere of 
a world through color. But Rodin moves a step further to offer a real, three 
dimensional atmosphere and space, to capture through his carving and especially 
modeling light to bring forth through the concrete materiality of his figures the 
illusion of motion, and furthermore expression and feeling. (For the relation of 
Rodin’s work to Impressionism see also chapter 4, p. 137). 
 
Modelling, Stokes remarks, is a process that allows more freedom than carving. The 
treatment of the material is free in the sense that the artist can proceed to changes and 
corrections. ‘The modelled shape is not uncovered but created’.54 The final form of 
the work is not as in carving a pre-given form but comes through the process of 
creation and of handling of the materials. This handling of the materials is without 
restrictions, it is as Stokes puts it, ‘an imaginative communion with the significance of 
the material itself’.55 
 
The simplicity and economy of the new painting came in the new sculpture with 
Rodin’s detail of handling the material. Rodin does not leave any aspect or part of the 
work untouched, but at the same time the work as a whole often appears as abstract, 
fragmentary and unfinished.56 The formal properties of the work and the way the 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Stokes, op. cit., p. 157.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p. 108.  
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figure is presented are what drive the viewer’s attention rather than the figure as part 
of a myth or a story. Thus, even if elements of myth and religion are not absent from 
Rodin’s work they take a whole new meaning and function in terms of the form of the 
figures. Rodin’s fragmented or unfinished figures drive the viewer ‘to ‘read’ with his 
own body the missing parts of the sculpture’.57 The meaning of his figures does not 
come forth merely by terms of representation but also by the way they are presented 
to the viewer and the way the viewer fills in the missing parts of both the form and the 
meaning of the work.  
 
1. 3. The notion of object in modern sculpture 
 
Rodin’s tendency to move from representation to abstraction was to be developed in 
the history of modern sculpture with Brancusi and Picasso towards the ‘condition’ of 
the object and with Duchamp towards the readymade object itself.58 Brancusi’s work 
brought into the history of art two important and at the same time opposite tendencies 
of the art before 1914. The first tendency is a new relation between art and life and the 
second a new conception of abstract art. Even if he himself did not consider his work 
to be abstract, he became one of the most important abstract artists.59 However, the 
notion of abstraction in his work does not come as a deduction or reduction of the 
image of the objects into a carved work. Abstraction in his work is the manifestation 
of an image of an object.60 And this is what his aim was: to reveal the real world 
through the shape of his work, through form which in Brancusi’s work becomes 
according to Krauss the ‘manifestation of surface’.61 Brancusi produces works from 
images that appear ‘already established’.62 The round surface of the figures and the 
ovoid shape that characterises part of his work could be seen to incline towards the 
form of a found object, ‘a form that is in a real sense given to Brancusi rather than 
invented by him’.63 In the same way, Krauss remarks, ‘the aesthetic act resolves 
                                                
57 Ibid., p.109. 
58 Ibid., pp. 15-40, 107-127. 
59 Edith Balas, ‘Object-Sculpture, Base and Assemblage in the Art of Constantin Brancusi’, in Art 
Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Autumn, 1978), pp. 36-46, (p. 46).  
60 Rosalind E. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, (Cambridge, Mass, London: MIT Press, 1981). 
pp.69-103, (p. 103). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 84. 
63 Ibid., p. 88.  
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around the placement of this discovery object which transposes it into a particular 
context from which it will ‘read’ as art’.64  
 
What Rodin and Brancusi manage to do is to free sculpture from its traditional 
context, the architectural or public space and the monumental pedestal. Rodin’s and 
Brancusi’s sculptures are autonomous, they stand by themselves independent from 
their location. For both art is a happening within the work itself. The autonomy of 
Rodin’s sculptures comes through expressivity of his figures which cancels any 
adjustment of his sculptures to the surrounding place. (For a further discussion on the 
relation between the work of Rodin and its place see chapter 4, pp. 125-139). 
Specifically, in Rodin’s work the relation or rather separation of the work and its 
context is due to the materiality of the work, through the detail of carving and 
modeling. The work standing on the ground without a pedestal seems isolated and 
alienated from its setting. However, the large size of his sculptures and the 
expressivity of the bodies of his figures drive the viewer closer to the work and 
manage to surpass the isolation of his sculptures from their setting. (For a further 
discussion on the matter of isolation and homelessness of Rodin’s sculptures see 
chapter 4, pp. 125-139). 
 
The relationship and contradiction between the work and its context in Brancusi’s 
work emerges also through the materiality of the work. In opposition to the details of 
Rodin’s large scale work Brancusi brings the polished surfaces of his small size 
figures. To overcome the break between the work and its site Brancusi creates for 
each sculpture its own setting, its own base, its own pedestal. The meaning of his 
work progresses through the analogy between the pedestal and sculpture. The pedestal 
seems to support the work both in terms of form and concept, making it part of the 
work. Brancusi’s pedestals are what give art status to his objects, they constitute the 
world and the place of the work.  In fact for Brancusi his pedestals are part of the 
work.65 As Balas writes, Brancusi ‘was not making pedestals’, what we take to be the 
                                                
64 As Krauss writes ‘one finds oneself at this point in an area of almost insidious overlap between 
Brancusi and Duchamp. For like the readymades, the ovoid of The Beginning of the World … is a 
found object, a form that is in a real sense given to Brancusi rather than invented by him. Similarly the 
aesthetic act resolves around the placement of this discovery object which transposes it into a particular 
context from which it will ‘read’ as art’. Ibid. 
65 Balas, op. cit., p. 38. 
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base or the pedestal of the work represented Brancusi’s conception of art.66 The form 
of the pedestal, its size and material come to achieve an inseparable unity with the 
figure or object.67   
 
Brancusi however, in opposition to Rodin, abandons even more the role of the 
narrative in the understanding of sculpture. In Brancusi’s work the meaning does not 
depend on a dialectical process of experiencing the work. His sculptures are seen from 
the beginning as a whole and as a unity they drive the viewer not to observe the 
details of his materiality but rather gaze at the surface of the work and its 
contradictions with its base.  
 
In the history of modern sculpture Brancusi and Duchamp followed the same 
approach on the matter of ‘sculptural narrative’; ‘both of them rejected the 
technologically based role of analysis in sculpture, creating work that questioned the 
very role of narrative structure by gravitating toward that which is unitary and 
unanalyzable’.68 However, Brancusi’s works, in opposition to the readymades of 
Duchamp, can still be placed, Krauss argues, ‘within the arena of representation.’69 
Specifically, Brancusi’s sculptures play between the condition of a figure and that of 
an object or readymade form but neither facet prevails such as in the case of the 
Sleeping Muse (fig. 3).70  But even when the work appears to prevail as an object as in 
the case of The Begging of the World (fig. 40) the work’s image alters through its 
‘theatrical presence’, through its symbolical or better metaphorical status.71 What 
characterize these works is that their ovoid, polished shape brings forth a ‘tension 
                                                
66 According to Balas, Brancusi himself did not draw a conceptual distinction between the functional 
object in his studio and his sculptures. His work thus is set between the condition of an object as a 
utilitarian object or artifact and the condition of the object as art. Ibid. 
67 In Derrida terms the base constitutes the parergon of the work. It ‘comes as an extra’, as an addition 
to the work. Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, 
(Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 57. Brancusi’s carved figures are to be 
seen in terms of representation rather as mere objects. But their polished surfaces, in addition to their 
small size need an addition, something extra to complete it as figures and as works of art. This need is 
not to be understood as a lack in the sense of an emptiness. But it makes it stand as a work of art as 
‘come back, equal or similar to itself’. Ibid.,  p. 80-81. 
68 Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, p. 103. 
69 Ibid., p. 84. 
70 Ibid., p. 114. 
71 Ibid., p. 116. As critics often claim The Begging of the World is to be seen as a metaphor of the 
origin of the world, as the primary core of the birth of world. However, placed in Brancusi’s production 
of art, The Begging of the World will not be read as a story of cosmic origins. It could be seen as a 
continuity of his previous ovoid shape works, as a metaphor of the beginning or birth of life, of sight, 
speech, hearing and smell.  
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between the real and the invented’, 72  between their status as object and as work of 
art. Their understanding is developed through this interplay of reality and art, artifact 
and artwork.  
 
This interplay between reality and art is developed between the figure and its 
pedestals but also between the work as a whole and its space. This relationship 
between the work and its space appears often as an additional element that comes to 
complete the metaphorical meaning of the work. The shiny surfaces of the figures 
appear as if they are absorbing the atmosphere of the world around them, not the 
world as it is but its light, colors and shadows. Brancusi with his work achieves not 
merely the representation of the external world and its objects but the isolation in each 
work of an idea of an object. By abstracting and removing the details from the objects 
and figures he isolates an essence of them. What his work represents does not come as 
the result of abstraction and reduction but for him through realism. As he states, ‘that 
which they call abstract is the most realistic, because what is real is not the exterior 
form but the idea, the essence of things’.73 
 
Brancusi’s carved works as well as Picasso’s constructions and paintings have 
achieved ‘the success of ‘the object’’ in both sculpture and painting. But as Tucker 
argues, it seems that these artists ‘have felt an impulse to move backwards or 
forwards violently’.74 Brancusi challenges the boundary of art and reality with works 
in which their form appears readymade and their reflection upon their shiny surface 
integrates the surrounding atmosphere, a part of reality itself. Picasso on the other 
hand integrates reality through the use of the same readymade objects into his cubist 
constructions and succeeds to bring what Tucker calls an objective result.75 
Specifically, he succeeds in this by the material he uses, that is, un-worked wood, 
string, nails and everyday objects and having readymade objects as his subject matter 
(fig. 5 and 6). In opposition to the sculptures of Brancusi which come to represent 
figures, the human body, and faces in Picasso’s constructions represent the objects 
themselves. The viewer does not transit from what he primarily sees to an image. 
                                                
72 Ibid., p. 116. 
73 Garmen Giménez and Matthew Gale (eds), Costantin Brancusi: The Essence of Things, (London: 
Tate, 2004), pp. 127-133, (p. 133). 
74 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p.107. 
75 Ibid., p. 108. 
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The image in Picasso’s constructions is the object itself. Even though his theme 
comes from traditional still life painting, that is glasses, dishes, musical instruments, 
his work shows greater autonomy than this artistic tradition and complete in itself by 
bringing it closer to the status of the object.76 His works are abstracted from both the 
pictorial space of traditional still lifes and the monumental status of traditional 
sculpture. 
 
The object status that Picasso gives to his work emerges as a process throughout his 
artistic career from his cubist painting to his constructions. As Octavio Paz writes, 
what Picasso succeeded in doing with his works, Duchamp achieved by a single work 
‘that is nothing less than the negation of work in the modern sense of the word’.77 
Painting emerges as a criticism of previous movements but the movement, Paz argues, 
emerges as the criticism of painting. The pictures of Picasso, Paz writes, are images, 
but the works of Duchamp ‘are a meditation on the image’.78 Duchamp’s readymades 
could be seen as a synthesis of Brancusi’s polished carved works which look like 
readymade forms and Picasso’s use of readymade and un-worked tools in his 
constructions. Duchamp’s polished urinal calls the viewer not to see it as an image of 
something else, but rather to gaze it as an interesting construction. His Fountain (fig. 
7) provokes the viewer to think the image of the urinal as a readymade object in the 
art world.  
 
This tendency toward the status of the object is what characterizes the same ambition 
of modernism.79  It begins during World War I with a reaction to traditional aesthetic 
principles and with the emergence of a new shift, ‘a new convention’ towards the 
condition of the object.80  The notion and idea of object continued to influence the 
artists of modernity, to become the foremost ‘aspiration of modernism from about 
1870 until the Second World War’.81 It was this ‘objectiveness’, Bolge remarks, that 
pushed artists to abandon the canons and techniques of traditional art.82 The work 
                                                
76 Ibid., p. 65. 
77 Octavio Paz, Marcel Duchamp Appearance Stripped Bare, trans. Rachel Phillips and Donald 
Gardner, (New York: Arcade Pub., 1990), p. 1. 
78 Ibid.,  pp. 2-3. 
79 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p.107. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 George S. Bolge, ‘The Painting/Sculpture Connection’, in Woman’s Art Journal, vol. 3, no. 2. 
(Autumn, 1982 – Winter, 1983), pp. 54-56, p. 55. 
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with new objective methods and techniques, ‘independent of its maker, of its 
audience and of the world in general’ is to be considered in an objective manner, as 
Tucker writes, with ‘its own demands’ and ‘its own objective existence’.83 As Bratu 
and Marculescu write, it was ‘a sort of radical reduction of all previous aesthetic 
meanings’.84 This reduction appears as a process which reduces the objects and their 
objectivity not to a subjective meaning but rather to the absence of meaning. 
Particularly, as Bratu and Marculescu state, ‘phenomenological reduction, as époché, 
is a multistaged process within which objects, objective meanings—may be reduced 
in a pure striving toward what could be called an empty space of meaning’.85 
Primarily in poetry and painting but also in sculpture, music and architecture the 
notion of object appears as ‘an ideal condition of self-contained, self-generating 
apartness for the work of art’.86   
 
Painting moved towards a three dimensional art and evolved, Bolge argues, ‘into an 
art form that consciously rejected pictorial depth in space based on perspective’ to 
become a physical object in itself.87 And this in order to stress the same means of 
painting, its flatness, two dimensionality and the color itself rather than 
representation. Poetry, on the other hand, stresses language and the appearance of the 
poem rather than verse, meaning or messages.88  In contrast to the ‘object-status’ of a 
painting or a poem, which seem capable of sustaining and ‘supporting’ their 
meaning, the ‘object-status’ of sculpture limits or even appears to cancel its 
meaning.89 Painting, architecture and music  
 
are in some sense withdrawn or protected from the sudden and violent intrusion 
into consciousness offered  by sculpture when the habitual meaning is suddenly 
                                                
83 The modern world as Tucker writes, ‘came to denote an ideal condition of self-contained, self-
generating apartness for the work of art, with its own rules, its own order, its own materials, 
independent of its maker, of its audience and of the world in general’. Tucker, The Language of 
Sculpture, p.108. 
84 Horia Bratu and Ilena Marculescu, ‘Aesthetics and Phenomenology’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, vol. 37, no. 3, (Winter, 1979), pp. 335-349, (p. 344).  
85 Ibid. 
86 As Tucker writes, ‘Out of objective perception, objective method, developed the objective 
consideration of the work itself—its own demands issuing from its own objective existence-the 
flatness, bounded rectangularity, colour and tactility of the painting, the appearance of the printed poem 
on the page, with the simultaneous objective consideration of the conventions needed to support the 
illusion of space and volume in painting and meaning in poetry’. The Language of Sculpture, p.108. 
87 Bolge, op. cit., p. 55. 
88 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, pp. 107-108.   
89 Ibid.  
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challenged, without the expectation created by the fact of the wall or the 
rectangular canvas, the fact of the building.90  
 
Modern sculpture, Tucker writes, ‘once it has recognised itself, has no particular 
container, no announcement as it were of its own arrival’.91 The problem with modern 
sculptures is that the more the work approaches the form of objects, the more the 
distinction between artwork and artifact, art and life disappears ‘to the point at which 
all reasons for making sculpture, and indeed art in general, seemed to disappear’.92 
The ‘objectivity of method, his workmanlike physical approach’ of Rodin’s 
sculptures, furthermore the ‘success of ‘the object’’ of Brancusi’s and Picasso’s works 
have reduced the distance between artwork and artifact. 93 But in the case of 
Duchamp’s readymades, this distinction appears to be altogether cancelled.   
 
The category of sculpture included through history of art a diverse range of objects, 
subject matters and material. But as Krauss argues, sculpture as other forms of art has 
its own rules, which even if they could ‘be applied to a variety of situations, are not 
themselves open to very much change’.94 As Krauss writes ‘Duchamp’s concern with 
sculpture as a kind of aesthetic strategy’.95 Duchamp’s readymades as three 
dimensional objects placed in an art space could only fall into the category of 
sculpture but not into the category of aesthetics.  
 
Krauss places Duchamp in the history of art and particularly in the history of modern 
art to argue that Duchamp still focuses on the aesthetics of his art but in a negative 
way. The ‘aesthetic strategy’ of Duchamp’s works concerns their experience not as 
beautiful and interesting objects but merely as objects. Duchamp’s, for Krauss, 
‘aggressive and formally offhand’ work rejects the traditional role of the analysis and 
aesthetic interpretation of art. Duchamp’s work questions the role of narrative by 
creating works that are ‘unitary and unanalyzable’.96  Thus, the experience of these 
works and their understanding as art could not be based on an aesthetic analysis or 
reading of them but on a theoretical or in Danto’s terms, on a philosophical approach. 
                                                
90 Tucker, ‘Modernism, Freedom, Sculpture’, p. 155. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Tucker, The Language of Sculpture, p. 107. 
93 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
94 Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’, p. 280.  
95 Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, p. 103. 
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Duchamp’s ‘readymades are unworked and, for the most part are not representational. They 
are common objects slipped into the stream of aesthetic discourse, as a series of questions 
to which there is no certain reply’.97 Even if we consider readymades to be unique objects 
or forms in the field of art they are not unique as everyday objects. 98 They are, Danto 
remarks, ’beyond good and bad taste’, ‘commonplace and dull’ objects. To see them as art 
we have to see them, according to Danto, in an interpretive manner. Someone could 
respond to the readymades in an aesthetic manner but someone else might not. Duchamp, 
Danto remarks, succeeded in excluding ‘aesthetics from the concept of art’.99 For Danto 
aesthetics in the work of Duchamp is distanced from art. That is, the question of art does 
not call merely for approaches in taste, beauty and pleasure but for something deeper than 
that and more philosophical. Aesthetics, Danto remarks, ‘has been a fairly marginal 
philosophical subject’.100  But philosophy could respond to these works in a much more 
precise way. As Danto remarks,  
 
it was only when I encountered Warhol’s Brillo Box that I saw, in a moment of 
revelation, how one could make philosophy out of art. But Brillo Box has only the 
sensuous properties possessed by Brillo boxes, when the latter are conceived of merely as 
decorated containers. A lot of Warhol’s works are aesthetically as neutral as the 
personality he endeavored to project. 101 
 
For Danto, the Brillo box displayed as a work of art is making a kind of philosophy. It 
could be seen more as a statement about art, as an argument on the way objects are 
transformed into art. Despite its design or beautiful colors the Brillo box in the art space 
does not become art due to its external or aesthetic properties. Everyday objects could 
possess aesthetic properties but their properties do not make them works of art. For Danto 
it is not through aesthetics but through philosophy of art that these works could gain their 
art status. And Duchamp makes the turn from aesthetics to the philosophy of art a necessity 
for the art identity of his works.  
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1. 4. Modern art and traditional art  
 
A characteristic, according to Luban, which can be applied to a great number of 
modern works is that they are ‘fraudulent’. As Luban writes, ‘the characteristic 
failing of modernist work, when it fails, is not that it is that it is bad but that it is 
fraudulent, by which I mean this: art is the working of a medium – objects, pigments, 
sounds, words – but not every working of a medium is art’.102 But does the new in 
the history of art always appear as non-art, or fraudulent art? Does the new art and 
hence the art which does not encompass past aesthetic conditions and principles 
inevitably appear as fraud? 
 
Radically modern works of art are not mere objects or meaningless creations. For 
Danto it is precisely their separation from aesthetic qualities of the past, such as the 
mimetic, that gives to these works their art meaning. Mimesis was no longer 
considered to be a necessary or sufficient condition of art, for its essence and for its 
beauty. Kandinsky’s works survived, Danto claims, despite the fact that his works do 
not possess the mimetic condition.103 (Further on mimesis and art see pp. 58-59). 
 
In the history of art new art movements did not have an immediate reception as good 
art and even recognition as art. In order, for example, for post-impressionist art, Danto 
argues, to be ‘accepted as art’ it was essential not so much to focus on ‘a revolution in 
taste’ but rather on the new characteristics of the accepted works of art. The result of 
the new acceptance was that post-impressionist works of art were taken as art and 
furthermore a variety of anthropological objects, such as masks and weapons 
transferred from historical or anthropological museums to art museums.104 These 
objects do not become art objects but gain the status of an artwork. What was once 
considered to be an artefact is now seen as a work of art. The fraudulent art becomes 
art through the history of art and changes in art genres and in the art world in general.  
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The development of modern art and its relation or rather opposition to the art of the 
past could be seen as a dialectical progress in the history of art. According to 
Greenberg, artistic modernism can be placed in a dialectical history of art and be 
understood as another historical turn following classicism and romanticism, which at 
the same time shares or revives characteristics from the art of the past. 105 It introduces 
new elements and innovations but to achieve the high quality of the art of the past, 
modernism assimilates elements of traditional styles, methods, techniques and 
themes.106 The form in these works, even if different from traditional art, has both a 
language and organization, that is, a vocabulary and syntax.107 In poetry these formal 
experiences come through a difficult and ‘allusive’ language which forces ‘the reader 
out of the voyeuristic mode in which we customarily appreciate scholarship’.108 In 
addition, in music the predominance of form comes through ‘the tone-rows and folk 
songs and dissonance.’109  
 
For Luban, Kandinsky’s  Improvisations (fig. 8), is the first abstract painting to 
acquire its value through a rejection of pictorial representation. It encounters the 
criticism of the tradition of pictorial painting ‘as if it were a subject matter’.110 
Modern painting utilizes the means of painting, two dimensionality, flatness and 
colours to provoke us to see the painting, not as a picture, or image, but as a 
painting.111 The continuity of traditional elements of art is or rather becomes the 
means of modernism to declare its reaction to these phenomena.112 Thus, non-
representation or abstract paintings ‘make us see that representation was merely a 
convention, a limitation’.113 Modernism, Greenberg writes, ‘embraces the 
conventional polarities of literary and art history; or rather it abandons them (and in 
doing so exposes their limited usefulness).’114 It distinguishes itself from previous 
aesthetic movements ‘by its inclusiveness’ and ‘its openness’.115  
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The lack of traditional qualities in modern art appears as a criticism of traditional art 
but on the other hand it is through this lack that modern art manages to create 
something new. What modernism rejects and criticizes is not traditional art in its 
whole. Rather, modernism is opposed to the means of realism or illusion that pre-
modernism art uses in order to present a different and idealized world. Traditional 
painting performs thus as if it was not painting.116 The viewer-beholder is turned into 
a ‘voyeur’ who is taken by a story, a narrative or a myth, can ‘forget herself, her 
predicament’.117  The task of modern painting is to exile the viewer from the beautiful 
world of illusionistic and representational traditional art and make her see the painting 
as painting, as beholder of the painting.118 But the criticism and rejection of tradition 
is not the primary aim of artistic modernism. As Luban writes, ‘the real task of 
modernist art is only in part to make us discontent with the past: it is also to make 
art’.119 
 
The rejection of the element of narrative and representation make art a thing among 
other things in everyday life. But this appears to be the same task of a great part of 
avant-garde art. Modern art appears to deny following a common approach, position, 
and task and to refute any notion or a definition.120 There are two main directions that 
modern art seems to have followed; the one is a progression within the limits of art 
and the second a cancelation of the same concept of art and aesthetics and a 
progression towards an anti-art, or non-art. In particular, De Duve argues, some 
modern artists challenged the traditional concept of art but they were still confining 
themselves ‘within the specific boundaries of painting and sculpture’. Other artists 
influenced by Duchamp challenged with their works both the notion of art. They 
‘played’, De Duve writes, ‘a game on the definition of art in general’.121   
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Duchamp’s readymades and later found art and conceptual art aimed to ‘expand’ the 
notion of art to include objects that not only do not share any aesthetic features with 
what we know as art but as such they do not have any ontological differences from 
everyday objects. In modernity ‘art’, Danto writes, ‘became an object for itself’. The 
turn from art into art-object follows historically the turn from pre-modern to modern 
art. According to Danto the historical shift into the period of modernity does not refer 
to or indicate merely another period but ‘a new kind of period’ while at the same 
time ‘it marks a kind of crisis’.122  
 
To sum up, the work of Rodin orientates a new beginning for the art of sculpture. 
Rodin turned sculpture away from mimetic representation. His subject matter is not 
enclosed in the materiality of his work but he let it happen, appear through the 
unfinished surface of his figures. With Rodin the harmonization of the unity of the 
relation between form and idea that characterises traditional sculpture is challenged. Is 
the unity between form and idea in modern sculpture broken? In Rodin’s work the 
form does not link directly to a specific idea because the idea or subject matter of his 
work is not completed. The unfinished character of the form of his figures reflects the 
unfinished character of his subject matter. The apprehension of his work is left to be 
completed by the viewer. 
 
In Rodin’s sculpture the idea is still the form. The form of his figures is coherent with 
the subject matter, but in opposition to traditional sculpture form and idea are not 
perfectly and harmoniously coherent. The unity between form and idea and hence the 
beauty of his sculptures does not derive through the perfect anatomy of the body and 
especially of the face but through the braking up of the anatomy of the whole body in 
favour of the expression. The elements of abstraction of the bodies of Rodin’s figures 
do not constitute a reduction of the expressivity of his figures. On the contrary it is 
due to abstraction that his figures express suffering, effort, pleasure, love or thinking.  
 
Early modern sculpture appears to preserve the unity between form and idea. Even if 
the turn from mimetic representation to abstraction becomes more pronounced the 
form always refers to the content. In Brancusi’s work, for example, the abstraction of 
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his figures indicates the abstraction of his subject matter in order to reach the essence 
of it.  
 
However, Duchamp’s readymades and art movements that were influenced by his 
work, especially found art and conceptual art, appear to break the unity between form 
and idea or concept. The urinal of Duchamp exhibited as art is not supposed to have 
the same content or in this case function as the actual readymade object in everyday 
life. The meaning of these works appears to lie on the breaking of the unity of form 
and content. But how could an object be seen as a work of art if the unity of form and 
content is totally broken? For Hegel all kinds of works of art represent different forms 
of the unity of form and content but this unity can never be broken.  
 
The next chapter focuses particularly on the relationship between form and content in 
found art and conceptual art. By focusing on two movements of found and conceptual 
art and on the distinction between form and content the examination aims to justify 
their meaning and understanding on the ground of phenomenology. 
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2. Modern object sculpture: content versus form 
 
 Art can be understood only by its law of movements, not according to any set of 
invariants. It is defined by its relation to what is not.123 
 
 It exists only in relation to its other; it is the process that transpires with its other.124  
 
2. 1. The Fountain 
 
The notion of freedom was central in discussions of modern art, its creation and 
meaning and as de Duve indicates it was precisely the concept of freedom in art that 
motivated the Society of Independent Artists to organise an exhibition without jury. 
The exhibition was to be held in April 1917 at the Grand Central Palace, a huge 
building in New York .125 The only rule of the Society was the motto ‘No jury, no 
prizes’.126 Thus, ‘anyone’ who paid six dollars could exhibit two paintings without 
having to be accepted by a jury. One day before the opening of the exhibition, Walter 
Arensberg and Rockwell Kent, two of the organisers of the exhibition, were arguing 
standing in front of a white object signed and dated: by R. Mutt, 1917. ‘The pristine 
oval white object on a black pedestal gleamed triumphantly. It was a man’s urinal 
upside down’.127 
 
‘Was Duchamp’s urinal a joke or a test? Or was it both?’ de Duve asks. Both jokes 
and tests are plentiful in the history of artistic modernism and they are to a great 
extent two aspects of the same work. Futurist, Dadaist, expressionist, and surrealist 
works of art had already put the history of art to a test. 128  
 
However, in the case of Duchamp’s readymades  
 
the joke was a test in more than one sense, for the testing devise was obviously 
designed to be itself submitted to a test: if the hanging committee of the show at the 
grand Central Palace consented to exhibit the gleaming object poking fun at them, 
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they would have to call it art. If they were to pass the test, so would it. They 
didn’t.129 
 
The reaction was to come the day after the opening of the exhibition with a press 
release that stated that the fountain is not by definition art but it ‘may be a very useful 
object in its place’; its place however is not in an exhibition of works of art.130 The 
fountain was not displayed at the end in the exhibition or written in the catalogue and 
was never seen by the visitors as it had been lost. What happened to the original 
object is unknown, despite of the various stories surrounding its fate that say that it 
was banned from the exhibition or it was stolen or destroyed.131  
 
The story of the readymades did not begin with the Fountain. The Fountain was not  
the first to appear on the scene; ‘on the contrary, it was one of the last ‘unassisted’ 
ones’ which start ‘their paradoxical public career’ on the 1917 in the independents 
artist  show. The previous years Duchamp had already displayed two readymades in 
the exhibition of modern art. They were called Bottle Rack, 1914 (fig. 9) and In 
Advance of the Broken Arm, 1915 (fig. 10) a snow shovel but received no attention 
either from the visitors or the public.132  In these years Duchamp produced his first 
two readymades marking his involvement with industrial objects. And this signifies 
the main period of his career - the mature one, which was driven by an obsession with 
the nature of art, with ‘what it is that ‘makes’ a work of art’.133 
 
It was due to the Fountain that Duchamp’s readymades today have gained the status 
of artwork, and this cannot be denied.134 Thus in the end the Fountain passed the test 
and as de Duve argues, ‘that’s the irony of the joke’.135 What cannot also be denied is 
that artists after Duchamp pushed the limits of art even further. Specifically, the 
artistic movements of found art and conceptual art challenged art both as an object 
and as a concept by presenting objects to be seen as works of art that not only did not 
share any aesthetic or artistic features with traditional art but often did not have any 
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ontological differences from everyday objects. Still by being presented as works of art 
they need to be ontologically different from their identical everyday object.136 
 
In order for found art and conceptual art to achieve distinction from their 
commonplace counterparts it is claimed that art is to be seen not in terms of its 
primary function or purpose but as a vehicle for a purely formal understanding of the 
object, in the case of found art, or conceptual understanding of the object, in the case 
of conceptual art. 
 
Conceptual art and found art share the aim of breaking the unity between 
form/appearance and content/idea. Both appear to maintain the superiority of the one 
in opposition to the other, that is, form in found art and content in conceptual art.137 
Found art seeks the separation from the content, or spirit to indicate the predominance 
of form. And furthermore, conceptual art aims to sustain the value of the content/spirit 
over the form.138 Can found art and conceptual art be considered ‘to be valid instances 
of art’?139 Can something that is merely sensible or merely thinkable be a work of art? 
 
2. 2. Artistic modernism  
 
Until modernity the artist usually worked on commission; he made works for 
churches, monuments for public squares that had a social significance and message. 
As Stern states,  
 
an artist however, who means his product not to become an integral part of the 
existing social world, must feel either as an outcast or as a man, who, instead of 
contributing to the world, has to create a whole world of his own; in short, as a 
God.140 
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According to Greenberg, it was their search for the absolute that led them to abstract 
or non-representational art- free from the universal and eternal values of art.141 
 
The avant-garde poet or artist tries in effect to imitate God by creating something 
valid solely on its own terms, in the way nature itself is valid in the way of 
landscape—not its picture—is aesthetically valid; something given, increase, 
independent of meanings, similar or originals.142  
 
What they reject as relative in traditional art is the representation of the world as 
beautiful and pleasant. They wanted to create an art that does not imitate and 
represent the world. Their ambition was to transcend the relativity of the 
representation and idealisation of the world by traditional art and make a new, original 
and at the same time pure and absolute kind of art. But how could a work of art be 
totally new, original and still valid as art? The modern artist reacting to his weakness 
to reach in a complete manner the absolute encounters some relative aesthetic values. 
‘The very values in the name of which he invokes the absolute are relative values, the 
values of aesthetics’. Thus, he ends up imitating not God, but the procedures and 
disciplines of art themselves. As Greenberg argues, ‘this is the genesis of the 
‘abstract’’.143 
 
The artist of modernity abstracted from his art the content and theme in order to create 
an art that could stand just for the sake of art. 
 
         [T]he avant-garde poet or artist sought to maintain the high level of this art by both 
narrowing and raising it to the expression of an absolute in which all relativities and 
contradictions would be either resolved or beside the point. ‘Art for art’s sake’ and 
‘pure poetry’ appear, and subject matter or content becomes something to be 
avoided like a plague.144  
 
The modern artist turns his attention from themes of ordinary experience to the 
medium of his own art. Abstract or non-representational art could be seen as 
aesthetically valid through their originality. The new and original could ‘only be 
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found in the very processes or disciplines’ that modern art has imitated by traditional 
art. These processes and formal properties become then the subject matter of the new 
art.145   
 
2.3. Hegel, found art and conceptual art  
 
The modern period begins by proclaiming a superiority of form and ends up declaring 
the supremacy of concept and idea in art. This development is reflected in the two 
main artistic movements or categories, found art and conceptual art. Both found art 
and conceptual art challenge the unity between form/appearance and 
content/idea/spirit. Found art seeks a separation from the content, or spirit, in order to 
indicate the predominance of form. Furthermore, conceptual art aims to sustain the 
value of the content/spirit over the form.146 
 
Found art and conceptual art placed in Hegel’s system of art could be seen as the 
‘recognition’ of the disconnection of form and content.147 They challenge Hegel’s 
notion of art ‘by falling’, Fowkes writes, ‘outside or at the very outmost fringe of the 
continuum and yet claiming to be valid instances of art, in some cases claiming to be 
the most valid contemporary instances’.148 But is it possible for art to survive merely 
as form or concept?  
 
For Hegel everything is spirit. What distinguishes everyday objects from art objects is 
that art ‘manifests itself as spirit’.149 Thus, even if other objects in the world 
constituted by spirit, only works of art can be perceived as the manifestation of 
spirit.150 ‘Its physical shell, whether this be colors, lines, tones, or mental images, is 
not to be taken at face value; it is evidence of spiritual activity’.151 Art in Hegel’s 
philosophy of history belongs to the first stage of the absolute spirit. For Hegel the 
spirit is driven towards its absolute freedom by disconnecting itself from form and 
materiality, passing through three stages, art, religion and philosophy. In art the spirit 
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progresses from the massiveness of architecture to the three dimensionality of 
sculpture to the two dimensionality of painting. It reaches a higher form as it moves to 
music and to poetry, the art of language and thought.  However, the materiality of art 
as much as it is reduced in poetry is still what holds back the spirit from reaching its 
final purpose.152  
 
For Hegel the process towards the absolute is a process towards the conceptual. Form 
and materiality are not suitable for the manifestation of the conceptual idea of the 
absolute. The sensuous is what eliminates art in relation to religious and then 
philosophy which is placed in the higher level in Hegel’s philosophy of history. Thus 
Hegel, by placing philosophy at the end of the continuum, liberates it from form. In 
philosophy there is no separation between form and content but they are considered as 
one, for both are conceptual.153 
 
Art on the other hand can not be separated from form. At the end of the continuum of 
the absolute spirit, works can no longer be considered as art. This includes works that 
‘are so bogged down in matter that they contain no trace of [the] self-conscious 
attempt by spirit to manifest itself, or those works with so little physical anchorage 
that there is no visibility or sensuous intuitedness of spirit.’154 On the other hand, 
following Hegel’s philosophy of art we could argue that there are objects that could 
be considered as works of art because though they do not break, but still they 
challenge the unity between form and content. Symbolic art constitutes the beginning 
of Hegel’s absolute spirit of art, the art that claims the superiority of form over 
concept. At the other end of the first stage of the absolute spirit Hegel places romantic 
art, the art that exist almost in terms of concept and thought proclaiming thus the 
superiority of concept over the form.  
 
Could modern art be understood either as what Hegel names symbolic or romantic 
art? Fowkes seeks to understand found art and conceptual art in terms of symbolic and 
romantic art. The problem of placing found art and conceptual art in Hegel’s 
aesthetics is that these two arts do not become works of art but mere things or objects. 
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For Hegel art has a religious function. The three stages of art, the symbolic, classical 
and romantic are representations of the spirit of God, manifestations of the divinity 
and holiness of God, as has been noted in chapter 1.  
 
To understand found art and conceptual art or generally modern art in terms of 
Hegel’s aesthetics we need to see it not as an expression of the pre-existing stages of 
the art but rather as their continuity, that is, to see what art is after Hegel’s death of 
art. In opposition to Fowkes’ Hegelian critique of modern art, placing it in Hegel’s 
progression of art, Adorno sees modern art as an internalization of Hegel’s death of 
art.  
 
For Adorno modern art is aware of its death and its failure to be the kind of art that it 
was before. ‘Art responds to the loss of its self-evidence not simply by concrete 
transformations of its procedures and comportments but by trying to pull itself free 
from its own concept as from a shackle: the fact that it is art’. 155 
 
Society once enjoyed a blessed closure when every artwork had its place, function, 
and legitimation and therefore enjoyed its own closure, whereas today everything is 
constructed in emptiness and artworks are internally condemned to failure.156 
 
New works of art are exposed to ‘the danger of complete failure’.157 But artworks 
could become genial when the possibility of failure is present.158 For Adorno it is due 
to the possibility of failure that art is preserved.159 Art in modernity for Adorno is 
aware of its inability to reach the greatness of the art of the past. This awareness 
comes forth through the breaking of the unity of form and concept.  
 
Yet, there are objects, Fowkes argues, that could be considered to be works of art 
even if they either ‘seek but fall short of the perfect unity of inner meaning and 
external shape…or because they transcend this unity by entering more fully into the 
realm of spirit.’160 Could, as found art claims, ‘everything sensible’ be considered as a 
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work of art as long as it is placed by an artist in a collection place?161 Or could, as 
conceptual art claims, ‘everything thinkable’ be considered as a work of art and be 
detached from any external relations with things in the world?162Is conceptual art to 
be understood only conceptually, ‘as a way of doing philosophy by other means’?163 
 
2. 3. 1. Found art 
 
For Fowkes the term ‘found art’ does not refer to a specific artistic phenomenon or 
movement but to ‘instances’ or artistic phenomena of the 20th century. What these 
works share is that they minimize the role of the ‘technical skill of the artist’.164 The 
aim of the artist of found art is ‘to find rather than create works of art’.165 The artist of 
found art aims to expand the realm of art such that it includes objects that were not 
previously thought of as art: found objects such as machine made objects (fig. 11 and 
12) and natural objects.166 The notion of found, Fowkes suggests, allows us to 
encounter abstract and surrealist work of arts, works such as Duchamp’s readymades, 
the use of found objects into other works such as paintings, assemblance or collage, 
and some musical compositions. In addition, as Fowkes claims, if we are not 
confining ourselves in the 20th century, it allows us to include also archaeological 
objects such as fragments and ruins.167 
 
Fowkes claims that found art as well as relics from traditional art could have an 
aesthetic appeal. He seems to follow the Romantic aesthetics in which the 
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appreciation of the beautiful considered not only art but nature, and human 
constructions which have lost their original form such as architectural fragments and 
ruins. On the contrary, Duchamp does not ask us to see his readymades as beautiful 
objects or works of an aesthetic interest. With Duchamp and furthermore with found 
art the distinction between aesthetics and philosophy of art becomes wider.  
 
By expanding the notion of art, the artist expands the notion of creation as well.168 
Creation no longer signifies a mere process of production but an action or gesture of 
taking out objects from our everyday world.169 By placing everyday objects  in an art 
world, the artist of found art presents them in a new light as objects of aesthetic 
interest170 and contemplation without any concern for their origin and for the reasons 
they appear in the aesthetic place.171 ‘By singling out objects in the world, even those 
objects caught up in their own non-aesthetic context, the artist can transform these 
objects into works of art. This is the claim of the found artist’.172 
 
The expansion of the notion of creation and the concern with technique is what 
grounded or undermined modernism. The artist of found art provokes us to see the 
works as mere appearance, form, and shape, to attend to their external properties 
disregarding their meaning or interpretation.173  
 
In Hegel’s terms the artist of found art seeks to ‘minimize the manipulative 
contribution of spirit’ and to present works the inner meaning of which cannot be 
descried.174  Now the realm of art does not depend on the way the artist apprehends 
and represents the world but rather, according to Fowkes, merely on ‘the mode of 
apprehension’.175 But any form which does not carry a spiritual idea is not an 
aesthetic form and could not be considered a work of art. Thus, an everyday object or 
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artefact could not be seen as an aesthetical object or form. The aesthetic form is the 
one that has the spirit of art, which then becomes its content.176  
 
But the concept or in Hegel’s terms the spirit of art cannot be perceived merely as 
appearance like other objects in the world. Natural and everyday objects often appear 
to sustain an artistic unity of a meaning and form. This unity however has either 
arisen independently or exists to fulfil a specific utilitarian purpose. That is, in nature 
the appearance ‘is never fully overcome, as appearance’ is ‘indeterminate and 
abstract’ and cannot be manifested. Moreover, the unity of meaning and form of 
everyday artefacts is so specific and disclosed that it does not allow the spirit to be 
presented as such.177 Thus, in found art the spirit is not manifested as the spirit of art, 
the ‘spirit has not moulded and thus is not self-consciously manifest’.178 The viewer 
can only gaze at the work as mere presence and appearance as if the spirit has left the 
object ‘because spirit doesn’t recognize itself behind the object’s presence’.179 
 
Nevertheless the object’s presence is what becomes in found art its content. The 
content is the form, ‘is to be dissolved so completely into the form’ reducing the 
work of art to itself.180 The absolute in Hegel’s aesthetics ‘cherishes’ some values 
more than others: ‘the very values in the name of which he invokes the absolute are 
relative values, the values of aesthetics’.181 The artist of modernity does not work in 
terms of theme, content or subject matter but in terms of form to present the same 
principles and process of art themselves. For Greenberg, this leads to the turn from 
representative to non-representative art or as he calls it to ‘the genesis of the 
‘abstract’’. The artist by turning his interest away from the subject matter of ordinary 
experience, focuses on the subject matter of his own art.182 The aesthetic value of 
abstract, non-representational art cannot concern the accidental or ‘arbitrary’ ‘but 
must stem from obedience to some worthy constraint or original’.183 The restriction 
of representation of everyday experience according to Greenberg could only take 
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place in the processes and conditions of the art of the past, the art that has already 
imitated the ‘common’ and ‘extroverted experience’.184 
 
2. 3. 2. Conceptual art 
 
Conceptual art, like found art, questions, if not rejects, our basic beliefs of what it 
means to produce a ‘work’ of art’. It negates the act of artistic creation and replaces it 
with an idea and specifically ‘with having an idea’.185 What is in question is not form 
but ‘artideas’, which are for the conceptual artist ‘the true works of art’.186 The term 
conceptual art, also referred to as concept art, idea art or information art, refers to 
works that were produced since the mid ‘60s.187  Even if conceptual art is not strictly 
defined as a movement it emerges almost at the same chronological period in North 
America, Europe and Latin America. It is often seen as a different category of art and 
played an important role in the acceptance or recognition of photographs, musical 
scores, architectural drawings and performance art as forms of art of equal standing to 
painting and sculpture.  
 
The ‘change’ that conceptual art brought is that it moved the interest in art from 
creation, artistic skills and talent to its meaning, a shift from ‘making’ artifacts to 
making meanings.188 The task of conceptual art seems to be the creation of the idea 
rather than the work of art. Art, aesthetic pleasure and interest are placed in a more 
radical area and are considering being merely the idea.189 The conceptual artists seem 
to accept Fawkes’ statement that art is and has always been conceptual. Its truth or 
essence is or comes through its concept. From this point of view conceptual art could 
be seen as superior to other artistic phenomena, because it emphasises the conceptual, 
it starts and ends with the conceptual.190 This term ‘conceptual’ refers not merely to 
an idea or a concept but to thinking or, according to conceptual artists, to philosophy 
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itself. Art, Joseph Kosuth writes, becomes almost equal with philosophy. ‘Art’s only 
claim is for art. Art is the definition of art’.191  
 
Kosuth, one of the first and most important conceptual artists, marks with his first 
exhibition the emergence of conceptual art. In this exhibition that took place in 1966-
1967 and was titled ‘Art as Idea as Idea’, Kosuth presented a series of objects such as 
a chair and a clock together with enlarged photographs of these objects and their 
dictionary definitions (fig. 13).192  His art was not the found object, the depiction of 
the object or its definition but the concept or idea of their synthesis. What he presents 
is not the absolute definition or idea of the object but analogies among the three 
variations of the work. Each part of the work refers to the work as a whole which for 
Kosuth refers back to art itself. For Kosuth not only conceptual art but art in general 
and the essence of art is its ‘self-referentiality’. Art is not for the world, it does not 
exist to decorate the world or to become an object of use in the world. ‘Art is a self-
enclosed system of ‘statements’. Any external reference or use is beside the point’.193  
 
But can art stand merely as idea, or as philosophy, as Kosuth suggest? How the 
Hegelian approach that Fowkes proposes could provide the art identity of conceptual 
art?  
 
A concept or, using Hegel’s terminology, a spiritual idea is not an aesthetic or artistic 
content if it does not come forth through form. The spirit is the content only when it 
takes form. 194Art needs its external form to be understood as a work of art. Works of 
art do not ‘state’ or ‘point to’ a meaning, but rather ‘manifest’ a meaning through 
materiality and form; form and content in works of art, as Hegel has shown, may be 
linked in many levels but they must never entirely disappear.195  
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According to Greenberg’s formalist position quality and aesthetic value begin with 
‘content and inspiration’ and not form. 196 But it is form that allows inspiration and 
becomes the means to it. It is through form that the viewer generates or discovers 
‘content.’  
 
When a work of art or literature succeeds, when it moves us enough, it does so ipso 
facto by the ‘content’ … no more in Goya’s than in Mallarme’s, no more in Verdi’s 
than in Schoenberg’s’ this is ‘what can and what can’t be legitimately put in words 
about works of art.197  
 
The understanding of art or aesthetic satisfaction, Greenberg argues, derives from the 
content but content can never be separated from form.198 For Greenberg the form is 
not taken as in Hegel the matter, the physical embodiment of the idea but as the shelf, 
the structure of the work. His conception of the notion of form is closer to Kant’s 
designation of form as structure. Furthermore, for Greenberg the relation between 
form and content is taken in a more literal sense. Form is always going to be the 
reference point of art. The separation of form and content is not possible because form 
is always going to be the vehicle, the structure of the content. But in Hegel’s 
aesthetics art is developed in favour of this separation. For Hegel even this disjunction 
is not possible at all because art’s progression lies to its need to be liberated from 
matter.   
 
Kosuth’s exposition of conceptual art reflects the need of art to eliminate matter and 
thus enhance its conceptual status. From a Hegelian point of view Kosuth places art in 
the sphere of philosophy. He accepts the death of art and recognizes it as a positive 
event for art. For Kosuth conceptual art and modern art are liberated from traditional 
conventions concerning form and matter as well as from aesthetic principles and aim 
to bring forth the concept, an idea.  
 
For Fowkes art cannot stand merely as an idea. The idea comes forth through form. In 
conceptual art this relation is still important in order for it to be art. Kosuth considers 
as a work of art statements about art and the nature of art (fig. 14). But not every 
statement about art is art. ‘Physical embodiments of the self-referentiality’ of art 
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differ from ‘statements about self-referentiality’199  Conceptual art taken as idea does 
not mean that this idea becomes equivalent to philosophy, as Seamon writes, ‘the idea 
itself, is not a philosophy or as a way of doing philosophy by other means’.200  
If merely the idea is what is considered to be art and aesthetically interesting and 
valued then it does not need to be presented through form, or as he states, it ‘should 
not, be actualized in the world’. Kosuth’s argument about the validity of conceptual 
art in terms of its self referentiality fails to distinguish art as a unique activity.201 
 
Even if art progresses towards the absolute spirit it can never be separated from 
matter. For if it did, it could not be considered as a work of art. In Hegel what is 
unique in and about art is its special relation between external and internal properties, 
between form and idea.202  
 
2. 3. 3. Concept versus form 
 
Found and conceptual art aim to expand the notion of art but by breaking the unity 
between form and content they fail to ‘manifest’, Fowkes suggests, ‘a clear sense of 
what is special about art’203 and what makes their works objects of art. As Fowkes 
indicates, the expansion of the notion of art in a way that will include objects of art 
that before would not be considered as art results ‘in a narrowing of the domain of 
art’.204  
 
The narrowness of each of the conceptions of art implicit in found art and 
conceptual art actually gives way to a widening of the realm of art to the point 
where the floodgates are opened to practically anything, for what is allowed to pass 
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by is, in effect, anything that resembles traditional works of art-physically, in one 
case, ideationally, in the other.205  
 
If everything could be considered as a work of art then nothing is.206 According to 
Hegel a category that could be applied to everything is ‘the same as Nothing’. Hence, 
the task of separating form and content in art, of taking either form or meaning as the 
basic feature of art, makes the category of art to collapse.207 
 
However, Adorno does not see the expansion of limits of art and the separation of 
form and content of art as art’s failure or a threat to the concept or category of art. 
New works of art, Adorno argues, are exposed to the risk of ‘complete failure’.208 For 
Adorno, it is because of the awareness of art’s failure to clarify what is special about 
it and its failure to be the kind of art that it once was, that art manages to expose the 
tension between form and content. Found art and conceptual art do not aim to surpass 
the limits of art and hence art itself but to reveal the strain of the relationship between 
form and content.  
 
2. 4. The institutional theories of art 
 
Danto in his account ‘Beyond the Brillo Box’ argues that ‘the population of artworks 
is a mutually self-enriching system of objects, any given member of which is 
considerably richer because of the existence of other artworks than it would have been 
if it alone existed’.209 But as he argues, an object has to be an art object in order to be 
advantaged from the enrichment of art.210 
 
Does the entry of everyday objects into the system of art signify the end of art and 
thus presuppose a different approach to the meaning of art?   
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In modernity it became apparent that art could be made or consist of pretty much 
anything. Because of that there is not a sign or feature left to distinguish art from 
common, everyday objects. Specifically, as he declares, there does not exist a 
perceptually feature capable of differentiating art from non-art.211  For Danto, the 
entrance of ordinary objects into the art world constitutes an ending. Danto, following 
Hegel’s notion of the death of art, denominates a new era and a new conception for 
art, the modern era. The end of art refers to the historicity of art and indicates that its 
development has stopped. The end of art is, as Danto states, ‘the end of the possibility 
of progressive development’.212 Pre-modern art represents the world within the limits 
of their own art; pre-modern painting, Danto states, makes us see and understand the 
objects of the world within the limits of the surface of the painting.213 What has 
changed with modern art is that the limits of art were themselves perceived. ‘Art 
became its own object in a philosophical move that almost exactly recapitulates what 
Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge, where the gap between subject and object is 
overcome’.214  
 
Why is one readymade object art while another (its commonplace counterpart) is not? 
Does the meaning of the object status of modern art take place as Danto argues ‘only 
on the level of philosophy’?215 
 
According to Danto, there are two possible ontological mistakes one could commit in 
understanding something as a work of art. The first mistake is when we take an object 
to be a work of art when in fact it is not. When we walk into a gallery or museum 
room of modern art we might take an object, such as a chair, to be the work whereas it 
is there as an actual chair for people to sit and not as a conceptual work of art of 
Kosuth for instance. The second mistake is when we take something as an everyday 
object when instead it is a work of art.216 For example, we sit on Kosuth’s chair 
because we did not realise that it was a work of art. If we claim that these works 
appear as unique objects or forms in the field of art, they are not unique as everyday 
objects. They do not appear as aesthetically interesting; on the contrary, their aim is to 
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exclude aesthetics from their understanding. This is what Duchamp and the 
movements of found art and conceptual art succeeded in doing, to exclude aesthetics 
from art as a concept and as an object.217 This indicates the shift from aesthetics to 
philosophy of art. Art is no longer to be evaluated and perceived in terms of aesthetic 
principles but the ground of philosophy. This shift of art towards philosophy reflects 
the emergence of the institutional theories of art.  
 
These works of art which are perceptually identical to ordinary objects call for a non 
aesthetic for their meaning, understanding and art identity. For Danto, this approach 
could only be a philosophical one. According to Danto’s institutional theory of art, the 
meaning of these works does not depend on their formal properties but comes through 
theory itself. The interpretation of these works is what gives them their value and 
status as art works. Kosuth’s chair in the gallery place becomes a work of art because 
and if a theory of art claims it to be as such.  
 
Danto’s argument on the institutional theory of art is based upon the turn from 
aesthetics to philosophy of art, the turn from experience and perception to conceptual 
interpretation of art. However, he pushes this turn even further to argue that the 
philosophy of art and interpretation is all that is needed for the understanding of these 
works of art. As their formal properties are identical with everyday objects they can 
become art through a theory of art. What distinguishes a chair and a work of art which 
is comprised by an actual chair is a theory of art.  
         
          It is the theory that takes it up into the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing 
into the real object which it is (in a sense of is other than that of artistic 
identification). Of course, without the theory, one is unlikely to see it as art, and in 
order to see it as part of the artworld, one must have mastered a good ideal of 
artistic theory as well as a considerable amount of the history of recent New York 
painting….  It is the role of artistic theories, these days as always, to make the 
artworld, and art, possible.218 
 
Art became, Danto writes, ‘its own object in a philosophical move’.219 Art for Danto 
is to be understood in a Hegelian sense, that is, as the beginning of the spirit of 
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absolute knowledge passed with modernity to the stage of philosophy.220  For Danto 
modern art is equivalent to philosophy.221 This equality is not to be taken as an 
absolute one. But even if they utilise different means, art became a way of doing 
philosophy.222  
 
An object exhibited as art is to be identified and evaluated as art through an 
interpretation although it might not have any ontological differences with everyday 
object. For Danto the differences between works of art, such as the readymades and 
their commonplace counterparts cannot be sustained by perception and experience, 
they are ‘indiscernible counterparts’.223 
 
Fowkes on the other side argues that the difference between readymade works of art 
and their everyday counterparts derives from the resemblance of the readymade that 
are presented as works of art with traditional art. But their resemblance is a 
metaphorical one. The shiny surface of the urinal could be seen in terms of preceding 
sculptures but still this does not make it art. The affinities that Fowkes draws between 
readymade works of art and the art of the past cannot distinguish these works from 
everyday objects. Any everyday object could be seen to share aesthetic and artistic 
elements with artworks but this does not make it art. Advertisement has always had an 
aesthetic appeal and on the other hand the design of everyday object is based on 
artistic skills and techniques. For Danto the resemblance that these works of art share 
with traditional art could not sustain their art identity. 
 
Perception and experience can no longer sustain the art status of these works; thus for 
Danto we need an art theory to prove that these objects are art and their identical 
counterparts are not. A theory that will not refer to art as it appears but to the reasons 
it stands as art. Thus, the theory needs to consider the external properties of the object, 
that is, its institution, what Danto calls the ‘artworld’. Danto argues that is the 
‘artworld’ that transforms readymade objects into works of art. For Danto, the 
‘artworld’ is that which makes possible a theory of art and knowledge of history of 
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art.224 As Danto remarks, ‘it is but a matter of choice: and the Brillo box of the 
artworld may be just the Brillo box of the real one, separated and united by the is of 
artistic identification’.225 
 
Two further institutional theories are created for these works to be identified or 
understood as works of art. The first theory focuses on the artist and the second on the 
collection place. As De Duve writes ‘something is art because an artist so decided; 
something is art because the context so determined it’.226        
 
The first theory which De Duve calls ‘the appropriative theory of art’ 227 is grounded 
on the approach of André Breton who designates art in relation to the artist, the 
appropriator. Breton argues, considering particularly the status of the readymades, 
that they are works of art as far as the artist chose them to be. The main problem with 
this theory is not the right of the artist to choose what is or could be art, but rather the 
artist’s own identity, that is, whom is to determine whether someone is an artist. Thus 
if we accept that an artist has the right to appreciate a readymade as an art object, we 
leave the possibility open for anybody to become an artist as far as he appreciates an 
object as art.228  
 
The second theory which de Duve calls ‘the contextual theory’ is the theory of Daniel 
Buren who designates art in terms of its place, the art context. According to the 
contextual theory an object becomes a work of art because it is placed in the art place 
of an exhibition or collection. But not all objects in an art place are art objects. To 
accept that a place is artistic because it contains works of art still presupposes a 
different concept of art. 229 
 
But art either as a choice of an artist or as part of an art place are one and the same. 
De Duve writes, ‘the joke is that both theories are true’.230 The readymades of 
Duchamp could be seen as works of art in the first place because an artist has chosen 
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it to be so and in the second place because they were placed in an art space. Although 
both theories have gained support, as Duchamp’s readymades are considered to be 
works of art, at the same time they are incomplete. Neither theory manages to 
distinguish art and artefact and find a distinctive art quality or condition in 
Duchamp’s readymades which will transform them into works of art. 
 
Nevertheless, the validity of both theories is based upon a circular argument, it 
depends on the institutions but the validity of the main principles of the institutions 
depends in turn on theories and definitions. Both theories are formed into an 
institutional theory of art: the artist is somebody whose identity depends on an 
institution of art and an institution of art is the one that will show and promote the 
artist and his creations.231 Both are institutional theories of art and both can maintain 
that Duchamp’s fountain is art, ‘and so did it happen that the joke pasted the test’.232 
 
Institutional theories of art do not give an answer to the question of what makes an 
object a work of art. Otherwise stated, they do not explain what we mean by calling 
an object a work of art.233 Even if we accept that the existence of some objects 
depends not on how they are to be perceived but on how they are to be interpreted, the 
paradox is that it is precisely the existence of works of art as ‘unperceived aesthetic 
objects’ that calls for something more than an interpretation but, according to 
Seamon, ‘not a theoretical revolution’.234 Danto’s theory on the artworld succeeded in 
giving to the readymades their artistic identity and value but Danto achieved this by 
minimizing the role of the aesthetic as perceptual experience in art. ‘Aesthetics’, 
Seamon denotes, ‘is now a misleading world for the theory of art’.235   
 
To argue that a thing becomes art through its interpretation presupposes that any thing 
could become art through an interpretation. For Danto although any object could 
through theory be a work of art, this does not mean that every object is a work of art. 
In opposition to the two institutional theories of art that argue that a work becomes art 
either by the artist or the art space, Danto claims that this is not enough. For Danto it 
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is a theory, an argument on the validity of these works that give them their art status 
and identity. If so these objects are art objects despite the fact that we cannot 
experience them aesthetically as traditional works of art. They are transformed into 
works of art only in reference to the theory or argument that sustains their art status.  
 
Not every object could be a work of art through an interpretation. Religious artefacts 
stand as such in terms of their interpretation but this does not mean that this 
transformation makes them into works of art. The interpretation of the cross, for 
example, does not transform it into art but, on the other hand, Duchamp’s works are 
transformed.236 The problem with the art identity of conceptual art lies in the 
distinction between conceptual works of art and manmade objects, such as cultural or 
religious artefacts, which exist in favour of their concepts. Why then, Seamon asks, is 
an object in some cases art and in others is not?237 The form of these artefacts might 
have nothing to do with their concept but still they manage to manifest it. We still 
need an element to distinguish art from artefacts and, specifically in the case of 
conceptual art, an element which will distinguish it from other forms of symbolism 
and self-referentiality.238   
 
According to Seamon, we need a criterion that distinguishes some forms of 
symbolism and object-art that makes them into art from other forms of symbolism and 
objects-artefacts that signify something else. ‘The arbitrariness of the relationship 
between image and concept is, therefore, not what defines conceptual art; that may be 
necessary but it is not sufficient.’239 
 
The question of what is a work of art presupposes a condition, or, according to 
Seamon, a dimension that will transform the work into art – whereas the everyday 
object as similar as it might be to the art object has to remain as such, a mere object, 
or an object of use. This dimension is different from Danto’s institutional theory of art 
and his designation of the artworld as it aims to bring back the role of experience in 
art. Seamon’s starting point for his designation of the conceptual dimension of 
modern art is the shifts of art values and art theories in the history of art.  
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The notions of the value and theory of art are historically defined. The emergence of 
modern art and the need of its aesthetic appreciation and valuation drove aesthetics 
and art criticism into the so called ‘modern theory of artistic value’.  According to 
Weitz examination on the role of theory in aesthetics within the framework of history 
of art and aesthetics this new form of value becomes part of the same process and 
notion of art. A process which, according to Seamon, is driven towards ‘a 
consensus’.240It is a ‘process’, Seamon writes, ‘of overreaction and subsequent 
normalization’ that through the history of art appears to be ‘its ‘logic’.241  
 
Art as a movement or style has its own limits. As Danto argues in his account of 
‘Narrative and Style’, there is a ‘natural limit to a style…a limit which cannot be gone 
beyond’. Artists often push the limits of art whilst remaining within a style of art or, 
as sometimes happens, by creating a new style. Thus, as Danto puts it, in art history 
we have artistic movements ‘stopping but not ending, ending but not stopping, ending 
and stopping’. 242 But there is not an art movement that seems to be in a permanent 
stasis, ‘neither ending nor stopping’.243 We are inclined to see history of art as the 
progression of one style towards ‘its logical limits’. The ‘logical limits’ of history and 
art become now visible. But this does not mean that art has ended, art Danto writes, 
‘has not stopped in the West’. 244  
 
2. 5. ‘The conceptual dimension of art’ 
 
The history of the development of art is a history of changes in art genres, art forms, 
concepts, and of the aesthetic appreciation of art. These changes do not come to 
replace past concepts and values. 245 We can still find, Osborne remarks, concepts of 
art that survive though the course of history, ‘consistent and compatible conceptions 
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of art’ which ‘we have inherited but not fully clarified’.246 In order to comprehend and 
appreciate the special structure of art, we need a historical account of art as an object 
of aesthetics. According to Gallie, the appreciation of art presupposes an examination 
which will indicate the way the concept of art emerged and the relationships among 
aesthetic theories, that is, the reasons why they chose each time different standpoints 
for their examination of art. 247 If the outcome of this examination gives us a ‘proper 
grasp of the structure of the concept of art — if we see the grounds of its essential 
complexity and contestedness’ we are going to be able to comprehend also the ‘futile 
history of conflicting aesthetic schools’’.248 ‘The arts being the kinds of activity that 
they are — ever expanding, ever reviving and advancing values inherited from a long 
and complex tradition — the character…of art…is exactly what we should expect’. 249  
 
One of the concepts of art that has survived through history is the concept of aesthetic 
value. As Greenberg writes, the ‘ultimate’ concern with aesthetic value ‘is not new in 
itself’. What differs in modernism is its ‘exactness’, its ‘self-consciousness, and its 
intensity’- in other words, what is new is the way that modernism represents aesthetic 
value, that is its autonomy, and precision.250 
 
Each artistic period characterizes aesthetic value in a different manner. There are 
three main shifts from Renaissance art to Romantic art and then to modern art and 
specifically to found and conceptual art. According to Seamon, even if each period of 
art, Renaissance, Romanticism, and modernism, designates a different dimension and 
value of art, taken as a whole they proceed towards the ‘consensus’.251  
 
The process towards the conceptual, according to Seamon, has its origin in the period 
of Renaissance and the mimetic designation of art. Art was a representation of the 
external world and was valued in accordance to its ability to capture the world and its 
objects. Specifically, Renaissance art and sculpture influenced by the classical art of 
antiquity, was understood as a mimesis of the world and in sculpture of the human 
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body and was valued in terms of the mimetic theory of art. According to Seamon, in 
Renaissance theory the notion of mimesis prevailed because ‘the artist pursued what 
A. E. H. Gombrich calls the ‘discovery of appearances’’.252 In Renaissance art the 
artist transfers the world in his work, light and space, not so much through an accurate 
mimesis of the world but rather through a number of techniques that allow him to 
enclose to his art the way reality appears. Often their themes were influenced by 
classical tendencies of art and ideals about nature and reality. Thus, the viewer of 
Renaissance art is the cultivated viewer, the one who has knowledge of these 
tendencies and ideas. 
 
Hegel from the beginning of his investigation of art rejects the mimetic theories that 
developed during the Renaissance time and were also continued by German 
romanticism. For Hegel mimesis is not the aim of art.253 The pleasure and admiration 
of art does not derive form their ‘naturalness’ and their imitation of the world.254 
Imitation is deceptive, Hegel remarks. The admiration of art does not depend on a 
comparison between what we see in a work of art and reality.255 Even if the artist 
studies nature and uses it as a source of inspiration his aim is not to imitate it. Art’s 
aim cannot lie on ‘purely mechanical imitation of what is there’.256 The purpose of art 
is to manifest the spiritual through form.  
 
For Hegel art is superior to reality, nature. A work of art Hegel states, originates from 
the spirit. The natural products cannot present the divine.257 The natural sensuous 
phenomena, ‘the sun, the sky, stars, plants, animals, stones, streams, the sea’ can 
merely have ‘an abstract relation to themselves’.258  Furthermore, through the natural 
process they ‘are drawn into connection with other existents’ and they lose their 
independence. In these natural phenomena the true meaning of the absolute spirit has 
not yet emerged. ‘Nature, it is true, emerges, but only in its self-externality; its inner 
being is not apprehended by itself as inner, but is poured out into the diverse 
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multiplicity of appearance and therefore is not independent’.259 Art however as an 
independent external existence could manifest the true meaning of the absolute spirit, 
bring forth the divine and holiness of Gods.  
 
The second shift was to come with Romantic art, a movement in which art was no 
longer understood as appearance but as feeling and emotion. This shift motivated the 
emergence of the emotivist and the expressive theories in aesthetics.260 The claim of 
the expressive theory, which stands in opposition to the mimetic theory of art, is that 
by creating an art that represents mere appearances of things the artists ignored the 
expression and emotion that a work of art projects, which is the defining property of 
art. Weitz remarks in his account ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, ‘without 
projection of emotion into some piece of stone or words or sounds, etc., there can be 
no art, and any true, real definition of it, contained in some adequate theory of art, 
must so state it’.261 
 
The shift from mimetic to the expressive form of art indicates a shift of the 
relationship between art and viewer. As Gallie remarks, the attention now in the 
Romantic arts is no longer the ‘cultivated’ viewer but the public and the emotions the 
artist communicates to the public.262 This change in the history of aesthetics was to 
come, Gallie suggests, with the work of Tolstoy. Tolstoy alters the role and the 
function of the object of art, the relationship among the individual artist, his tradition 
and the viewer.  
 
Art is an achieved communication; and its peculiar value is simply that a certain 
elementary kind of communication takes place. Art is no longer to be valued as a 
commodity, as an object of cupboard love, as a display of original virtuosity or 
traditional discipline. It is proclaimed as an essential bond of union between man 
and man, as a necessity of human life.263 
 
But is the aesthetic equivalent to emotions? Is the emotive element in art sufficient for 
something to be considered as art? Weitz argues ‘that in some sense the aesthetic 
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experience is emotive is true, but it is not emotive in the sense of evoking emotions in 
us. It is not art’s function to give us an ‘emotional bath’: life does that pretty well’.264 
Weitz adds that art is different from everyday life in the sense that contemplation and 
aesthetics is different from everyday activity. Art ‘assimilates the emotive values of 
life and presents them in sensuous media for our contemplation, not for our 
indulgence’.265 
 
Racy in his work entitled ‘Aesthetic Experience’ argues that most aesthetic theories 
start from the position of either the work of art or the artist rather than from the 
position of the viewer. Racy suggests that we need to start our inspection of art by 
looking critically at the aesthetic experience and by re-examining the role of the 
audience.266 The process of appreciating art in terms of aesthetic experience emerges 
as part of an empirical aesthetic and specifically, according to Racy, from the latter 
part of 18th century and the expressivist theory of art. The claim of expression theory 
is that human creations are art only when they sustain aesthetic experience. Thus, a 
human creation cannot be considered as art if it does not maintain an aesthetic 
experience. ‘A work of art would be an artefact expressing experience and capable of 
arousing and sustaining aesthetic experience’. This criterion became the main 
rationale in the construction of the art world. 267 But aesthetic experience does not 
define art and what constitutes a work of art. It concerns the descriptive properties of 
art and can be applied to anything that is created for appreciation and not for use. The 
question is not if a work is good or bad, but how it is and therefore why is art.268  
 
Even if art in Romanticism remains a means of communication rather than an 
autonomous object it prepares the ground for the artistic freedom which was to come 
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with modernism. Specifically, it brought the changes that drove the history of art and 
aesthetics to the formalist approach and theories of art. The third shift emerges with 
non-representational and abstract painting and sculpture and the designation of art in 
terms of form and external appearance.269 
 
The exponents of formalist theory contend that the essence of painting and therefore 
of art is its physical appearance, its ‘significant form’.270 The essence of art emerges 
or is constructed through its formal properties, through the arrangements of the lines 
and colors, the shape and volume of painting. These arrangements define painting and 
other kinds of art in terms of the organization of their plastic and formal elements. 
Therefore, a creation will not be considered as being a work of art if it does not have 
these formal analogies and if it cannot be seen as a significant form. A painting is, 
according to the formalist theory, ‘everything on the canvas except its representational 
elements’.271 
 
For Greenberg, the value of art lies in the formal properties of the work or, as he 
argues, on the technique of the work. The ‘technique’, which is for Greenberg the 
concern with the ‘medium’ of arts, became an ‘artisanal’ concern’ as he calls it, a 
‘formalist’ emphasis’ on the work and its value.  This ‘‘artisanal’ emphasis is what is 
responsible for the hard-headed, sober, ‘cold’ side of Modernism. It is also part of 
what makes modernism react against Romanticism’.272  Modernism in contrast to 
romanticism does not take the medium for granted, as ‘transparent or routine’, but the 
medium becomes the main consideration of modernism.273  
 
Seamon’s thesis on the conceptual dimension of art appears to stand in opposition to 
previous formalist approaches to art. The formalist approach of art could be applied to 
a great extent to the work of Modernism and specifically the experimentation with 
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new materials, methods, forms, and technique that challenge previous movements of 
art. Nevertheless, formalism does not characterize modern art in its whole. As a reply 
to formalism, artists especially in late modernity came to question and abandon the 
concern with the technique and form and to focus on pure meaning and concept. 
 
But could art stand in terms of its concept? What is the conceptual dimension of 
modern art?  
 
As Adorno remarks, the definition of art even if it includes the art of the past always 
reflects present art, its ambitions as well as restrictions, it is ‘at every point indicated 
by what art once was, but it is legitimated only by what art became with regard to 
what it wants to, and perhaps can, become’.274 The four shifts in the history of art 
formed, according to Seamon, three ‘different kinds of aesthetic value’.275 The 
leadership of mimesis as the essential aim of art ‘has been challenged by expressive, 
formalist, and now conceptual theories’.276 Each theory emerged to contest the ‘title 
of the true’, and prove that is the only important and possible theory of art.  Each 
theory as plausible as it might appear ultimately fails to define the concept of art.277 
Each time ‘the challenger’ seeks to dominate the realm of art but ends up adding to 
the art that it has proceeded.278 As Seamon remarks, these theories of art have been 
‘transformed’ in or by the history of art not into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of art, but into the same aesthetic ‘dimensions’ or values of art.279 
  
Seamon sees the conceptual dimension of art as the key element which places modern 
art at the limits of art. In particular, for Seamon, the prime mover of the development 
of art is the conceptual. This is because, as he states, the conceptual element in art is 
not new. 280 As Seamon indicates, modern art and specifically conceptual art 
‘cultivates a dimension’ that was already present in traditional art and especially in 
poetry and literature, through the form of allegory, metaphor and symbolism.281 Thus, 
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the conceptual dimension should not be understood as a challenge to the meaning and 
value of art but ‘as a permanent possibility and an addition’ for our considerations of 
the artistic value that has emerged on the last two hundred and fifty years.282 Seamon 
proposes regarding conceptual art and the conceptual dimension of art ‘that the 
addition of expressive and formal dimensions to the mimetic moved us towards a 
plausible theory of value in art. Adding the conceptual broadens and strengthens what 
I shall call, adapting the well-known phrase of Paul O. Kristeller, the modern theory 
of artistic value’.283 
 
The notion of dimension and value of art appears in Seamon’s thesis as a reply to the 
problem of the concept of art theory in the history of aesthetics. His aim is to find the 
value that formed and characterised art in each period and movement. This value does 
not define art but rather reflects partly the notion of art in a specific period. For 
Seamon, the continuous re-designation of art which characterizes the history of 
aesthetics reflects the development of art as an object but not completely the nature 
and definition of art. But does this mean the impossibility of defining art? 
 
For Weitz, aesthetics cannot define art and this is because it is impossible to gather 
the necessary and sufficient elements that constitute all kinds of art and at the same 
time distinguish art from other objects and activities. This is because art is not a 
closed concept that can actually be defined completely but an open concept which 
over time will accept new elements. As Weitz states, ‘aesthetic theory is a logically 
vain attempt to define what cannot be defined, to state the necessary and sufficient 
properties of that which has no necessary and sufficient properties, to conceive the 
concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and demands its openness’.284  
 
However, even if we consider the concept of art as an open concept, as Weitz argues, 
this does not stop the designation of art’s value and properties. Osborne moves a step 
further from Weitz to argue that despite the fact that the concept of art is an open 
concept we still need to define and designate art. Through a genre or a kind of art we 
cannot generalize and answer what a work of art is. There are no aesthetic or artistic 
                                                
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 For Weitz the problem is that true definitions of art cannot be proved empirically. Weitz, ‘The Role 
of Theory in Aesthetics’, p. 30. 
  
65 
rules or laws for the evaluation of art or its properties. ‘The assertion itself might be 
held to constitute one defining characteristic inherent to all works of art’.285 But this 
does not mean that there is no concept of art, that art is indefinable. Thus, the concept 
of art should be ‘open’ in order to allow alteration and development in art. However, 
Osborne remarks, an open concept of art does not necessarily mean that it is 
indefinable.286 
 
A successful work of art is creative and something through which something new 
emerges. The new in a work of art can be a problem for defining it – but it can be part 
of a new notion of art. Fine art has been changed and developed, introducing to us a 
number of new materials and techniques and allowing  new forms of art to emerge, 
such as photography and cinema.287  The matter of change or development from pre-
modernism to modernism is not to be understood, according to Osborne, as an 
absolute transition from the traditional concept of art to a new concept of art. ‘The 
notion of change involves the existence of something which continues through 
change’. 288 But to predicate the change in art, and what is new in these works, 
presupposes that we already know what art is. But what is art or otherwise stated what 
kind of concept art is?  
 
The definition of an open concept that ‘is susceptible of change and development’ 
should be possible. 289 Art as well as other social disciplines which have their origins 
in the ancient past have been developed through history to such a great extent that the 
new often challenges the same notion of its provenance. For example, Osborne 
claims, the notion of modern science, even if it is different from ancient or traditional 
science, and even if we assert that as a concept it will be developed further in the 
future, yet we cannot claim that because of these changes and developments it cannot 
or must not be defined. We can understand what science is when we speak – and the 
same happens with art.290 It is important to acknowledge that the concept of art is not 
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the same with other conditions, but it changes like other conditions ‘radically’ through 
time. 291 
 
Seamon’s thesis on the plausibility of the theory and value in art follows the same line 
of thought and could be taken as another reply to Weitz’s criticism of the role of 
theory in aesthetics.  The re-designation of art and its continuous progressive 
development reveal the difficulty of defining art or designating its necessary and 
sufficient properties. But this difficulty for Seamon does not necessarily indicate the 
impossibility of the definition of art. Although Seamon does not take a clear stance on 
the concept of art, he seems to examine art as a concept that could be defined in terms 
of the art of the present. Past definitions of art were not wrong because they were 
incomplete or insufficient. Each period cultivates a number of dimensions and 
elements of art but across different periods the relationship among these elements 
varies. The predominance of formalism and later conceptualism in modernism does 
not come to replace completely the element and theory of representation and 
expression. Past elements continue to exist and past theories could still be valid in 
modern art, if we were to take their meaning in terms of the predominant dimensions. 
As Gallie writes, these predominant dimensions are ‘very naturally graded in different 
orders of importance’ and this is because of the ‘general condition of the arts’ and of 
the criticism in arts in any present time.292 
 
Conceptual art, as Seamon states, ‘does not force us to rethink completely the nature 
of art’ but helps us rethink the conceptual element of traditional art and furthermore of 
art generally.293 Conceptual art expands ‘the modern theory of artistic value’, ‘our 
sense of what art is’ and of the relation between art and viewer.294 
 
2. 6. Concept and allegory  
 
According to Fowkes, the spirit of art in Hegel’s aesthetics might offer a safe ground 
of validation for art. Hegel’s dialectical system of art - absolute spirit is an internal 
aesthetics through which the meaning lies on both form and concept but derives 
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through concept. Fowkes argues, reflecting Danto’s position on the ‘indiscernible 
counterparts’, that an approach which relies merely on the physical properties of the 
work cannot provide the validity and truth of art. 295  
 
Both Seamon and Fowkes seem to incline towards an internal approach of art and 
aesthetics. They claim that what can give the meaning to these works does not derive 
merely from the physical form of the work but from its concept. Fowkes on the one 
hand argues in favor of the spirit whereas Seamon on the other hand towards 
conceptual and metaphorical function of art.  
 
For Fowkes found works of art could be seen as aesthetically valid forms of art on the 
ground of Hegel’s symbolic art and particularly on the early stage of symbolic art. 
Symbolic art is the art in which the unity between form and idea or concept is 
incompatible to each other. The distance between form and idea of symbolic form of 
art could be seen as well in found art.296 Found art can not stand merely as form, it is 
the concept that allows found art to be a work of art.  
 
In the case of conceptual art it is again the relationship between the form and the idea 
that gives to them their validity as works of art. It is through this relationship that the 
idea becomes visible. Thus, conceptual art functions like Hegel’s romantic art and 
particularly poetry. Form and matter can never abandon art ‘when it departs from the 
body of art, and only then, we are no longer in the realm of art’.297 
 
According to Seamon, to prove that found art and conceptual art are art and their 
commonplace counterparts are not presupposes that we identify a feature that will 
make them art - and at the same time distinguishes from other forms of symbolism or 
mere ideas.298 Seamon however goes a step further for the validity of found art and 
conceptual art. For Seamon the distinction between art and object cannot lie in a 
relation between form, matter or image and concept, or idea. What constitutes art 
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emerges beyond the relation of its form and concept, which as Seamon puts it, 
although this relation is necessary, is not sufficient.299   
 
Modern art, according to Seamon, often is to be seen as a kind of ‘mini-allegory’ or 
metaphor, which is loosely bound to its appearance. 300  That is, modern art is to be 
understood in the field of Hegel’s romantic art and particularly as poetry. Instead of 
language modern painting and sculpture utilise material objects and in some cases 
even language as a means for their meaning. Specifically, works of found and 
conceptual art just as traditional allegories, metaphors and symbols, call the viewer to 
transit from what he sees to ‘something else’, to make inferences from the image or 
symbol to an idea or meaning.301  These two cases of modern art are often to be 
understood as ‘a mini-allegory’ or a metaphor even if the meaning or meanings are 
‘indeterminate’.302 
 
There is a common process of perceptual deciphering of art that begins with what we 
see in the work and ends with how we understand it. From the position of the artist the 
work of art is a ‘schematic entity’ ‘a purely intentional product’; from the position of 
the viewer it is a schematic entity that is to be completed by the viewer or ‘consumer’ 
through the experience of the work. 303 The work of art is to obtain its aesthetic shape 
when the viewer will actualize it ‘in its potential elements’.304 That is, it is through the 
aesthetic experience that the unity among the work, its creator, and the viewer 
becomes manifest. The manifestation is to take place in a material world, the place 
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that the work is exhibited which, according to Ingarden, becomes ‘the background and 
displaced itself in the shape of the ontological foundation of the work of art’.305 
 
Stated differently, to understand a work the viewer needs to close the gap that was 
opened by the artists. This leap is a form of communication, Seamon argues, which 
brings the viewer closer to the idea of the artist.306This gap takes different forms in the 
arts. In painting, photography and graphic arts the gap can be said to be between 
knowledge and perception, that is, between our knowledge of seeing into a two 
dimensional surface and our perception of a three dimensional object, figure or 
landscape.307 With representation, direct symbols, or obvious plot the gap between 
what we see and what we perceive is narrow.308 Seamon here examines the case of 
Orwell’s Animal Farm. Even if the language of the book is analogous with a 
children’s story with animals, it has intended political implications and allegories. In 
this case, the reader makes the leap between what he reads and the idea of the artist 
due to these inferences in the text. The gap between the language and its metaphorical 
use is narrow, the symbols and allegories are clear and the reader can decipher the 
political inferences of the author.309 
 
As the appearance of the representational object is abstracted from the real object, the 
wider is the gap. But it is precisely this perceptual leap, Seamon argues, from the 
surface of the depicted object or image to its meaning that pleases us.310 ‘Our success 
at having made the inference is marked by delight in having successfully gotten what 
the artist was up to, which, unlike more straightforward forms of communication, 
demands imaginative inference’.311 However, if the gap is too wide, as in the case of 
Duchamp’s readymades, and other works of found art and conceptual art, we find 
these works obscure and difficult.312 
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The difference between the conceptual dimension of traditional art on the one hand 
and found and conceptual art on the other is that the function of traditional art is 
formed in terms of previous dimensions of art, that is the mimetic and the expressive 
dimensions. Traditional works of art carry mimetic and expressive ‘implications’ that 
we ‘intuitively’ understand or decipher. 313 They direct the viewer on the way he could 
place the image or symbol into a context, a narrative and transcendent to the meaning 
of the work. The viewer does not question the choice of the specific image, figure, or 
object but their function as a social or religious object.314  
 
How art that seems to deny any relation with its social and historical present is to be 
understood and interpreted? Is this denial that which gives to art its autonomy?  
 
For Adorno it is precisely the distance of modern art from social and religious 
purposes that gives it superiority in relation to the art of the past. But as we will see, 
its autonomy for Adorno does not derive merely by its self referentiality but by the 
differentiation of art and life which came as the result of historical and social 
alterations. That is, art’s autonomy is both historical and social. Art reflects its social 
and historical reality but this does not mean that the authentic work of art belongs to 
its historical present and can only by appreciate by its present community. For Adorno 
the truth value of the authentic work of art does not come forth through its present 
history but when it surpasses it. 
 
2. 7. The matter of autonomy of art 
 
Modern art seems to distance these implications in order to stand as an object for 
itself. Modern works of art in opposition to the art of the past are not based on rules 
and properties of art in order to achieve social purposes, which are formed by their 
present social and cultural categories and classes. The social character of art is what 
abstracts from it its autonomy. For Adorno, the ‘truth value’ of traditional art is more 
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‘limited’. It is not absolutely autonomous because it is part of individual social 
status.315 
 
How is autonomy in art to be understood? Which art could be considered as being 
autonomous art?  
 
As Adorno writes ‘the attitude of contemporary art towards tradition, usually 
revealed as a loss of tradition, is predicated on the inner transformation of tradition 
itself’.316 In Harding’s interpretation of Adorno the ‘aesthetic’ expression of the 
artefact ‘anticipates a new-found autonomy in the contemplation it facilitates’. But as 
Harding remarks, even if we can argue that the concept of the autonomy of a work of 
art indicates the separation of art from practical schemes, this separation captures one 
side of the Adorno’s notion of autonomy of the work of art.317Adorno’s notion of 
autonomy is ‘double-edged’. On the one hand autonomy could be seen in terms of 
isolation of art, ‘a philosophy of l’art pour l’art’.318 By liberating art from its 
previous social functions, art changes from a means for social alterations to that 
which declares ‘the delusory presumptions of engagement’.319 Modern art aims to be 
liberated from past social functions of art. Its objective is to function for nothing else 
but itself. The intention of the artist to bring forth an idea is formed by the work and 
refers back to the work itself. But this autonomy is ‘ephemeral and terminal’; it 
belongs to what the work ‘potentially offers to the individual in the counter-image it 
provides to a specific socio-historical context’.320 
 
On the other hand, autonomy is to be understood as the result of historical and social 
alterations. Historical and social changes are that which will distinguish art and 
life.321Autonomy is thus historical and social in the sense that is part of a historical 
process. This autonomy emerges, according to Adorno, through the ‘unresolved 
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tensions’ that a work of art ‘has’ with its historical and social present.322 This 
autonomy is formed by the relation between art and society and from the way this 
relation is formed through each historical present.323 According to Harding, Adorno 
takes the autonomy of art to be in accordance to its new historical context, ‘to the 
unresolved dialectical tensions of a work that respond to sociohistorical conditions 
that have subsequently changed’. As Harding writes, ‘autonomy denotes the aesthetic 
tension’s lack of resolution, a resolution that only supersession at a specific historical 
moment could have bought’.324 
 
The emphasis on and interest in the concept of autonomy of a work of art that 
developed during the late 18th century within the frame of literature theories, came as 
a result of an attempt to free the work of art from ‘the social praxis’.325 The spheres of 
art and society come together in Adorno’s aesthetics. Art and society are viewed as 
parts of the same history, rather than a reflection of one into the other.326 The 
historical process is what constructs the autonomy of the work of art. The autonomy 
of art is what guides Adorno’s aesthetics to illustrate the cohesion of art and society, a 
cohesion which happens in a particular historical time and by the non-identity of 
art.327 
 
Adorno’s model suggests that, for example in the case of a poem, the critic will not 
start by analyzing the social frames of the work but from the work itself. This 
presupposes a model of history which will include as ‘parts’ elements or sections of ‘a 
unified process the social, political philosophical and aesthetic realm’.328 The 
interpretation, or rather exegesis, of the text is what will indicate the social 
circumstances that designate the creation of the work. What we can take to be the 
social meaning of a text, or a poem, is included in its language and emerges as what 
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Adorno calls ‘social history’ in an indirect way.329 For Adorno, Harding remarks, the 
poem is ‘a philosophical and historical sundial’; the critic through the analysis and 
interpretation of the poem can construct/decipher ‘the meaning of social history’.330 
And this deciphering should be understood in terms of reference to the social history 
of the poem and not the events, facts or ‘objective structures’.331  
 
The bourgeois social reality emerged not as a part of a continuum, of ‘an eternal, 
‘natural’ condition of life’, but the same condition of life ‘in a succession of social 
orders’. Greenberg sees the historical present of art as part of it. As he argues social 
and historical reality is reflected in works of art, ‘even if unconsciously for the most 
part’. It was not by chance, that the emergence of the avant-garde coincided in time 
and place with the growth of the European scientific revolutionary thought in 
Europe.332 
 
‘Directly as artifacts, however, as products of social work, they [art works] also 
communicate with the empirical experience that they reject and out of which they 
draw their content’. 333  Art is bound up with ‘social empirical reality’ with a mutual 
coexistence, that is , art always is a reply to the ‘social empirical reality’ which in turn 
offers the essence or, according to Harding, the ‘origin’ ‘from which art emerges’.334 
The modus operandi for the historical reality and the autonomy of art, ‘is itself 
dialectical’.335 
 
Adorno does not claim however that the work of art is always historically dependent. 
Works could die when ‘the conditions of empirical life change’. ‘What was once true 
in a work of art… was dismantled in the course of history’.  Art needs the conditions 
that bring it to presence.336 In contrast, a work is important when it is not bound to its 
historical place and time. The authentic work could be seen in relation to its present 
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history, but its truth value will emerge not from its present but by its ability to 
‘transcend’ its historical present.337   
 
                Instead of a movement of negation that resolves itself in subsequent movements (as 
in Hegel), historical passage is, for Adorno, the steady accumulation of unresolved 
tensions, repressed beneath the appearance of resolution. Adorno argues that the 
dialectical tensions between an art work and its origins remain intact and 
unresolved, buried beneath the passage of time. 338  
 
This absence of resolution is what will provide the foundation for the autonomy of art 
‘upon temporal movement without a reconciliatory absorption into a greater 
whole’.339 The aim of his aesthetic is to reveal these tensions in order to ‘subvert’ 
what conduce to its ‘reification’.340 
 
2. 8. The meaning of Duchamp’s readymades 
 
The recognition of found art and conceptual art as works of art will come through a 
different understanding of art and not as in the case of traditional art through a 
deciphering of the formal parts of the work. 341 Looking specifically at Dadaist works 
of art, Fowkes argues that its concept or understanding does not lie in a recollection 
and reconstitution of its external signs or on the relation between its form and shape. 
Rather, it comes as the result of the work’s relation with the other works upon the 
scene.342 Chance in Dadaist movement becomes the process by which the work comes 
not into presence but ‘upon the scene’.343 As Krauss writes, their recognition as works 
of art emerges through the work as a whole, and ‘is triggered by the object but is 
somehow not about the object’.344 It goes beyond the objects and their time of 
existence that is, the time of the experience of the objects. Their recognition ‘does not 
resemble the linear passage of time from the seeing of the object to the cognition of its 
meaning. Instead of that kind of arc, the shape of this moment has much more the 
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character of a circle—the cyclical form of a quandary’.345 The work sent us back to 
itself. But in contrast with other modern works of art which still carry aesthetic and 
artistic qualities, Duchamp’s readymades sent us back to the image of a readymade 
object and to the question of its existence in the art space. 
 
In the case of Duchamp’s readymades, the metaphorical or allegorical passage cannot 
bring us into the realm of art. We return to our first perception of the object, of the 
urinal as a commercial object. ‘For the Fountain, with its shiny white porcelain curves 
and countercurves, has a sensuous presence that elicits one’s normal visual response 
to works of art: a response that tends to promote an analytic examination’.346 ‘The 
Fountain thwarts this analytic impulse.’  A readymade object cannot be formally 
decoded. And what we are constantly thinking, Krauss says, is that as long as 
Duchamp did not invent the shape of the urinal and the formal relationships of the 
object, we cannot perceive the work ‘as having encoded the meanings carried by 
formal decisions’.347 The metaphorical meaning of Duchamp’s readymades does not 
appear to have been formed by Duchamp but by the viewer.348 
 
For Duchamp, the Fountain has ceased being a common object, because it has been 
transported. ‘It have been ‘flipped’ or inverted to rest on a pedestal, which is to say 
that it had been repositioned, and this physical repositioning stood for a 
transformation that must then be read on a metaphysical level’ as what transforms it 
into a work of art.349  ‘This moment of realization is the moment in which the object 
becomes ‘transparent’ to its meaning. That meaning is simply the curiosity of 
production—the puzzle of why and how this should happen’.350  
 
The aim of Duchamp, or as Krauss puts it, his strategy, was to present a work which 
as such cannot be reduced to a formal analysis. A work that ‘is detached from his own 
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personal feelings, and for which there is no resolution of one’s efforts to decode or 
understand it.’ His work is not intended to hold the object up for examination, but ‘to 
scrutinize’ the same process of artistic transformation and to cancel out the traditional 
procedure of narration.351  Yet for Seamon, Duchamp’s Fountain implies an idea or, 
according to Bratu, intends to bring forth a meaning. But the gap between image and 
idea is so wide that makes the effort to close the gap a big challenge,352 to come closer 
to the primary meaning/intention of the work, to transit from what we see to the 
meaning or metaphor of the work.  
 
The relation or divergence between the image of the work and the idea of the artist 
brings us to the matter of intentionality.  According to Bratu and Marculescu, in 
empirical aesthetics the intention of the work of art, painting, sculpture, or musical 
score or poem is primarily understood as the physical ‘virtual’ or audible/sound object 
which then becomes the object of aesthetic judgment.353According to Bratu and 
Marculescu, the intentionality, accomplished or not, is related to the interpretation of 
the object. 354 Intentionality, Bratu and Marculescu continue, can never be without a 
referent—but it can be without a meaning. In fact intentionality as such, ‘outside its 
verbal expressions’, does not have a meaning. The meaning is raised with the 
expression of a mode of intending, either ‘in a statement, a judgment, an utterance’.355 
 
Modern works of art, such as products of the Dada and surrealist movements as well 
as non-representational and abstract paintings and sculptures, do not have what Bratu 
and Marculescu name an ‘outside referent’. That is, they lack a direct reference to the 
external world because ‘an inner referent is taking its place’. These works of art 
become, as Bratu and Marculescu write, ‘self-referential, without for that matter 
ceasing to exhibit intentionality’.356 This kind of art follows the way the mind 
functions. This task is founded, Bratu and Marculescu argue, ‘on the belief of the 
superior reality of some forms of association neglected heretofore’.357 
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But if the meaning of art follows the ‘functioning of the mind’ then how are we to 
distinguish art from other forms of actions? What is the difference between artistic 
actions or states and other everyday forms of actions such as pain or joy?  
 
Other forms of actions such as psychological actions or mental states, for example, 
pain, dread, joy, according to Bratu and Marculescu, do not constitute intentional 
actions, they ‘are not intentional mental states’ because they do not have a referent. 358 
Works of art have a referent but not all works exhibited as works of art have meaning. 
There are objects of art such as earth art, some readymades and conceptual works of 
art which as such cannot have a meaning. A work of art fails to retain a meaning –  if 
its boundaries become invisible or if its horizon of constitution is no more than ‘a 
mere solipsistic horizon is being conceptualized’.359 These works ‘will never retain a 
meaning — if they have any — except from the horizon of phenomenological 
constitution’.360 
 
Why do empirical aesthetics and the aesthetics of experience seem incapable of 
providing to these works with a meaning? Can aesthetic experience form an effective 
criterion or means for distinguishing works of art from everyday objects? How 
phenomenological aesthetics could ‘retain a meaning’ for works of art even if these 
lack an ‘inner referent’?   
 
To see an object aesthetically does not presuppose the isolation of the object ‘in an 
artificial space of contemplation, or putting it under the microscope of ‘objective’ 
scrutiny’.361 For Bullough we perceive an object aesthetically by isolating it in its real 
place. We proceed into a separation and a distancing of the object from its actual 
setting and putting it ‘out of gear with the practical self’. The distanced object allows 
it ‘to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends’.362 There is not a 
common aesthetic perception of objects but one that varies in accordance with the 
characteristics of the object and on the other hand to the psychological situations of 
the viewer.  
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According to Dickie, the notion of distance in Bullough’s account of physical distance 
in art indicates that 
 
an object may be ‘put out of gear with the practical self’ to one degree at one time 
and to some other degree at another, and also that the same spectator under the 
same psychological circumstances may distance one object to one degree and 
another object to another degree, depending on the characteristics of two objects.363 
 
Still physical distance does not concern the aesthetic attitude in its whole but a 
psychological attitude that a viewer takes toward some objects. ‘Distance is a 
necessary and sustaining, but not a sufficient, condition of the esthetic attitude, and 
hence is actually only part of the esthetic attitude’. 364  
 
The work of art has organic boundaries. When we imagine a work of art we place it in 
a certain horizon, that is, the horizon of the work of art in relation with its 
environment. For example, in modernity ‘the disappearance of the pedestal from 
sculpture…far from causing them to vanish’ enhanced their ‘natural boundaries’.365 
Phenomenology, in contrast to ‘natural’ or empirical aesthetics, does not seek to 
designate art in terms of its descriptive properties but rather to enclose ‘temporarily’ 
the horizon of the work of art and the work’s properties in order to approach its 
meaning. As Bratu and Marculescu write, phenomenology aims to answer how art is 
‘arrived at, perceived, remembered, imagined, translated, admired, contemplated, 
reproduced, distorted.’ 366  Phenomenological aesthetics through the process of the 
phenomenological constitution proposes an intentional analysis of the way the objects 
are presented physically or imaginary, and the way of understanding them or in Bratu 
and Marculescu’s words, the way of ‘intending them’.367  According to Bratu and 
Marculescu, phenomenological constitution does not indicate a ‘physical 
establishment’, ‘formation’, ‘institutionalization’ of the meaning of art that is of the 
creation and construction of art in relation to the external world. It is rather a 
construction ‘a bestowal of meaning upon the presentations from which all 
naturalistic connotations have suspended, reduced’. Phenomenological constitution is 
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not the reading as such, but ‘an interpretive reading’, a deciphering in the sense of 
decoding not of encoding.368 
 
There are two main operations of aesthetic constitution for achieving this. The first 
one, which could be applied to every work of art, concerns the interpretation, reading 
or decoding of the meaning of the art object.369 The second operation of constitution 
is based upon ‘a preceding act of reduction’ and it is what will prepare the 
interpretation and meaning.370 Reduction here is, according to Bratu and Marculescu, 
the ‘suspension of judgment about something, temporarily, in order to reintroduce 
meaning and interpretation later on, in constitution’.371 
 
This creation of the meaning, Bratu and Marculescu suggest, is to be understood as a 
performance or in the sense of the Greek word poiesis. It indicates a genesis, ‘an 
artistic producing’, which from the position of the viewer signifies ‘a collaborative 
effort up to the level of re-creation of the work of art, exactly like the player’s 
performance of a piece of music’.372 The understanding of the notion of performance 
or poiesis presupposes a distinction between the work of art as such and as an 
aesthetic object, that is, as an object of sensory experience. The notion of creation 
comprised by both ‘the constitution of the aesthetic object and the production or the 
performance of the work’. The notions of constitution and performance in 
phenomenology are like the two faces of a coin, they are ‘interdependent or even con-
stitutive of each other’.373 
 
According to Bratu and Marculescu, the distinction between art and non-art does not 
come merely through artistic intentionality. The boundaries between art and non-art 
are drawn by the horizon of the object of art which is formed by the ‘coincidence 
between artistic intentionality and aesthetic constitution’374 In this respect artistic 
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intentionality loses its ‘self-authenticating’; ‘that is, the art object can no longer be 
presented as self-referential or arbitrary instituted by degree’.375 It is with the aesthetic 
constitution that artistic intentionality will determine the boundaries of the object of 
art and the position of the viewer in the creation of the meaning of the work of art. 
 
What is special in modern art is that the work of art fulfils the process of the 
performance of the meaning of art. This process of the experience of the object is 
constructed ‘from the subject to the object’.376 The beholder, reader or spectator 
proceeds into a decoding of the work as it performs, that is, he reconstructs the 
performance into a secondary meaning, which is ‘a souvenir, a sheer remembrance of 
his own experience’.  Thus, the secondary noema can never be or reach the primary 
noema, which is the noema/idea/intention of the creator. The intention or the image of 
the artist as such cannot be reconstituted entirely as such. ‘All we can judge, identify 
with, read, constitute, decode, interpret is his performance or the result therefore, the 
stanzas before our eyes’.377 For Bratu and Marculescu, the aesthetics of modern art is 
not merely ‘the deciphering of a puzzle, but a certain interpretation of this 
deciphering’.378 
 
Understanding found art and conceptual art does not call for a deciphering of a 
meaning but for an identification of the boundaries of the object and the way the 
object performs. Found art and conceptual art provoke the viewer to identify his 
position within the horizon of art and the art world. Their meaning is replaced by this 
scheme which is constituted by the viewer, the work and its place. Through this 
scheme found and conceptual art loses its self-referential character and could gain its 
identity as art as long as this identity reflects the art that has preceded it, and as long 
as the art object can be placed back in a dialectical history of art.  
 
As in the case of Duchamp’s readymades their legitimation ‘will have to come’, De 
Duve writes, ‘from comparison with the past.’379 However, this comparison or 
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strategy, as De Duve calls, is not going to be an institutional one. As De Duve writes 
this strategy is what  
 
allows the reconstitution of a chain…of expectations that are aesthetic, the 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction of which are framed in an institutional context 
precisely made of what is already aesthetically legitimate in the eyes of the 
protagonist at any given moment.380 
 
For Danto and to some extent for Seamon this strategy is the dialectical history of art. 
It is the knowledge of the history of art, of art theories, genres and movements that 
could make legitimate everyday objects as works of art. The appearance of the 
readymades in the art space could be seen as the result of the progress of art to be 
disconnected with life and reality. A disconnection that was to come in a radical 
manner with the same objects of everyday life. Duchamp’s readymades and the 
movements of found art and conceptual art become art in the context of art’s 
dialectical progress. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Bratu and Marculescu argue, despite the changes and development of art, its 
principles remain the same. If art ‘is disappearing’ it is because the unity between 
nature and culture, life, reality and art, no longer have any ‘classification value’. ‘We 
are witnessing the death throes of the classical representational impulse as, more than 
likely, the birth of a totally new understanding of sign-systems and their social 
uses’.381 New notions and terms need to come forth in the fields of aesthetics and art 
criticism to convey ‘the manifold of the aesthetic status of the work of art’.382  What is 
called modern or new, or appears as a total breakup in relation with the art of the past 
but its opposition with the art of the past is what shapes the new perception of art.383  
The death of art does not declare the disappearance of art rather than an ending of 
art’s relationship with life and reality. Modern art is no longer an integral part of life 
but it belongs in Danto’s terms, in the ‘artworld’. For Danto modern art belongs into a 
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new era of art and its meaning depends on the knowledge of art’s history, on an art 
theory.  
 
The urinal is not a work of art, but the history of art has allowed the possibility that 
the one chosen by Duchamp for the art exhibition to be considered as such. As de 
Duve writes, ‘once on the record, the Richard Mutt case has proven impossible to 
erase’.384 It has passed into the history of art, it is one of the most situated works in 
books on the history of art and contemporary aesthetics.385 The Fountain ‘has been 
registered in the jurisprudence of modern art’. The art identity of the Fountain 
presupposes, De Duve argues, a legal terminology. Its legitimacy as art concerns the 
Fountain particularly but also other readymades to be considered artwork. 386 After 
Duchamp artists continued challenging the boundaries of art, the laws of the art world 
and the theories of aesthetics and art criticism. As De Duve denotes, even if the 
Fountain passed the test its legitimation is still on trial. But again this is the irony of 
the story of the Fountain. Its legitimation is not valid. Philosophy can provide an 
argument for its validity. ‘From institutional legitimation—or art status—it does not 
follow that aesthetic legitimacy—or art quality—is secured once and for all. The 
urinal is still awaiting further trial’.387  
 
But what cannot be changed is that Duchamp’s readymades formed a different history 
of art, ‘a new kind of period’ in Danto’s words in which art pushed the limits of art in 
order to redefine its nature, its autonomy and its relation to life and society. The 
antiphasis here is that art claims its autonomy not through traditional art, creativity or 
talent but rather through everyday readymade objects, objects of non-art. And this is 
what the artist of found art and conceptual art aimed to do. 
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Both found art and conceptual art singled out objects from the world in order to see 
them as works of art. The Fountain can be understood either in terms of its 
appearance or of concept. They both bring the same implications for the way we 
understand art. Even if the primary aim of found works of art is their form and shape 
they raised questions about the nature of art. The answer that readymades appear to 
suggest, according to Krauss, is that a work of art, is not its physical presence or 
appearance but rather a statement on art. 388 Duchamp’s intention in presenting the 
readymades was to denote that art is not merely the external form of a work. His 
intention, Krauss writes, ‘was to make a point and one to which the actual physical 
presence of any particular readymade contributed very little’.389 Duchamp’s works or 
rather acts were raising questions about the nature of art, on ‘of what it is that ‘makes’ 
something a work of art’.390 His readymades stand as a specific concept of art and 
from this point of view Duchamp could be seen more as a conceptual artist than a 
found art practitioner.391  
 
On the other hand, the understanding of conceptual art does not derive merely from 
the way these works stand as concepts about art but depends partly on the external 
qualities of the work.392 Even if the primary impulse of conceptual art appears to be 
the idea, at the same time we could examine these works under the notion of found 
art.393 What is of aesthetic interest in these works is not concept or meaning, but as 
Fowkes states, ‘we are left, as with found art, to gaze at a physical presence’.394 
 
Found art and conceptual art drive us to re-think art and aesthetics, and the meaning 
of theory in aesthetics. The conceptual dimension of art is to be taken as another shift 
in terms of a dialectical history of art which again is not permanent but ‘bears its 
marks of its time’.395 However, the acceptance of the conceptual as the fourth 
dimension could justify the validity of these objects as objects of art.  
                                                
388 Krauss, Passages in modern Sculpture, p. 73. 
389 Fowkes, op. cit., p. 159.  
390 Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, p. 72. 
391 As Fowkes contends, ‘Duchamp is to be regarded more of a conceptual artist than something else. 
Specifically, ‘conceptual art – only now recognized as a movement – looks back to Duchamp as its 
precursor and source of inspiration’. Fowkes, op. cit., p. 159. 
392 Ibid., p. 161. 
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Through the conceptual dimension of art the work, the artist and its audience all come 
together as in traditional art. But is the purpose of bringing together artist and public 
in this extension, to include any object as art and anybody as artist or beholder? As De 
Duve denotes ‘the pact that binds together the artist and their public ought to extend 
to include anyone and everyone’. However this agreement or convention is not a real 
but rather a symbolic one.396 
 
Art in modernity could be seen only through a symbolic scheme that binds together 
the work, the artist and an audience. The gap that is opened between the work and the 
viewer could only be closed through deciphering the intention or role of the artist in 
modernity. It is not primarily social, political or ideological but the result of an 
aesthetic dialogue or ‘negotiation’ of the form of the work of art and the feeling of the 
individual viewer, which are not ‘expressed’ in statements of the sort  ‘this is 
beautiful’ but rather ‘this is art’.397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
396 De Duve, op. cit., pp. 461. 
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II. The validity of modern art after the ‘death of art’ 
 
Introduction 
 
This part of the thesis examines the matter of the validity of art in modernity. 
Specifically, it focuses on Heidegger’s thinking about art after the ‘death of art’ and 
on the way modern art, and particularly poetry, painting and sculpture, is to be 
understood within Heidegger’s philosophy of art. The first chapter of this examination 
is developed through a discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of art, his concept of art 
and his approach to art in modernity. The study continues with an examination of 
Heidegger’s thinking about poetry and painting in modernity, focusing on the relation 
between art and space/world. The second chapter focuses on the matter of the 
homelessness and isolation of modern sculpture. The homelessness and isolation of 
sculpture are examined in a more literal sense as the loss of their space and their 
ability to function symbolically within their location. Looking specifically at the work 
of Rodin and Giacometti, I discuss how modern sculpture could overcome its 
homelessness and gain its validity as a work of art. 
 
Following Heidegger’s thinking on art, this study starts with a discussion of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of art and his designation of the nature of art. Subsequently, 
the discussion proceeds into an examination of Heidegger’s thesis on the question of 
the ‘death of art’. Heidegger in the closing stage of his discussion in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, published in 1935, presents modernity as an age in which art has 
lost its truth revealing function.398 Heidegger declares the absence of art in modernity 
which echoes Hegel’s conclusion on art and the death of art. In modernity divine and 
absolute values are spread in various activities and are no longer formulated by art.399   
However, in 1960 Heidegger comes to rethink the significance of the new art of 
modernity. According his new view, the artist of modernity challenges the defined 
limits of art and proposes an art that falls outside the realm of the traditional concept 
of art, outside traditional aesthetic theories and the art market. In Heidegger’s new 
                                                
398 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in, Poetry, Language, Thought, (New York, 
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conception, poetry as well as painting in modernity could stand as genuine 
happenings of truth. 
 
Taking account of Young’s discussion of Heidegger, the examination is developed 
through Heidegger’s thinking about the poetry of Hölderlin and Rilke and the 
paintings of Klee and Cézanne. What he was interested in finding in modern painting 
was the way art allows a world to come forth, to appear through colours and abstract 
forms. For Heidegger the painting as a ‘holy ground’ does not represent the world and 
earth but projects it, allows it to happen, makes visible what was hidden.400  
 
But modern sculpture emerges declaring a loss of space. Modern sculptures sit in a 
specific place but they appear alienated from that place and incapable of speaking 
about it. Does the awareness of the loss of space of sculpture constitute a verification 
of its homelessness? The matter of homelessness of sculpture is examined through a 
selection of works of Rodin and Giacometti. The study suggests that both artists 
manage to overcome the homelessness of modern sculpture. They both provide 
sculpture with a part of world in which these could belong. In Rodin this world 
constitutes part of the sculpture itself whereas in Giacometti the world is the space 
that the work occupies to create the distance that the work is to be seen from.  
                                                
400 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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3. Heidegger and modern art 
 
3. 1. Heidegger and art 
 
Heidegger’s texts on art are not to be understood as philosophy or as ‘a universal 
theory’ of art but rather a ‘thinking about art’. 401 For Heidegger traditional 
philosophy of art is a philosophizing of art and philosophizing is ‘bad and thus 
muddled’. 402 The thinker for Heidegger has to step back from philosophy, from the 
‘thinking that merely represents, merely explains’ into ‘the thinking that responds and 
recalls’.403 The tool of his thinking and investigation of the truth being of things is for 
Heidegger language. Heidegger through his writings ‘is at work shaping his language, 
that is, his thinking, in the intense, condensed way—dichtend—characteristic of the 
poet, der Dichter’. 404 Heidegger’s language becomes more poetic and enigmatic in 
his discussion of art and generally through his later writings. But this is not accidental. 
405 Firstly, through his language Heidegger intentionally distinguishes his writings 
from the character of traditional aesthetics and philosophy of art.406 Secondly and 
most importantly through the continuous exploration of language he manages to 
respond to and recall his objects, to unveil their being but at the same time to show the 
relativity of their being. His writing ‘is the most concrete thinking and speaking about 
Being, the differing being of different beings and the onefoldness of their identity in 
and with all their differences; and it is one with the being of the thinker and speaker, 
himself’.407 ‘It is a speaking that, like all genuine poetry, says more than it speaks, 
means more than it utters’.408 As Hofstadter writes, Heidegger’s thinking about art is 
‘like poetry and song, it grows out of being and reaches into its truth.’ 409  Hence, 
Heidegger’s language comes as a result of his task of unveiling the essence of truth 
and being. His poetic thinking, his search of truth in the origin of language ‘goes 
                                                
401 Hofstadter, ‘Introduction’, in Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. ix-xxii. (p. ix).  
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403 Ibid., p. xi. 
404 Ibid., pp. xi, xxii. 
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406 Young, op. cit., pp. 171-174. 
407 Hofstadter, op. cit., p. xi. 
408 Ibid., p. xii. 
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along with the growth of the author’s vision of truth and being, and of man’s life in 
the context of truth and being’.410   
 
Heidegger’s investigation of art is unfolded through his thinking of Van Gogh’s 
shoes, a block of granite, the bridge, a poem, an axe, a jug. As Hofstadter remarks, 
Heidegger in his thinking about art takes into account works of art of the past and 
modernity but also things that appear simple like the axe or jug.411 In opposition to 
traditional aesthetics and philosophy of art, Heidegger does not designate art under 
the notion of fine art and does not follow the development of art and art movements. 
His discussion on art is focused on the truth of art and is evolved through the 
consideration of individual artists, works and objects without any strict criterion for 
their selection.412  
 
In addition Heidegger does not take art as in traditional aesthetics to be an object of 
pleasure and satisfaction, an object of aesthesis.413 Rather, Heidegger’s understanding 
of art is placed within the field of phenomenology. According to Bratu and 
Marculescu phenomenology is concerned with the way of intending to things and the 
way we understand them. This intending is not an interpretation of the object’s 
meaning but a creation, a poiesis of its meaning in relation to the human and the 
boundaries of the object.   
 
Objects of art like any other object are things, phenomenal experiences to our 
senses.414 In Heidegger’s approach works of art as well as things are considered as 
physical objects, as they appear to us, ‘as they show themselves in the fullness of their 
appearance’.415 For Heidegger we do not merely perceive works of art and everyday 
objects but also we handle them. As Heidegger say works of art are treaded like 
objects. 
 
                                                
410 Ibid., p. xi. 
411 Ibid., p. ix. 
412 Young in the last part of his work presents his own defence for why we can still consider 
Heidegger’s discussion of art as philosophy of art. Young, op. cit., pp. 171-174, (p. 173). 
413 Hofstadter, op. cit., p. ix. 
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The picture hangs on the wall like a rifle or a hat. A painting, e.g., the one by Van 
Gogh that represents a pair of peasant shoes, travels from one exhibition to another. 
Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest. 
During the First World War Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the soldier’s 
knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of 
the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar.416 
 
Every object Heidegger sets to examine always ends up in a dialogue with the 
question of being and truth. Heidegger, Hofstadter writes, sees all his objects ‘in the 
light of the disclosure of the appropriation of beings to Being’.417  
 
In his search for Being of art Heidegger draws a distinction between the formal 
appearance, for instance the abstract shapes of the work, and what the work presents 
to us, for instance a figure or a landscape.418 The understanding of a work of art 
comes through an awareness of the object’s infinite nature, the awareness that we 
cannot capture all the aspects of an object featured in an artwork. Objects as such 
have many aspects, endless, plenitude points of view. For Heidegger, however, we 
can only see some aspects of an object, the aspects that are intelligible to us.419  
 
For Heidegger art is a revealing of being and truth. Art is the place of truth and being 
(for a discussion on art as the place of truth in relation to theology and philosophy see 
chapter 5, pp. 149-154). Art for Heidegger is not merely a product, something made 
or manufactured, but rather ‘it always means knowledge’.420  Art is ‘the disclosing of 
beings as such, in the manner of a knowing guidance of bringing-forth’.421  
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Heidegger designates the true nature of Being as both revealing and concealment. 
(Further on Heidegger’s notion of Being and Dasein see chapter 5, pp.156, 173-176). 
Truth in Heidegger’s thinking is not and cannot be equated with the absolute or 
primary truth. Heidegger goes back to the ancient Greek meaning of the world truth, 
to the notion of aletheia in order to designate truth not as an absolute revealing and 
bring forth but as partly revealing and partly hidden.422 The Greek word for truth is 
aletheia, which literally means un-forgetting. The hidden, the concealed is this which 
has been forgotten. Art thus aims to bring forth or to reveal truths that have been 
fallen into oblivion, in Greek word lithi. The purpose of an artwork is to release or 
reveal these internalised truths to the people of a specific time and place.423 Art 
reveals to us the nature of things that we take for granted, the life and world of the 
peasant through the representation of the shoes in Van Gogh’s painting. The realising 
or happening of truth is not fully contained in the work, but it occurs outside the work 
of art.424 
 
3. 2. ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ 
 
Heidegger manages to give to art the power to form and found history, to reveal the 
vocation of and preserve the historical being of human.425  ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’, Heidegger’s early discussion on art, presents art as a genuine happening of truth, 
the ‘divine’ and of a historical present.  According to Heidegger, the origin of the 
work of art is ‘the source of the nature in which the being of an entity is present’.426 A 
work of art’s origin is not the artist, the creator of the work. For Heidegger, the artist 
is merely the beginning of the work, its ‘causal origin’ in the sense that the artist 
releases the work of art. In Heidegger’s words, the artist ‘remains inconsequential as 
compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative 
process for the work to emerge’; ‘the work is to be released by him to its pure self-
                                                
422 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 49-53. 
423 Young, op. cit., p. 34. 
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subsistence.’427 For Heidegger, the artist by releasing the work of art also releases 
himself from it.428 
 
The work of art independent from its primal agent needs to be something more than a 
mere creation.429 The concept of art is expanded to include the artist, the work’s 
historical community and its era. Art is the origin of the work of art, of the artist and 
of the historical community in which the work of art and artist are placed, ‘of a man’s 
historical existence’ which are at the same time are the ‘preservers’ of art.430 The 
work of art, first released by the artist cannot exist independently of ‘a people’s 
historical existence’. Art’s historical community will preserve art in its greatness.431 
The origin for Heidegger is, as Young put it, ‘a logical or conceptual origin, that in 
virtue of which an entity of a certain kind counts as being of that kind’.432  But the 
being of each entity comes forth through a circular process. That is, the community 
recognises itself in and through its art and furthermore, the community holds art into 
existence and this is what makes art great.  
 
The greatness of art lies upon its need for preservation and recognition by the 
community; it does not depend on the qualities or style of the work.433 The greatness 
of art does not derive through the work but it is external to the work of art. Art can be 
the foundation of a community when the community preserve and accepts it as its 
foundation. The Greek temple becomes the foundation of the community when the 
community recognises it through its actions as such, through its honour, sacrifices and 
festivals. 
 
 Its greatness, for Heidegger, is external to art in the sense that it comes forth though 
its preservers, the historical people, their gods, the festivals and gatherings of the 
community, the community’s historical present. In ancient Greece, the human is the 
preserver of art, the one that as Heidegger writes ‘must gather (legein) and save 
(sōzein), catch up and preserve, what opens itself in its openness, and he must remain 
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exposed (alētheuein) to all its sundering confusions’.434 The greatness of art, 
Heidegger remarks, is revealed as far art is ‘an ‘absolute need’’.435 Art needs to be 
part of the community and furthermore the community forms part of art’s absolute 
and holiness.    
 
The art that Heidegger speaks about is the great art of ancient Greece and the middle 
ages, such as the temple, the statue of a god, the epic, the drama, and the cathedral. As 
Young writes, Heidegger expands the traditional notion of art to include 
‘charismatic’, ‘world-defining’ events of many kinds. The work of art can therefore 
be accepted under the notion of the cultural paradigm as a happening of truth, or as an 
event of truth. The Greek temple, the sculpture of a god, but also the Olympic Games 
and ‘the act that founds a political state’, can all be viewed as great forms of art.436 
 
For Heidegger art reveals the way things and humans are but also designates human 
existence. Art reveals the truth of the world that humans already live in, the earth, the 
sky, ‘the light of the day’ and ‘the darkness of the night’. Moreover, art designates a 
new world for humans and their way of living.  
 
 Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and 
so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the 
stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings 
to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The 
temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air.437 
 
For Heidegger great art fulfilled an important need or purpose, it revealed people of a 
specific time and place what is, what dwells there, and how they should live their 
lives.438 Art presented gods, and set the dialogue between divine and human fate, 
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bringing it ‘to radiance’.439 The temple, Heidegger writes, ‘gives to things their look 
and to men their outlook’.440 The temple reveals the historical community in which 
are placed their gods and the fate of  humans.441  For Heidegger, art reveals the holy 
to the community, the way human existence is to be understood and human actions 
are to be evaluated, as victories or disgraces. As Heidegger writes in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, ‘by means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This 
presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy 
precinct’.442 
  
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around 
itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and 
blemishing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of 
destiny for human beings. The all-governing expanse of this open traditional 
context is the world of this historical people.443 
 
Heidegger does not use the notion of world in the sense of nature, history and 
population.444 As he states, world is not the collection of ‘things that are just there’, 
either the idea or in Heideigger words, ‘an imagined framework’ of the collection of 
things. On the other hand world is not to be taken as an object, as what we see in front 
of us. ‘World is the even-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of 
birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being’.445 
 
In the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ world fulfils itself with earth and both create the 
foundation for art. The relation of world and earth is linked to Heidegger’s position on 
the notion of truth as both revealing and concealment. World does not merely reveal 
the earth but neither does it merely enclose it. Both world and earth encloses and 
uncover each other.  Thus, art brings forth world and earth and truth in the sense that 
it does not reveal them as absolute and unbounded truths. Truth is never an absolute 
given. Art makes us aware of that truth, it makes us aware that world and earth are 
never merely natural or given 
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The interplay between world and earth becomes in later Heidegger the fourfold of 
earth, sky, divinities and mortals, a ‘mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and 
sky, divinities and mortals’.446 Each one is a mirror that captures the others. ‘Earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals—being at one with one another of their own accord—
belong together by way of the simpleness of the united fourfold’.447  
 
It is due to ereignen, the event or happening of truth, that the fourfold joins and brings 
into light the truth of beings and enables each of them to exist in its own authentic 
way, to be ‘in appropriation of and each other’ to belong ‘together in the round dance 
of their being’.448 Earth and sky, divinities and mortals, inhere together in one, ‘by a 
primal oneness’.449  
 
   to be a human being is to be on the earth as a mortal, to dwell, doing the ‘building’ 
that belongs to dwelling: cultivating growing things, constructing things that are 
built, and doing all this in the context of mortals who, living on earth and 
cherishing it, look to the sky and to the gods to find the measure of their 
dwelling.450 
 
The fourfold finds its place in art. Art unifies the fourfold, it preserves it in its ‘primal 
oneness’ and allows humans to dwell. Humans have the ability to build, that is, to 
cultivate and construct; the ability to produce in the sense of poesy, to manifest the 
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unknown and to ‘take the measure of the world’ and thus of their own nature.451 When 
humans take the measure of the world and their nature then they are able to truly 
dwell.  
 
To dwell here implies that humans create and build a world; they construct their place 
and give meaning to a brute environment.452The human, Heidegger writes, ‘is insofar 
as he dwells’.453 Specifically, the notion of dwelling tells us, according to Heidegger, 
about the way that ‘we humans are on the earth’.454  Dwelling means ‘to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine’.455 
For Heidegger, humans ‘consist in dwelling’ that is to ‘the stay of mortals on the 
earth’.456 To be a human ‘means to be on the earth as a mortal’.457  Humans are 
mortals and ‘they are called mortals because they can die’. And only mortals from the 
fourfold are capable of the death as death. They not merely die but they know that 
they will die. For Heidegger humans (Dasein) acknowledge their mortality, the 
finitude and contingency of their existence. 
 
‘Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, 
before the divinities’.458 Mortals belong to the fourfold by dwelling, that is, in order to 
preserve. Human beings dwell when they preserve the fourfold ‘in its essential 
being’.459 Mortals dwell, Heidegger writes, in the saving the earth, that is, they are 
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preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things’. The fourfold is secured in 
things but in the things that let as such ‘are let be in their presencing’. That is, by nursing and nurturing 
nature, ‘the things that grow’, but mainly by constructing ‘things that do not grow’. For Heidegger both 
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setting the earth free ‘into its own presencing’.460 Saving the earth, Heidegger writes, 
does not mere mean a protecting from danger, or to exploit the earth, master it or 
‘subjugate’ it. To save means, Heidegger writes, ‘to set something free into its own 
presencing’ .They dwell because ‘they receive the sky as sky’, ‘they await the 
divinities as divinities’, ‘they initiate their own nature—their being capable of death 
as death—into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good 
death’. 461 
 
For Heidegger it is though art that the human can be part of the fourfold, and take the 
measure of its existence. This revealing is the preserving of art but stays open as long 
as gods have not fled, as long as the sculpture of the god is the god himself. According 
to Heidegger, great art and its truth revealing function exists for people of a certain 
time and place. Great art serves its purpose by being historically and culturally 
bound.462 ‘The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time 
sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as a native 
ground’.463  
 
People of a different time and place inhabit different worlds. According to Heidegger 
works of art of the past that are taken out of their world, ‘torn out of their own native 
sphere’, and are displayed in museum and gallery collections, lose their truth 
revealing function.464 They are preserved and conserved to hold as much as possible 
of their original appearance and still attract our admiration and theoretical interest. But 
‘however high their quality and power of impression, however good their state of 
preservation, however certain their interpretation, placing them in a collection has 
withdrawn them from their own world’.465  This ‘withdrawal’ is permanent. As 
Heidegger writes, we can not ‘cancel or avoid such displacement of works’ by visiting 
them in their original place, the world of the temple or a cathedral ‘that stands there 
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has perished.’466 They are mere objects and even if we were to consider them as a 
result of a historical world or of a dialectical process, this world does no longer exist. 
They are objects of science, aesthetics, theory and pleasure but ‘no longer the same 
as, their former self-subsistence’. For Heidegger, what we see, admire, or study and 
interpret does no longer concern their true being but rather it concerns things as they 
merely appear, to their ‘object-being’.467  
 
3. 3. Modernity and art 
 
In the closing stages of his discussion on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ Heidegger 
presents modernity as an age in which great art no longer exists.468 For Heidegger art 
in modernity is no longer a truth-revealing. Heidegger’s declaration of the absence of 
art in modernity echoes Hegel’s conclusion on art and the death of art. Art, 
Heidegger states, is ‘a thing of the past’ and it has been since the end of the middle 
ages.469 Modernity, he states, is ‘the age without an artwork’, ‘the age that has 
forgotten the festival’ the gathering together of the community within that wonders 
that happens in the work (the communal condition).470 
 
If great art is art that is ‘an ‘absolute need’’ then the decline of great art consists of art 
no longer being an absolute need. Art that does not have a necessary or absolute 
access to the truth can no longer be considered great.471Art, Heidegger writes, ‘forfeits 
its essence, loses its immediate relation to the basic task of representing the 
absolute’.472 Great art died because things called art in modernity had lost their truth 
revealing function as well as the purpose of telling people the right way to live. Art in 
modernity does not encounter ethical ways of living, it is no longer ‘‘truth’-
disclosing’, it is not able or willing ‘to disclose to its audience, at least the outline, the 
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shape of the proper way to live’.473 The work of art is now an object ‘of mere 
subjective experience’.474 
 
One of the central characteristics of modernity is the fact that art passed into the area 
of aesthetics. In modernity divine and absolute values are spread in various activities 
and no longer formulated by art. Aesthetics aims to reform eternal values and their 
meaning, through theories, and thinking and philosophising on art. But these are, 
Heidegger writes, ‘merely the half-baked clichés of an age when great art, together 
with its nature, has departed from among men’.475  
 
But does the end of art take place in the modern age? What is the origin of this 
ending?  
 
In ancient Greece art rose to its highest level.476 Ancient Greeks ‘had such an 
originally mature and luminous state of knowing they had no need of ‘aesthetics’’.477  
For Heidegger aesthetics and generally philosophy constitutes the beginning of art’s 
ending. But Heidegger does not place the ending of art in modern European 
philosophy, but rather he places it back to the beginning of philosophical thinking, 
ancient Greek philosophy. Heidegger argues that even though aesthetics had its 
origins in ancient Greece, it began when Greek art came to an end. The ending of 
great art came together with the beginning of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle 
which formed the lines of future thinking of art, being and truth. 478  
 
Following the philosophy of Plato art was to be understood in terms of the distinction 
between matter and idea, appearance and concept. But this distinction or connection, 
Heidegger argues, has directed the thinking of art in specific interpretations that are 
removed from art’s wider and original meaning. Platonic approaches to art considered 
art merely as a product of creation, as the result of an artistic action, which has 
removed from art its primary meaning as knowledge, the disclosing and bringing-
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forth of the truth of beings.479 Platonic approaches to art such as mimetic theories 
interpret art in terms of the duality of form and concept, matter and idea and the truth 
of art in terms of mimesis of the external world. The truth of art in the field of Plato’s 
philosophy is understood as a representation, as a partially revealing of nature and 
world or in Heidegger words as oblivion. The truth, aletheia of art is never a mere 
representation of the world but a concealment and bringing forth of world. (for a 
further discussion on Heidegger’s criticism on platonic philosophy and metaphysics 
see chapter 5, pp. 149-159). 
 
Even if the end of art began with the emergence of ancient Greek philosophy, 
modernity is the era which designated the loss of its greatness. 480 Modernity alters the 
way art is conceived both in theory and practice. Thus, Heidegger declares the end of 
art in the age of technology, the age when science has entered truth. Science is seen as 
the only valid means to approach or discover truth. ‘The ultimate ground of the 
triumph of the aesthetic view of art is the imperialism of reason, the triumph of the 
view that science…has access to truth’. Art does not have a necessary or absolute 
access to the truth; art can no longer be great.481 The theory that coexists with art in 
modernity is ‘bad theory’. ‘Though theory cannot make art, it can kill it’.482 Good art 
in modernity is art that pleases and is enjoyed by its audience. 
 
As Heidegger writes, ‘as soon as the thrust into the extraordinary is parried and 
captured by the sphere of familiarity and connoisseurship, the art business has 
begun’.483 The new notion of art was what gave rise to the whole ‘art industry’. This 
industry focuses on creating objects for the pleasure of the select few who have the 
knowledge, culture, taste and money to appreciate them. In contrast with great art 
which was for all people of a particular time and place, the new art is for the select 
few, the elite. The ‘art industry’ produces ‘pleasurable objects’ for the ‘consumers’ of 
art in the same way that the fashion industry produces designer items and clothes for 
the consumers of fashion; art in modernity is a ‘sector of cultural activity’ but ‘merely 
one sector’ of that which puts a little icing on the cake of life given that many other 
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sectors are equally available.484 What was once considered to be aesthetically pleasant 
or to have ‘aesthetic appeal’ does not represent necessarily art and does not need art. 
Modern art as aesthetic art cannot be great; it is among others ‘‘a triviality’’.485  
 
But on the other hand the development and success of aesthetics needs an object to be 
completed.  Aesthetics, Heidegger indicates, rose when great art came to an end. It is 
precisely the recognition and discussion of the end of great art on which aesthetics 
bases its success.486  Hegel’s aesthetics, Heidegger remarks, is considered among the 
greatest works of aesthetics. But his system of fine art in philosophy presupposes the 
end of art.487 The whole structure of Hegel’s philosophy of history in which art is 
placed needs an art that has been ended; not necessarily in the sense of final end, but 
an art that is completed and fulfilled.  
 
As Heidegger writes in his essay ‘What are Poets for?’ ‘not only have the gods and 
the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the world’s 
history’.488 Modernity is the place in which gods cannot return, the place where there 
is not even an ‘abode’ prepared for the god’s return. 489  Heidegger’s reading of 
Hölderlin’s elegy ‘Bread and Wine’ remarks that modernity is ‘the era to which we 
ourselves still belong’; the era without gods and consequently the era where ‘night is 
falling’.490   Since what he calls the ‘united three’, that is, Herakles, Dionysos, and 
Christ left the world, ‘the evening of the world’s age has been declining towards 
night. The world’s night is spreading its darkness’.491 As Heidegger writes, for 
Hölderlin the sacrifice of Christ indicates ‘the beginning of the end of the day of the 
gods’. This is not to be taken according to Heidegger as a denial of the Christian faith 
in modernity and the relationship between the Christian and god. The nearer the 
world’s night is driven towards midnight the more the destitute predominates. But in 
this time not only the holy as the path that leads to the godhead is lost, but also the 
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traces that lead to the ‘lost path’ are almost erased.492 ‘The more obscure the traces 
become the less can a single mortal, reaching into the abyss, attend there to 
intimations and signs’.493  
 
This time is characterised not merely by the absence of the gods but also by their 
‘failure to arrive’ and furthermore by what Hölderlin names as ‘the ‘default of 
God’’.494 ‘The default of God means that no god any longer gathers men and things 
unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such gathering disposes the world’s 
history and man’s sojourn in it’.495 However, the default of god presages something 
even worse; as Heidegger writes, ‘the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance 
has become extinguished in the world’s history’.496 But the destitution of modernity 
does not lie to the absence of gods but to the fact that we cannot ‘discern’ this absence 
as a loss. ‘The time of the world’s night is the destitute time, because it becomes ever 
more destitute. It has already grown so destitute, it can no longer discern the default 
of God as a default’.497 
 
Humanity’s present existence is technology centred, it is a life where ‘everything, 
including man himself, becomes material for process of self-assertive production, 
self-assertive imposition of human will on things regardless of their own essential 
natures’.498 The time of technology ‘is a destitute time, the time of the world’s night, 
in which man has even forgotten that he has forgotten the true nature of being’.499 In 
the time of technology humanity lost, according to Heidegger, its prime position as 
mortal. In the past the human was the object of the world and his gods. But as the 
result of the technological life, the human became the subject and world became the 
object.500 Humans do not seek merely to understand the world and their existence but 
to conquer them. In modernity mortality becomes a technological problem rather than 
a hermeneutic one.  
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Modernity, as Heidegger writes in ‘The Age of the World Picture’, liberated humans 
and brought subjectivism and individualism. What changed in relation to previous 
ages is that the human becomes a subject, which is to be understood in the Greek 
meaning of the word hypokeimenon, (hypo +keimai). This word indicates ‘that-
which-lies-before’ that which collects everything into itself. It is a metaphysical 
conception of the subject, Heidegger writes, that does not refer to the true nature of 
the human and not at all to the human as I.501  In modernity the world is understood as 
representing and aims ‘to bring what is present at hand [das Vor-handene] before 
oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one 
representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative 
realm’.502  To represent means ‘to set out before oneself and to set forth in relation to 
oneself’. Then the world is seen as a picture and the human as a subject.503 Our 
relation to something else, ‘willing, taking point of view, being sensible of’ it is a 
representing thinking.504 As Heidegger writes, ‘the subiectum, the fundamental 
certainty, is the being-represented-together-with—made secure at any time—of 
representing man together with the entity represented … i.e., together with the 
objective’.505 
 
But in relation to medieval and ancient times now the human has a position. In 
modernity art was in a position to stand to offer to the viewer the chance to decide 
which ‘position’ to take. According to Heidegger, the modern age offers humans the 
right to experience the object in his own terms, the opportunity to recede from the 
‘scene’, ‘of that which is generally and publicly represented’.506 The human is then 
the representative of that which has the status of an object, as Heidegger writes, and 
‘makes depend upon himself the way in which he must take his stand in relation to 
whatever is as the objective’.507  
 
The human as a subject asks: 
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is it as an ‘I’ confined to its own preferences and freed into its own arbitrary 
choosing or as the ‘we’ of society? is it as an individual or as a community? Is it as 
a personality within the community or as a mere group member in the corporate 
body? is it as a state and nation and as a people or as the common humanity of 
modern man, that man will and ought to be the subject that in this modern essence 
he already is?508 
 
But the modern world is no longer the place of gods.  The human is no longer part of 
the world but aims to conquer the world. But to this extent he remains without a 
shelter, a home. What characterises modernity is homelessness. The human is ‘in need 
of protection’, the human’s own ‘self-willing’ and ‘self-assertion’ makes him 
‘endangered’ but at the same time ‘unshielded’.509 The human in the age of 
technology is set outside ‘all care or protection’. The mastery of the objectifying 
world is what demolishes the chance of protection.510 The human constructs the 
technological world as an object and at the same time deliberately breaks his bond 
with the world.511 ‘Self-assertive man, whether or not he knows and wills it as an 
individual, is the functionary of technology’. The human now faces the world ‘from 
outside it’ and in addition ‘he even turns his back upon the ‘pure draft’ by 
objectifying the world’. The ‘parting’, as Heidegger calls it, is the opposition of the 
human towards the world, it ‘is not a parting from, it is a parting against’.512 What is 
dangerous and deadly is not technology, technologically advanced machines used in 
wars such as the atomic bomb. What is deadly for the human and human nature is, 
Heidegger argues, the ‘purposeful self-assertion in everything’, ‘the unconditional 
character of mere willing’; the belief that man by technological production can order 
the world. But it is this ordering that cancels any chances of recognition, it ‘destroys 
the realm from which any rank and recognition could possibly arise’.513 For 
Heidegger, willing in the sense of ‘self-assertion within a world’ is dangerous.514 
 
As Heidegger remarks, ‘the essence of technology comes to the light of day only 
slowly. This day is the world’s night, rearranged into merely technological day. This 
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day is the shortest day. It threatens a single endless winter’.515 The world now 
becomes unholy. The holy stays ‘concealed’ and a track towards the holy no longer 
appears. Some mortals could still be able to see the danger of the unholy and they 
have to recognize the threat that ‘assaults’ human being. ‘To see this danger and point 
it out, there must be mortals who reach sooner into the abyss’.516 
 
3. 4.  Heidegger’s position on Hegel’s thesis on the death of art 
 
According to Heidegger, Hegel’s designation of the end of art does not indicate that 
since the end of the middle ages there are no original works of art worthy to be 
admired.  As Heidegger argues, we cannot refute Hegel’s thesis on the end of art and 
overcome ‘all the history and happenings that stand behind them by objecting against 
Hegel that since 1830 we have had many considerable works of art which we might 
point to’.517 But these works exist only for some particular group of people and only 
for pleasure. And this, Heidegger remarks, does not cancel Hegel’s thesis on the end 
of art but rather verifies it. Hegel’s position on the death of art does not reject the 
possibility that in the future individual works could be original and valued. But as 
these works would belong to particular cultural sectors and particular population 
segments ‘it is proof that art has lost its power to be the absolute, has lost its absolute 
power ’. In terms of this loss the position of art and its relation with knowledge are 
designated in the ground of its present.518  
 
Even though Heidegger closes his discussion in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ with 
the Hegelian thesis on the ‘death of art’, he only partly supports it. Heidegger, 
according to Young, develops his own position on the ‘death of art’ by responding to 
Hegel’s four propositions on the ‘death of art’.519 
 
1. Hegel’s first proposition regards the decline of art in the modern age. Like Hegel, 
Heidegger agrees that art today is not ‘of its highest vocation’.520 Art counts as ‘the 
highest manner’, as great art when it is a manifestation of the truth of beings. Art to be 
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great must possess, like the Greek temple or the statue of god, ‘world-historical 
significance’.521 Great art needs to be truth revealing. 
 
2. Hegel’s second proposition refers to the loss of the greatness of art. For Heidegger 
too great art is ‘a thing of the past’, and it has been since the end of the middle 
ages.522 Following Hegel, Heidegger argues that modernity cannot be as great as the 
art of the past, and is ‘even at its best, something less (actually a lot less) than 
great’.523 Art that can no longer reveal a truth cannot be great. 
 
3. Heidegger disagrees with Hegel’s third proposition, which states that art is 
‘something past’ and will remain dead. 524  For Hegel history and thus art which is 
part of his conception of history never repeat themselves. The art of the past is dead 
and will never repeat its greatness.525 Heidegger rejects this view. For Heidegger 
history is not driven by laws; for him laws are mere ‘illusions’.526 There is nothing 
stopping the rebirth of great art, great art can regain the status and function it once 
had. 
 
4. Heidegger also rejects Hegel’s fourth proposition according to which the death of 
art is viewed as a necessary and essential change or turn, and because of that there is 
no reason ‘for serious regret’.527  Art became or becomes ‘an occasion…for nostalgia 
and expressions of gratitude’.528 In the closing of his investigation on ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, Heidegger questions whether art in modernity is ‘an essential and 
necessary way’ of the happening of truth. He views Hegel’s position on the ‘death of 
art’ in modernity as a matter that ‘has not yet been decided’; for Heidegger the world, 
historical people, are still in need of great art.529  
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Is art in modernity merely an object of aesthetics? Does art in modernity need its own 
public space?  How is the validity of art to be understood in an age that does not offer 
the social and cultural preconditions for such art? What is art in an age without gods? 
 
3. 5.  Art and Aesthetics 
 
In modernity art is no longer the place of truth, ‘art is no longer unavoidably 
formative for our experience of ourselves or the world; it no longer constitutively 
presents or even represents what is absolute for us’.530 The truth that is missing from 
art is not an empirical truth, a truth that is to be seen or experienced through art, but 
as Bernstein remarks it is categorical in the sense of transcendental truth. 531 Art 
according to Bernstein has been alienated from truth, it has lost its ability to present, 
not merely a truth, but to reveal what is absolute, divine and holy. According to 
Bernstein ‘art’s alienation from truth’532  refers not to the truth as such but to the 
truth that is beyond what is intelligible to us and known. The alienation of art’s truth 
is never an absolute absence. Even though Heidegger states that modernity is ‘the 
age without an artwork’, he does not declare an absolute end or death of art. 
Alienation thus is to be understood as the disclosure of truth, the impoverishment of 
the ability of an artwork to reveal a truth. The truth thus becomes a symbol, a 
supernatural truth, a representation or presentation of an empirical and aesthetic 
truth.  
 
Art becomes the space of his exploration of the truth and being but to do so 
Heidegger reconsiders the art of his time and retrieves its cognitive value. Precisely, 
Bernstein writes, Heidegger aims to ‘restore’ the status of art ‘as forms of 
cognition’.533 This task is undertaken by both Heidegger and Gadamer in opposition 
to the belief that was formed since the Enlightenment and designated the status of art 
in terms of subjective judgements.  
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However, Gadamer, Bernstein argues, proceeds in a more radical manner to the 
examination of the turn towards the subjectification of art. For Gadamer with 
enlightenment art lost its cognitive mode in favour of the understanding of art in 
terms of independent and autonomous judgments and subjective tastes. Heidegger on 
the other hand sees this turn in relation to the metaphysical turn in the history of 
philosophy and being. Individual states of feeling, will and thought come to replace 
the true being of art. Aesthetics for Heidegger becomes equivalent to considerations 
of art that are formed by emotions and refer to the beauty of art. For Heidegger, in 
the aesthetic apprehension of art the work of art becomes an object for the subject 
and the relationship between object and subject depends on feelings.534  
 
The notion of aesthetics, Heidegger writes, is formed in the same way as the notion of 
logic and ethics. What completes these notions is the world knowledge in the sense of 
episteme.535 Aesthetics is thus ‘the knowledge of human behaviour with regard to 
sense, sensation, and feeling, and knowledge of how these are determined’. What 
designates the human’s feeling and therefore aesthetics is, Heidegger remarks, the 
beautiful. The object of aesthetics is the beautiful and its relation to the human being’s 
feelings. But what is beautiful in Heidegger’s philosophy of art? As Heidegger argues, 
the beautiful is ‘what in its self-showing brings forth’ human’s state of feeling. But as 
such it is not related merely to art but pertains to nature and art, in the sense of 
handicraft.536  
 
Since in the aesthetic consideration of art the artwork is defined as the beautiful 
which as been brought forth in art, the work is represented as the bearer and 
provoker of the beautiful with relation to our state of feeling. The artwork is posited 
as the ‘object’ for a ‘subject’; definitive for aesthetic consideration is the subject-
object relation, indeed as a relation of feeling. The work becomes as object in terms 
of that surface which is accessible to ‘lived experience’.537 
 
Heidegger’s thinking of the meaning of art in modernity passes necessarily, Bernstein 
argues, through a thinking of the relation of modernity and art. A thinking that 
examines the way non-great art could be more than something aesthetically 
designated. ‘If such an excess beyond aesthetics is implicit in modern art, what is 
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required of philosophy is to underwrite it, to give back to art the transformation of 
cognition that it first makes possible’.538 
 
Thus, even if Heidegger in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ rejects art in modernity as 
great he does not consider the Hegelian ‘death of art’ as an absolute ending. Key for 
the discussion of the validity of art in modernity is the disconnection of art from 
aesthetics and metaphysics. One of the important points of his early account of art for 
a discussion of modern art is that it offers the premises for the overcoming of the 
relation of the function of aesthetic theory in art. The overcoming of aesthetics is, 
Young argues, what allows the re-emergence of a valid art in modernity, ‘creating the 
possibility of the rebirth of art’.539 And this through his designation of art as poetry 
which manages to open the ground for the validity of art after the death of art and to 
think art in modernity as a non-aesthetic art. 
 
More specifically, Heidegger’s early discussion on the death of art and his 
generalisation to modern works of art comes, according to Young, into contradiction 
with his post-war discussions on modern works of art. In 1960 Heidegger comes to 
rethink the significance of the new art in modernity. According his new view, the 
artist of modernity comes to challenge the defined limits of art and to propose an art 
that falls outside the realm of the traditional concept of art, outside traditional 
aesthetic theories and the ‘art industry’.540 Buildings and bridges as well as the poetry 
of Hölderlin and Rilke and the  paintings of Klee and Cézanne represent examples of 
the kind of art that Heidegger had in mind, an art that is not a mere aesthetic object; 
an art which is not an object of museology or ‘connoisseurship’. In his new 
conception, art in the public space or the representation of space in art seems to stand 
as genuine happening of truth.541 This is a re-designation of art which appears to 
accord with the tasks and views of his contemporary art movements. As Young put it, 
Heidegger’s view on art ‘looks to be quite prescient, an anticipation of aspects of the 
current avant-garde ’.542 
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Heidegger wants to find an art which firstly overcomes aesthetics, metaphysical 
meaning and interpretations and secondly could be seen as a holy ground, a place that 
could allow the spectator to dwell in it. Heidegger is searching to find an art in 
modernity that ‘discloses’ the world as a ‘holy place’, a secure place ‘in which the 
things in the midst of which we find ourselves are disclosed as holy things, things to 
be adored and cared for’.543  
 
3. 6. The poetic paradigm: the modern paradigm  
 
What is central in Heidegger’s writings is the relation or ‘identity’ between art and 
poetry.544 This connection becomes the key for the validity of art in modernity. This 
connection drives Heidegger to rethink in his writings on art in modernity and 
furthermore to overcome his thesis on ‘the death of art’. His rethinking of art 
signifies, according to Young, a turn in Heidegger’s thinking on art in the modern 
age. Explicitly it begins with his early thinking about the nature of poetry and 
develops through his discussion of the role of the poet and his reading of the works by 
Hölderlin and Rilke.545  
 
Young argues that even though poetry falls short of fulfilling ‘the highest essence of 
art’ of the Greek paradigm, it appears to be Heidegger’s ‘second paradigm of great, or 
at least ‘valid’ art.’546 ‘The modern paradigm’, as Young calls it, is what brings to 
modernity not the sublime, the eternal spirit of gods, but prepares a  holy ground for 
gods. For Heidegger, the poet is the one that can make us see the world ‘as a holy 
place’, who can make us see ‘the bright possibility of a true world’.547  
 
For poetry to be a true poetry in Heidegger’s sense needs two meanings, a wider and a 
narrow one. For Heidegger all forms of art are poetry in the wider sense of the word 
poetry; ‘if all art is in essence poetry, then the arts of architecture, painting, sculpture, 
and music must be traced back to poesy’.548 Here poetry is used as equivalent to the 
Greek notion of the word poesy, which means creation, a bringing forth of truth. 
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Poetry in its wider meaning is an opening of truth, poesy. Poetry is the ‘composition’, 
as Heidegger put it, ‘the lighting projection of truth.’549 ‘All art, as the letting happen 
of the advent of truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry’.550 
 
Poetry in its narrow meaning indicates the linguistic work and is the art that holds a 
privileged place among the arts. For Heidegger, a poem is a creation, an ‘invention’ or 
as he writes in ‘Language’, a ‘fictive act’. A poem is ‘imaginative’ despite the fact 
that it might unfold images and descriptions.551 The kind of  poetry Heidegger refers 
to is non-metaphysical poetry, the poetry which is free ‘from bondage to the time’s 
idols’.552 Poetry that refers to the present and not to an imaginary world, ‘the realm of 
the unreal’.553 Nevertheless the poet still employs imagination and the poem engages 
the reader’s imagination. But here imagination is part of the process by which poetry 
helps reveal truth, of creating images through language and words. As imaginative as 
a poet can be, he is concerned with the present, with conveying ‘something that could 
be present in its present’ in order to allow the reader to take these images into his own 
mode of imaging.554    
 
Poetry in the wide sense, according to Young, seems to satisfy Heidegger’s search for 
an art that can overcome metaphysics. This is because art as poetry functions as 
‘illuminating projection’; it discloses the worlds and its objects in order to let this 
world happen.555 
 
             Poetry unfolds of unconcealedness and projects ahead into the design of the figure, 
is the Open, which poetry lets happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in 
the midst of beings, the Open brings to shine and ring out.556  
 
This projective thinking is poetry. ‘Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of 
what is’.557 It is the saying and thus projection of the world and earth, and of its 
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synthesis as both conflict and union, and furthermore of the gods’ presence or 
absence, ‘nearness’ or ‘remoteness’.558 Therefore all art that discloses and projects the 
truth is poetry, poetry is the ‘setting-into-work of truth’.  ‘The nature of art is poetry. 
The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth’.559 Art is the founding of truth, 
an opening or an event of truth. This founding is to be understood not as a creation of 
a world from the beginning but as poesy, in Heidegger words, a ‘bringing forth’ of the 
world, earth, divinities and mortals. The work encloses the fourfold, it opens it up and 
makes it visible.560  
 
The poetic paradigm that Young proposes as the new paradigm of art in Heidegger 
encompasses both the wider and narrower meaning of the word poetry. It refers 
particularly to the way poetry opens the way for its fulfilment as a genuine art in 
modernity. But in its broad meaning the poetic paradigm allows all kinds of art to be 
seen as projections of truth. For Heidegger, what unifies the two meanings of poetry is 
language. Poetry as any kind of art is for Heidegger a speaking. Poetry as well as any 
art could bring back the authentic speaking of language. 
 
The speaking of language is not to be understood as a mere communication of 
messages, emotions or an ordinary human act. Specifically, Heidegger opposes his 
conception of language to four ancient beliefs that designate language as ‘audible 
utterance of inner emotions, as human activity, as a representation by image and by 
concept’ and as the expression of feelings.561  However, he does not come to reject 
these ideas as incorrect or wrong but rather as ‘useless’. Even if they are rooted in 
ancient times they overlook, Heidegger remarks, ‘the oldest natural cast of language’ 
that is they fail to identify ‘language as language’.562  
 
‘Language speaks’. And what is spoken keeps safe speaking. ‘In what is spoken, 
speaking gathers the ways in which it persist as well as that which persist by it—its 
                                                
558 Ibid. 
559 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 72. 
560 Young, op. cit., pp. 17,31, 34, 72. 
561 Heidegger, ‘Language’, pp. 191-192. 
562 Ibid., p. 191. 
  
112 
persistence, its presencing’.563 For Heidegger the pure and original speaking is the 
speaking of the poem.564  
 
Language is speaking about the nature of things only when the nature of language is 
respected or as long as language foregoes the speaking of humans. Language could 
unveil what things are and how they are. When we respect the nature of language it 
then tells us the nature of things.565 But humans speak as if they are those who shape 
and dominate language. For Heidegger it is language which is the master of the 
human, language comes first.566 The speech of mortals is not, Heidegger remarks, 
‘self-subsistent’.567 Humans need to learn ‘to live in the speaking of language’.568 As 
Heidegger writes: 
 
mortal speech is a calling that names, a bidding which, out of the simple onefold of 
the difference, bids thing and world to come. What is purely bidden in mortal 
speech is what is spoken in the poem. Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode 
(melos) of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a 
forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any 
longer. 569 
 
Poetry therefore is taken to be a language whose use has been forgotten, the ‘authentic 
language which has not lost its magic potency by being used up and abused’.570 In the 
poem we do not search language as expression of feelings or ideas but ‘the speaking 
of language’.571 Poetry measures the dimension of world and our existence, ‘the 
standard by which all other measures—of this or that or something else—are 
themselves measured’.572 
 
Humans use language as a tool, equipment, and like the tool it becomes used up, it 
loses its primary form and hence meaning and also it is taken as granted and becomes 
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natural. For Heidegger the equipment through its use ‘is worn out and used up’ but 
also its use itself ‘falls into disuse, wears way, and becomes usual’.573 But ‘the 
equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness’.574 Furthermore, the 
usefulness of the equipment lies in its reliability, that is, ‘the abundance of an 
essential being of the equipment’.575 ‘The repose of equipment resting within itself 
consists in its reliability’.576  The equipment ‘is half thing’ because it exists for 
something else, for a specific purpose external to it. Its use abstracts from it ‘the self-
sufficiency of the work of art’.577 According to Heidegger what distinguishes art from 
the equipment is precisely its self sufficient and self referential character. The event of 
the creation of the work of art 
 
does not simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work, casts before itself 
the eventful fact that the work is as this work, and it has constantly this fact about 
itself. The more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the 
uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not.578 
 
The truth of the equipment when it is used falls ‘into oblivion’ ‘as is the wont of 
everything commonplace’, it functions for something else external to it and thus is 
forgotten. 579The more useful the equipment is ‘the more inconspicuous’ its being 
remains within its equipmentality.580 It is when the equipment breaks down and can 
no longer be used that we come closer to its being.  
 
In this sense the true nature and meaning of language when is used, is forgotten, it 
looses its authenticity. Still poetry manages to break down its everyday use. Poetry 
encloses the self-sufficiency of language and allows it to emerge in its true being. 
Poetry is letting us know what things are in true. Poetry allows brings back the 
authenticity of language, ‘its magic potency’. 
 
Thus in order for a human to dwell in a true manner and in order to understand the 
world and his life, his existence, the human must poetically dwell, he must seek the 
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authenticity of things and reveal the truth of things that has been forgotten. Through 
the poetic bringing forth of art humans could ‘become aware’ of the way language 
‘bids to come the entire fourfold world of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, by 
bidding the things to come—window, snow, house, table’ ‘it bids to come the 
intimacy of world things—their difference, which appropriates them to one 
another’.581 For Heidegger ‘language is the original way in which ‘beings are brought 
into the open clearing of truth, in which world and earth, mortals and gods are bidden 
to come to their appointed places of meeting’.582  
 
‘The work of art lets us know’ the truth of things. Van Gogh’s painting discovers the 
‘equipmental quality’ of shoes.583 Poetry, speaking, earth, life, world 
 
From the dark opening of the worn insides the shoes the toilsome tread of the 
worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the 
accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform 
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and 
richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the fild-path as evening 
falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening 
grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. 
This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, 
the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, and trembling before the 
impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This 
equipment belongs to the earth and it is protected in the world of the peasant 
woman. 584 
 
‘This painting spoke’, Heidegger remarks. Van Gogh’s painting discloses the truth of 
the pair of shoes and furthermore the pair of shoes emerges into the truth, the aletheia 
of its being. ‘In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work’.585  This 
setting is poetic projection of the truth of things. Art as poetry reveals the truth of 
things, it brings them to stand in the light of their being.586 His painting projects ‘what 
shoes are in truth’, the world and earth of the peasant woman, the fourfold that allows 
her to dwell. 
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3. 6. 1. The poet in modernity: Hölderlin and Rilke 
 
Heidegger argues that today’s technological way of living and work and subjective 
pleasure and judgment harasses ‘our dwelling’. However, he argues that in the 
destitute days of modernity there is still space for the poetic dwelling, a genuine 
dwelling that overcomes aestheticizing.587 In this destitute time the ‘turning’ will not 
occur/happen either by a new god or the return of a ‘renewed’ old god.588 And this is 
because there is not a place for a god to return; people have not prepared an abode for 
the god to come. But how is it possible to prepare an abode for a god, if the holy no 
longer exists, or in Heidegger words, ‘if a divine radiance did not first begin to shine 
in everything that is’?589 ‘What are poets for’ in modernity? When is the ‘right time’ 
for the gods to return? Could the poetry of Hölderlin or Rilke that Heidegger 
discusses be seen as kinds of art that surpass aesthetics? 
 
The traces of the gods are no longer recognizable: the question that emerges is 
whether the holy is experienced ‘as the track leading to the godhead of the divine’ or 
we only have ‘a trace of the holy’.590 But what could such a track that leads to the 
trace be? Can this track appear to us?  
 
The song is what remains to name, as Heidegger writes, ‘the land over which it 
sings’.591  The poet in the ‘destitute time’ of modernity is the one who looks up to the 
sky and sees the god, not as absolute spirit but ‘in its manifestness the self-
concealment of the unknown god’. God comes to the poet ‘to help him dwell’.592 
Poets show to mortals the traces of gods, the traces into the night, ‘as the singers of 
soundness, the more venturesome ones are ‘poets in a destitute time’’.593 
 
Being a poet in destitute times is ‘to attend, singing, to the trace’ of the gods that have 
left.594 Poets are the ones that can trace the gods, in Heidegger’s words, they ‘are the 
                                                
587 Heidegger, ‘…Poetically Man Dwells…’, in Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 211-227, (p. 211). 
588 Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, p. 90 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid., p. 94. 
591 Ibid., p. 95. 
592 Hofstadter, op. cit., p. xiv. 
593 Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, pp. 137-138, (p. 138). 
594 Ibid., p. 92. 
  
116 
mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, 
stay on the gods’ tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way towards the 
turning’.595 The trace of the gods is the holy, that is, for Heidegger the ‘element of the 
ether for the coming of the fugitive gods’; ‘that within which even the godhead itself 
is still present’,596 and those are traces of the fugitive gods that the poet can only speak 
about, listen and sing for. Therefore in ‘the time of the world’s night’ the poet is the 
person who can speak about the holy; in/ through poetry or rather in the language of 
the poet ‘the world’s night is the holy night’.597 The poet does not turn night into day, 
he does not bring past into present but make us see night as a ‘holy night’. Hölderlin’s 
poetry and language, Heidegger remarks, allows the ‘world’s night’ to be as such a 
‘holy night’.598 
 
The time that Hölderlin finds to be the right time for the gods to return is ‘when there 
has been a turn among men in the right place, in the right way’.599 It is wrong to think, 
Heidegger argues, that Hölderlin’s time will be the time that everyone will understand 
his work. ‘It will never arrive in such a misshapen way; for it is its own destitution 
that endows the era with forces by which, unaware of what it is doing, it keeps 
Hölderlin’s poetry from becoming timely’.600  However, what is believed to be eternal 
only hides ‘a suspended transiency, suspended in the void of a durationless now’.601  
In Hölderlin there is the necessity to think his poetry and ‘to come to learn what is 
unspoken’. And the unspoken is the same history of being. We can come closer to the 
path of the history of Being when thinking opens up a dialogue with poetry.602 As 
Heidegger argues, his metaphysical conception of being is part of the destiny of the 
true Being. ‘The locality to which Hölderlin came is a manifestness of being, a 
manifestness which itself belongs to the destiny of Being and which, out of that 
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destiny, is intended for the poet’.603 Hölderlin’s poetry is a poetic thinking of being. 
But his conception of the being is still designated in terms of Western metaphysics. 604 
The manifestness of being that is located within metaphysics appears on the one hand 
complete and concrete and on the other hand a lethe, as ‘the extreme oblivion of 
Being’.605  
 
Rilke is also involved in the toils of the metaphysical view of reality.606  Rilke in his 
work designates the Being of beings metaphysically as ‘worldly presence’, that is, the 
presence that ‘remains referred to representation in consciousness’. The realm of 
presences, as Heidegger writes, ‘is presence in saying’.607 ‘If Rilke is a ‘Poet in a 
Destitute Time’ then only his poetry can answer the question to what extent he is a 
poet, whither his song is bound, where the poet belongs in the destiny of the world’s 
night. That destiny decides what remains fateful within this poetry’.608 ‘Rilke’s saying 
attains to the poetic vocation of the kind of poet who answers to the coming of world 
era’. But this era is not a ‘decay’ or a ‘downfall’ but a destiny that ‘lies in Being and 
lays claim to man’.609  
 
Poetry in modernity neither presents nor aims to present the gods or their divine spirit 
but merely ‘to build ‘the house into which the gods are to come as guests’’.610 
Hölderlin and Rilke are for Heidegger poets of modernity. They seek to present the 
holy by experiencing the unholy, the destitution of modernity. They experience the 
metaphysics of their time and they acknowledge the absence of the divinity and 
holiness of gods and of gods themselves. Through this experience they create a calling 
for the gods to come closer, to return. The poets, Heidegger argues, can find the holy 
because they can experience the unholy. And the unholy is that which ‘traces the 
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sound for us’; the holy is attracted from the sound, it ‘binds the divine’ and 
furthermore the divine brings nearer the gods. 611 
 
Poetry in modernity could allow dwelling. For Heidegger poetry and dwelling need 
one another, each belongs to the other and calls for the other.612 Poetic language and 
thinking are for Heidegger identical with poetry ‘as essentially poetry’ and this is 
what comes to be ‘an indispensable function for human life: it is the creative source of 
the humanness of the dwelling life of man’. It is poetry or rather the poetic aspect of 
our existence, it is poets ‘and their great poetry’ that could save us from being ‘brutes’ 
‘or what is worse and what we are most like today: vicious automata of self-will’.613  
 
3. 7. Modern painting 
 
The poet’s aim to present the ‘holy’ in  modernity drew Heidegger’s attention to the 
study of modern painting and particularly to discuss individual modern artists who are 
considered to be genuine establishers of the holy, such as Cézanne and Klee.614 As 
Heidegger argues, initially we see the work of Klee as non-figurative; but then 
objects, figures, and nature slowly appear. Abstract forms begin to take shape, and to 
transform into meaningful objects. What on a first inspection appears meaningless 
subsequently takes meaning, the invisible becomes visible, dwelling happens out of a 
‘holy chaos’. And this it is precisely what Heidegger was looking for in modern art, 
an art in which objects do not disappear ‘but step back, as objects, into a worlding’.615  
Worlding indicates that their truth or is never an absolute one and is never fully 
revealed but derives in relation to us and the way we experience these objects we 
become familiar with them and their world. Objects continuously obtain truth and 
meaning. Their truth is an ongoing happening; it revolves and develops in relation to 
their world and earth, to divinity, and mortals.  
 
Although Cézanne’s as well as Klee’s work appears initially as abstract or conceptual, 
it is not to be understood as fully abstract or conceptual art. According to Young, in 
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fully-abstract art the world, the representational objects and figures are entirely lost or 
‘disappear’. In contrast, the object in a semi-abstract work, even if it fails to prevail 
into or onto the scene, it does not entirely disappear.616 The painting as a ‘holy 
ground’ does not represent the world and earth but projects it, allows it to happen, 
makes visible what was hidden.617 For Heidegger the work of Klee and Cézanne are 
examples of what he calls non-figurative or semi-abstract art.618Such works of art do 
not merely represent and imitate the world and its objects but rather they create a 
world and then let it happen, appear.619  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s  approach of Cézanne’s work is based on this turn from the invisible 
to the visible, from stasis to motion. Merleau-Ponty sees this turn towards the visible 
as a result of the materiality of the work, of colours, shapes and lines. According to 
Merleau-Ponty succeeds to bring forth world in his work, and to create the illusion of 
motion and time not through lines and distance but through colour. The colours in his 
work concern the same ‘dimension of colour, that dimension which creates—from 
itself to itself—identities, differences, a texture, a materiality, a something….’620 
 
In his work the viewer is engaged at the same time with the space and objects; one 
looks for space and what the space contains.621 The world and its objects in his work 
derive through the spatiality of colours, which helps them obtain motion. Things 
appear to move ‘they began to modulate in the instability’.622 But motion in his work 
does not derives through a depiction of events but through a transition of a mere 
moment of the world’s motion. As Stokes contends, Cézanne work is a thinking of the 
complication of appearance, ‘the extreme complication of actual, even momentary, 
appearance’.623 For Stokes through the organisation of lines and colours Cézanne 
manages to turn the two dimensionality of his paintings into a space from where the 
world is not merely shown but affirmed. As Stokes writes, in Cézanne’s work: 
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the observational truth of light, space, colour, tone and mass in their subtlest, no 
less that in their generalized, modes, are the sole materials of his structure. The 
otherness of the outside world is affirmed, not mitigated, by the intrusion of this 
artist’s organizing mind. His art needed a constant exercise in observation, for each 
new canvas a forcible detachment from the preconceived; endless thought, endless 
vigilance for every inch of the picture space.624  
 
Light, space and colours become a world, for Heidegger, a presentation of the 
holiness of the world. But this happening does not come forth through the technical 
aspect of the work or from what it represents but rather through the way it allows the 
viewer to transit from what he sees to something else, through the way it brings the 
objects and the world to the present.625  
 
But for Heidegger the attending to the material aspect of the work is only the first step 
in understanding the work. According to Heidegger, the materiality of the work, the 
colours of the painting will then drive us to attend from what is presented to us, to 
‘something else’ that goes beyond the painting as mere colours.626 For Heidegger a 
work of art does not merely represent a world but encloses the world, an entity, a 
thing in order to allow it to be seen in its true being.627 
 
         The temple-work in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but 
rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of 
the work’s world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; 
metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to 
speak. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and 
heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and 
luster of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and 
into the naming power of the word.628 
 
As Heidegger remarks, if art manages to open up a world in the sense of releasing a 
sacred place then it opens up the possibility of human dwelling, the possibility to 
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preserve a home or to break from homelessness.629 Art as a material thing is a place. 
Art articulates and makes available a place.630 Art could release, Heidegger writes, the 
places of gods which have left but still the holy resides.  
 
But how does art make available a place for gods? How does Heidegger designate the 
notion of place and what is the relation between place and space?  
 
In opposition to the ancient Greek and later Christian conception of place Heidegger 
distinguishes the notion of place and space. Place in ancient Greek philosophy was 
understood as the concrete aspect of the infinite world and thus it obtains a 
metaphysical meaning. In Plato place was taken as what exists within space, choros 
and in Aristotle as the sensible environment which is formulated by the world, 
cosmos.631 Place was taken as the finite and sensory but it was always understood in 
relation to the infinity, to what lies beyond the sensual world.632 In Christian tradition 
until the early modern physics the notion of place was still understood in a 
metaphysical manner. Place was liberated into and out of the universe and became an 
infinite space, a teleological universalism.633 
 
According to Casey, since Kant the notion of place is designated by the human body. 
The human body is that which occupies and penetrates ‘a given place’, and 
furthermore experiences it, names it and learns it.634 The importance of the human 
bodily orientation is seen as ‘exceptional’ in the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. The kinesthetic experience of the human becomes now the mode of 
his knowledge.635 However, Heidegger places this action not in the area of place but 
of a world. In Heidegger place becomes not a direction but an ‘indirection’.636 
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Heidegger takes account ‘the role of the body in implacement’ but finds other means 
to access to place ‘as a subject of renewed philosophical importance’.637 Place as 
‘indirection’ is not cancelled but enclosed in and by the relation of the world and earth 
in his early thinking and later by the unity and contradiction of world and earth, 
divinities and mortals. Place obtains meaning when it is realized through dwelling, 
when the human stays ‘within the fourfold among things’;638 as Heidegger remarks 
quoting Hölderlin when human ‘spans the dimension by measuring himself against 
the heavenly’.639And only within the dimension of earth, sky and divinities human can 
measure the dimension of his own existence. As Heidegger writes: 
 
Only in the realm of sheer toil does man toil for ‘merits.’ There he obtains them for 
himself in abundance. But at the same time, in this realm, man is allowed to look 
up, out of it, through it, toward the divinities. The upward glance passes aloft 
toward the sky, and yet it remains below on the earth. The upward glance spans the 
between of sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling of man. 
We now call the span thus meted out the dimension. This dimension does not arise 
from the fact that sky and earth are turned toward one another. Rather, their facing 
each other itself depends on the dimension. Nor is the dimension a stretch of space 
as ordinarily understood; for everything spatial, as something for which space is 
made, is already in need of the dimension, that is, that into which it is admitted.640 
 
Space has extension. Is not emptiness, it is what extends to things and then things 
becomes measurable. Space for Heidegger is the destitute abstraction of technology 
and science. 
 
As against that, however, in the spaces provided for by locations there is always 
space as interval, and in this interval in turn there is space as pure extension. 
Spatium and extensio afford at any time the possibility of measuring things and 
what they make room for, according to distances, spans, and directions, and of 
computing these magnitudes. But the fact that they are universally applicable to 
everything that has extension can in no case make numerical magnitudes the ground 
of the nature of space and locations that are measurable with the aid of 
mathematics.641 
 
Space is ‘something that has been made room for’ and from there starts to be 
presented. Space acquires its being from locations and hence from buildings, from 
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constructions.642 In sculpture space becomes through ‘the sculptured structure’ 
‘closed, breached and empty volume’.643 But this emptiness is either a deficiency or ‘a 
failure to fill up a cavity or gap’. The emptiness comes together with place, and is not 
a failure rather ‘a bringing-forth’.644  
 
Painting captures things, figures and world and isolates it from us by enclose it into its 
surface. The place of painting exists within the limits of painting. But the place of 
sculpture is not completed in the work but through its space, its location and the way 
sculpture alters this location. If in painting the illusion of motion, light and space 
comes through colours, in sculpture it is derived through the way the figures orientate 
the viewer within its space. In sculpture the form and position of figures orientate the 
space and world around it. According to Hopkins, sculpture engages space and 
‘presents us with things as in the same place as parts of ourselves’. We see a plurality 
of forms, of aspects. It makes us ‘aware of ourselves, not merely as located, but as 
embodied’.645 
 
But the emergence of modern sculpture is based upon the loss of place. Sculpture in 
modernity sits in a specific location though it appears alienated and homeless from 
that place and incapable of speaking about it. How is this alienation and homelessness 
to be understood?  How can modern sculpture help restore the loss of its place? 
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4. Modern sculpture: the loss of space 
 
4. 1. The monument in modernity: Rodin 
 
Sculpture in antiquity was bound with the function and ‘logic’ of the monument. As 
Krauss remarks, ‘the logic of sculpture, it would seem, is inseparable from the logic 
of the monument. By virtue of this logic a sculpture is a commemorative 
representation.’646  It would stand on a specific location as a symbol and honour of 
that place and it would speak, Krauss writes, ‘in a symbolical tongue about the 
meaning or use of that place’.647  
 
The monument is erected for the particular purpose of holding human actions or 
events alive for the future nation to remember.648 The monument is erected to hold a 
history, victories of the past or a single human sacrifice, events that a nation needs to 
preserve. Old monuments hold a past, a history for the present. But the historical and 
artistic values of old monuments do not remain the same, they alter in terms of the 
present, they acquire ‘a present day value…for modern life and work’.649  The 
monument, a sculpture, a tower, a tomb, a column, a building, a temple or fragments 
of a temple, is bound up with the notion of architecture in the sense that it stands in a 
particular place and is in need of that place. It is through its place that a monument 
can function in a symbolic way but also the place and geographical alterations 
designate its value and historical importance. The monuments of antiquity do not have 
eternal values, they cannot function in the same way as they did in their historical 
present.  
 
For Heidegger these values are no longer revealed. The truth of the temple is enclosed 
in its historical past and community. The temple is not and cannot be the place of 
gods, of holiness and divinity even if is going to be part of another community. The 
temple stands as an aesthetic object, a monument of an era that has gone. Its truth is 
turned into aesthetic and historical values which are designated by the present 
community and culture. They have, Reigl argues, a relative and ‘historically 
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contingent value’.650  Even if they do not have a direct symbolical function to a place 
and furthermore culture they are still part of the historical development of that culture. 
But the ‘convention’ of the monument was mutable and with the modern age came a 
time when this logic started to ‘fail’.651 Monumental works in early modernism reflect 
this failing. They sit in a specific place but appear alienated from that place and 
incapable of speaking about it. For Heidegger the inability of art to reveal its place, its 
world and earth is what characterises the destitution of modernity. In modernity the 
monument is alienated from its world and earth and furthermore from its present 
community.  
 
Rodin’s The Gates of Hell (fig. 15) and Monument to Balzac (fig. 16) were originally 
planned as monuments. The Gates of Hell was a project for the doors of a new 
museum of decorative arts in Paris. The work was commissioned in 1880 and was 
planned to be completed and delivered to the museum in 1885.  However, the new 
museum was never built and Rodin never completed the work. However, Rodin 
worked on it for thirty seven years, until his death in 1917. The theme of this project 
was Rodin’s choice. Rodin had already begun to develop sketches of figures taken 
from Dante’s Inferno before the committee had ordered the work.652  
 
The Monument to Balzac was made in memory and honour of the persona of the 
French novelist Balzac. The Society of Letters of Paris before giving the project to 
Rodin had considered four other artists. Henri Chapu, who died before finishing the 
work, Marquet de Vasselot and then Millet and Coutan both of whom had applied for 
the project. Rodin was not the first choice but after the death of Chapu, Émile Zola, 
the new president of the committee, insisted on entrusting the project to Rodin. 
However, the society rejected the sculpture made by Rodin who then transferred it to 
his home in Meudon. In 1939, twenty-two years after Rodin’s death, the work was 
cast in bronze and was displayed at the crossings of two boulevards in Paris. 
 
The failure of The Gates of Hell and Monument to Balzac to stand as monuments is 
followed, Krauss suggests, by the fact that a number of versions of both works are 
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displayed in a number of museums in several countries whereas there is none standing 
on the designated locations, as both commissions that have ordered the projects had 
collapsed.653 This failure, according to Krauss, also came as the result of the form and 
specifically of the surface of these two works. In the case of The Gates of Hell the 
doors were so ‘gouged away and anti-structurally encrusted’ that they admit their 
inactive state ‘on their face’. On the other hand, the Monument to Balzac was carried 
out with such a level of subjectivity that even Rodin thought that his work would be 
rejected by the society. 654 
 
With these two works of Rodin, sculpture passed the limits of the ‘logic of the 
monument’ and entered into what Krauss calls ‘a negative condition’. Sculpture 
passed to ‘a kind of sitelessness, or homelessness, an absolute loss of place’.655 The 
failure of Rodin’s work to stand as monument signified at the same time the 
beginning of modern sculpture. It was ‘the modernist period of sculptural production’, 
Krauss argues, ‘that operates in relation to this loss of site, producing the monument 
as abstraction, the monument as pure market or base, functionally placeless and 
largely self-referential’.656 Is the loss of place of a sculpture necessarily a negative 
state for sculpture, or does modern sculpture comes to restore the place of sculpture?  
 
Rodin by placing a work such as The Gates of Hell on the ground transformed 
sculpture; sculpture was no longer an art isolated in its pedestal. Rodin managed to 
bring the viewer closer to the work.657 Rodin’s sculptures are not ‘erected’ like 
traditional sculptures. The absence of the pedestal cancels the traditional connection 
between the work and world, the relationship between the work’s and world’s place. 
As Stern argues, there is ‘no bridge, no attempt to connect the body architecturally 
with the world, with a place, where it should belong’. There is no place to which his 
sculptures could belong.658  
 
 If sculpture in modernity is without a place then does it cease to dwell?  For 
Heidegger art, buildings, and constructions create places. As Heidegger remarks 
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sculpture is ‘an embodying bringing-into-the-work of places, and with them a 
disclosing of regions of possible dwellings for man, regions of the possible tarrying of 
things surrounding and concerning man’.659 Sculpture is ‘the embodiment of the truth 
of Being in its work of instituting places’.660 Together with the temple they hold the 
ground, they reveal a world and at the same time they set ‘this world back again to 
earth’.661  They enclose ‘the figure of the god, and this concealment lets it stand out 
into the only precinct through the open portico’.662 They reveal the mystery and divine 
of their places. They make available places, for human to dwell, for gods to reside.  
 
In the destitute days of modernity Heidegger sees the bridge as an example of 
building that creates the place in which is constructed and furthermore gathers 
together earth and sky, divinities and mortals. As Heidegger remarks, the bridge does 
not merely connect banks over the stream but swings over it ‘with ease and power’. 
The banks are seen as banks because the bridge crosses a stream. ‘The bridge 
designedly causes them to lie across from each other’. The bridge brings with the 
banks the two sides of the landscape that lie behind the stream. Thus, it manages to 
gather in each other the stream, banks and land. The bridge brings the landscape 
around the stream and therefore it directs and bears the stream all the way through the 
meadows.663  
 
Resting upright in the stream's bed, the bridge-piers bear the swing of the arches 
that leave the stream's waters to run their course. The waters may wander on quiet 
and gay, the sky’s floods from storm or thaw may shoot past the piers in torrential 
waves-the bridge is ready for the sky’s weather and its fickle nature. Even where 
the bridge covers the stream, it holds its flow up to the sky by taking it for a 
moment under the vaulted gateway and then setting it free once more.664 
 
The bridge follows the everyday activities of humans, it attends to the motion of 
humans and in that way ‘they may get to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the 
other side’. The bridge also brings together ‘as a passage that crosses’, the divinities 
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when humans openly think of them or when they silently praise them. ‘The bridge 
gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals’.665 
 
But sculpture in modernity does no longer gather the fourfold in the way traditional 
sculpture and the temple in ancient Greece or even the bridge in modernity. Does 
sculpture in modernity allows dwelling in a different manner? 
  
‘But where are Rodin’s things to go?’ Rilke asks. Is there a place for Rodin’s work 
and what kind of place it is? 666 Which kind of social place is the place of Rodin’s 
sculptures? ‘A church? A government building? A bourgeois home? A public square? 
All equally impossible. A garden? Hardly. Nature? Perhaps’.667 As Rilke writes: 
 
one might almost be persuaded that there is nowhere any place for these things. 
Who will venture to receive them? And are they not themselves the confession of 
their own tragedy, these radiant things which, in their loneliness, have drawn the 
heavens about them? And which now stand there beyond the power of any building 
to control? They stand in space. What have they to do with us? 668 
 
In the houses of the eighteenth century and in its well-ordered parks he saw 
sorrowfully the last outward appearance of the inner life of an age. And patiently he 
discovered in it the marks of that union with nature which has since been lost.669 
 
His works could not wait; they had to be made. He long foresaw their 
homelessness. The only choice he had was to destroy them while yet within him, or 
to win for them the sky which is about the mountains. And that was his work. He 
raised the immense arc of his world above us and made it a part of Nature.670 
 
Rodin places his works in the world, in his garden or in his own museum.671 Rodin 
believed, that there is no right social place or building for his work.672 The art of the 
past had to fulfil a religious and social role for the historical community. But Rodin’s 
figures exist on their own, without belonging to a community, a location or place. For 
Rilke this ‘unplaceability’ is what makes Rodin’s sculpture to be without a home. But 
this homelessness is never a social or artistic weakness but rather for Rilke a divine 
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element.673 Sculpture is no longer called to represent history, human actions and 
events. It stands for itself independent from previous social and artistic purposes. The 
divine element of Rodin’s sculptures does not refer to representation of the gods but 
to the acknowledgment of the loss of the gods and to the homelessness of art in 
modernity which in Rodin’s sculptures is turned into autonomy. 
 
The first novelty of Rodin’s work is the removal of the pedestal from his sculptures. 
Rodin does not create a pedestal for his work, a social or religious base, or 
architectural background but gives himself a substitute. He provides most of his 
sculptures with ‘a piece of world to which they belong from which they seem to 
originate—a piece of petrified chaos as it were’.674 And when it seems that he 
provides a shelter for his work, this shelter is not external to the work but is part of the 
work and its meaning.675 Rodin was aiming to create works despite of their location, 
that could stand independent of their place.676 
 
In contrast to traditional sculpture his figures are not standing, showing themselves 
off. His figures do not perform or act. In the contrary, they do not do anything.677 
‘Rodin’s figures do not ‘make’ any gestures; they are their gestures’.678 What they are 
or, according to Stern what they say, comes through the intensity and expressivity of 
their bodies. As his work The Shade (fig. 17), Stern writes, speaks with his body but 
‘this ‘speaking’ is filled with that melancholia and intensity of the animal or the mute, 
which is the effect of frustration and despair, the effect of not being able to speak.’ 
The Shade is not doing something, it is merely ‘expressing himself’.  This expression 
does not have a receiver. He does not express himself to someone, ‘he is 
communicating, but with no partner/ he is praying, but to no God’.679 
 
Rodin has to find a way to overcome what Rilke described as the ‘essential 
homelessness of sculpture in an environment of impermanence and instability that 
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made the monumental redundant’.680  Rodin succeeds in overcoming the isolation and 
homelessness of his figures through the subject-matter of his work. His subject-matter 
is the intense conditions of feelings, which are developed either as composite, 
provocative or erotic. The new emotional subject-matter of his work could be seen as 
the second novelty of his work. Through his subject-matter Rodin achieves a 
transformation of homelessness into a positive state. ‘He transforms the isolation into 
something positive, into desire—desire to break the isolation’. As Sterns continues, 
‘Rodin plays God’ and gives to his sculpture a partner, because as Rodin states ‘it is 
not good, that the man should be alone. I will make him a helpmate’. Rodin creates 
works in pairs as in the case of his erotic works such as The Kiss, (fig. 18) Fugit 
Amor, The Eternal Idol, and I am Beautiful or a group of figures as in the case of The 
Burghers of Calais a monument  in honour of those who have been sacrificed in the 
fourteenth century to save the city from destruction or by multiplying the homeless 
figure by three or four as in the case of The Three Shades (fig. 19) in order to give to 
his figure ‘at least the consolation of its own company’.681 
 
Rodin’s compositions lack the expressive act that the single figure carries. In Rodin’s 
work ‘composition, architecture, structure, could only ‘carry’ within the limits of the 
single figure’.682 As Tucker argues, ‘multiplication of figures cancels out the distinct 
expressive potential of each by defining the dramatic too literally, i.e. tying it to a 
dramatic ‘situation, and by sheer visual overstatement’.683  
 
His figures play with gravity and this characterises a great part of his work. The 
expressivity of his subject-matter allows Rodin new methods for structuring his 
figures. In The Gates of Hell, for example, and in works that function both as 
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sculptures and as reliefs, the form and structure of the human body is designated by 
the posture of the figures.684  Towards the end of his artistic career Rodin developed 
the idea of re-structuring the figure in favour of its posture. This re-structuring was to 
be developed through a series of partial and fragmented figures. In his works Torso of 
Seated Woman Clasping her Left Leg, 1890, Iris, The Messenger of the Gods, 1890-
91 and Flying Figure, 1890-91 Rodin does not have a specific orientation of the 
figures.685  These works are not to be seen, according to Tucker, as arbitrary or overly 
expressive works. ‘Each sculpture is taut and tightly structured, with the arm or arms 
bonding to the leg to achieve a constructive unity that can still, by reference to our 
own body experience, be felt as anatomically ‘real’’.686 These works could be seen as 
having the character of an object.687 But even if this object character appears to derive 
from abstraction, this abstraction is not to be taken as an elimination of the form of 
the human body or of the figure. For Tucker, this abstraction is a result of his longing 
‘to express a sense of the figure with increased force’. Rodin’s figures function as the 
means to abstraction.688  
 
A third innovation that Rodin brings to sculpture is his approach to the human body. 
The force that Rodin gives to his figures creates an impression of a continuous 
movement. As Rodin states, ‘different parts of a sculpture represented at successive 
moments in time give an illusion of actual motion’.689As Champigneulle remarks, 
‘Rodin was so anxious to capture life ‘on the wing’’. Rodin used to work like a 
modern photographer who captures the natural expressions of his subject not by 
making him pose but through a selection of numerous snapshots. Rodin starts his 
work by sketching his model from many angles and positions and through his 
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sketches seeks to capture their fleeting motion.690 But Rodin, as Champigneulle 
indicates, was never satisfied in his study of the human form. He would always come 
back to his study ‘with a joyous and unfailing sense of discovery’.  Despite the details 
of the materiality of his work, it could be seen at the same time as a simplified version 
of movements which appear like a combination of the thousands of movements which 
comprise the human body.691  
 
Greek sculpture immortalizes God, the human image, the being. It is not the human 
body that Rodin wants to immortalize but ‘the becoming as such, the time character of 
life as such’, Stern argues. He aims to rethink the structure of the human body and 
how it comes into being, as Stern writes, to ‘retranslate the stability of the body into 
terms of becoming’. The head does not represent a substance but a process. The body 
has not found its final form.692 Rodin’s sculptures are a continuous quest of the 
expressivity of the human body.693 
 
4. 2. Rodin’s The Kiss 
 
Rodin’s work still shares a number of affinities with the academic neo-classical style. 
The element of the nude, the use of the marble, and his use of the pyramidal 
composition, in works such as The Kiss, Balzac and The Thinker, which were popular 
at the time for academic monuments. The fourth novelty in Rodin is that he chose a 
subject-matter that has never been represented before in sculpture and that he 
removed academic forms of symbolism that provoke the viewer to read the work as a 
narrative, as part of a story. The narrative in Rodin’s work is not entirely absent but 
derives from decoding the parts of the work, the work as a whole and the way it 
engages the viewer to observe it. The process of experiencing the work replaces the 
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unfolding of the narrative. His aim was to give to the work its own autonomy and to 
provoke the viewer to see it and examine it in its own terms. 
 
Lovers, as Champigneulle indicates, had not until Rodin been a subject matter for 
Western sculpture. Man and woman was often a common theme but usually 
represented in scenes of rape and abduction, or scenes of death, placed usually side by 
side on the top of a common tomb. On the other hand in the history of art, love was 
represented in the image of Venus or cupid.  Even if Rodin’s representation of love 
and the loving couple was one of his favourite themes, he never represented a Venus 
or a cupid but aimed to explore human embraces.694 With The Kiss, one of Rodin’s 
most popular works, ‘he portrayed love in living, visual terms, in terms of man and 
woman, of the kiss, of the embrace of bodies daringly entwined in their craving to 
become one’.695  
 
The Kiss is a marble sculpture completed in 1889 that belongs to the group of works 
conceived for Rodin's The Gates of Hell to represent the story of love of Paolo and 
Francesca in Dante’s Inferno. The Kiss was commissioned by the French government 
for the 1889 Exhibition Universelle. However, it was publicly exhibited for the first 
time in the salon of the National Society of Fine Arts in 1898. In 1991, the original 
Kiss was moved to the Museum of Rodin in Paris. It was so popular that the company 
Barbedienne made in 1899 a contract with Rodin to produce a number of smaller 
versions of the work in bronze. There are many versions of The Kiss, some cast by 
Alexis Rudier, one of Rodin’s assistants. The first title of this work was ‘Francesca da 
Rimini’ from the name of the Italian character from Dante’s Infermo who falls in love 
with Paolo the younger brother of her husband Giovanni Malatesta. According to the 
story, Francesca and Paolo fell in love reading the book of story of Lancelot and 
Guinevere, which Rodin places in Paolo’s hand at the back of the work. Even if the 
book is what will give the identity of Paolo and Francesca Rodin hides it in the back 
of Paolo so as not to interrupt the narrative perception of the work. The book becomes 
part of the process of experiencing the work.  
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Sculpture as such is to be seen from all round. In contrast to painting it requires more 
than one point of view in order to capture the aspects of the representation. In Rodin’s 
work, however, each aspect restrains the viewer from gaining an overall image of the 
work. Each part does not reveal what we expect to see. The viewer cannot obtain an 
overall view of the work from any one site of the work. The kiss of the couple is so 
difficult to be see that the viewer is provoked to see the work from many angles.696 
And as Krauss put it, it is like seeing the work from a wrong angle, but ‘Rodin’s work 
has no angle of view that would be ‘‘correct’’ – no vantage point that would give 
coherence to the figures’.697 Rodin’s aim is not to find an ideal view point, that is, a 
point which will allow the viewer to receive as much information as possible to 
apprehend the object. But rather his aim is, as Krauss writes, to provide ‘multiple 
vantage points’.698 
 
All viewpoints, all sides are important in the same manner. Sculpture thus loses its 
main view; there are no longer frontal and rear positions.699 The perception of the 
work does not derive as in the classical and traditional sculpture in general from what 
is there, from what we see but from what is not there, from what is missing.700 The 
structure is not as in a classical work a composition in which one part leads logically 
to another part and then to the whole. Rodin replaces this narrative reading of the 
work with one that sends us back to the work’s materiality and creative process.701 In 
The Kiss the faces of the figures are hidden which makes their embrace and their kiss 
a private action. However, even if in the original sculpture their lips do not really 
touch, the posture of their bodies gives the impression of an actual kiss. The meaning 
of The Kiss is developed through the process of experiencing the work, the embrace 
of the figures and the illusion of the motion of their bodies. 
 
However, according to Gsell, Rodin himself was not completely satisfied with The 
Kiss. He finds the embrace attractive but says,  
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I have found nothing in this group. It is a theme frequently treated in the academic 
tradition, a subject complete in it and artificially isolated from the worlds 
surrounding it; it is a big ornament sculpted according to the usual formula and 
which focuses attention on the two personages instead of opening up wide horizons 
of daydreams.702 
 
His aim is to engage the viewer with the work, to make him think about the work 
rather than gaze at the work. As his says, he wanted to offer to the viewer ‘the 
impulse… to wander according to its fancy. This, I believe, is the role of art’.703  
 
4. 3. Rodin’s The Earth and the Moon  
 
Like many of Rodin works, The Earth and the Moon derives from his work The Gates 
of Hell and is made in white marble in 1898-99. The title implies the contradiction of 
the earthly with the ethereal, the temporal and the eternal. Even if the title of the work 
is believed to refer to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the lack of symbols prohibits the 
viewer from reading the work in terms of a myth or a story about the creation of the 
world. The narrative symbolism is replaced by a symbolic relation between the 
fragmented marble block and the polished figures. The fragmented part of the 
material appears as if it is allowing the marble figure and its ‘rocklike’ background to 
conjoin in a ‘seamless’ oneness. As in Rodin’s work The Kiss, ‘the same piece of 
marble could look like flesh and like rock, as required by the representational content 
of the piece’; ‘the illusionist non finito aspect of the material, that allowed the marble 
figure and its rocklike base to blend into each other in a seamless unity’.704 
 
In opposition to the monumental status of The Kiss, The Earth and the Moon (fig. 20) 
does not drive the viewer to examine the work from many angles. Its small size, rocky 
character and the small size of the figures in relation to the block suggest than the 
work is to be seen from the front and from a close distance in order to observe the 
details and the way the figures emerge throughout the block. The difference and 
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contradiction between the figures and the block drive the viewer to see the work as a 
relief. 
 
The two figures in The Earth and the Moon are not autonomous as in the case of The 
Kiss. Rodin in this work brings a different kind of anatomy. There is not a logical 
structure of the bodies of the figures. The figures are ‘re-structured in terms of the 
posture’ and in terms of their background.705  The relief functions as the picture 
surface and as Krauss put it, ‘as an open space in which the backward extension of a 
face or a body occurs’.706 Usually in classical reliefs the released forms emerge in 
such way that their shadows draw the viewer’s attention to the ‘buried and unseen’. 
The unseen becomes part of the representation and the viewer has to fill in the 
information about the aspects that are hidden. 707 In this work the relation between the 
background and the figures does not function in favour of the representation. ‘The 
foul-round figures’ appear as if they are partially ‘released’ from their background. 
They emerge giving the impression that there is still a part of them unseen, hidden. 708 
The shadow appears, according to Krauss, to give emphasis to ‘the isolation and 
detachment of the foul-round figures from the relief ground’. This has as a result the 
enforcement of our impression of the background of the work as a concrete object ‘in 
its own right’. 709  The background becomes an object which holds up and interrupts 
the viewer from the illusion of seeing through it to a place beyond it. It blocks, 
according to Krauss, a perceptual expansion of the form of the figures. The shadow in 
Rodin’s work stresses the fact that the figures are on purpose unfinished or 
fragmented and necessarily partial.710 
 
The work reflects once more Rodin’s continuous exploration of the human form and 
expression. The expression of the figures does not derive from their face but from 
their bodies which gives also the impression of a circular motion. The central theme 
of the work is not the figures as such, but their motion, the way they emerge from the 
fragmented block, the way the block illuminates the figures, and the way the whole 
work comes to life.  The expression of his works derives through modelling. What is 
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characteristic of most of his works is that no part of the work is left untouched but as a 
whole the work often appears as abstract, fragmentary and unfinished. In both carving 
and modelling he handles every part of the figure in favour of the materiality and 
surface of the work rather than its representation. The surface is never entirely 
polished—it appears polished through the contrast of the figures with their 
background.711 This contrast is what unifies the figures with the background and their 
base.   
 
What is modern in Rodin’s works is ‘the concern with material, structure and gravity 
as ends in themselves’.712 Even though Rodin is not considered to belong to the 
Impressionist movement he did follow their search for capturing light. The 
impressionist painters wanted ‘to reconstitute natural light by breaking it down into 
components colours’ in order present the illusion of an actual movement. Rodin seeks 
to achieve this result and capture ‘vibrations of light’ ‘by breaking up surfaces’, to 
give the impression of motion and action to his sculpture.713 
 
The meaning of Rodin’s sculptures does not forego experience but happens through 
the process of experiencing the work, it ‘occurs in the process of experience itself’. 714 
There is no position, no ‘vantage’ point, from which we can get the answer for the 
meaning of the work, but only what Krauss calls a condition, a kind of ‘belief in the 
manifest intelligibility of surfaces, and that entails relinquishing certain notions of 
cause as it relates to meaning, or accepting the possibility of meaning without the 
proof of verification of cause’.715 For Krauss this condition is to be understood in a 
phenomenological manner. Krauss following Husserl argues that the meaning is 
synchronous with experience and it does not exist necessarily a priori to it. Krauss is 
concerned with Husserl’s notion of the self, which is ‘essentially private and 
inaccessible’.  
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In order for the ‘I’ to be the same entity both for myself and for the person to whom 
I am speaking, I must become myself as I manifest to others; my self must be 
formed at the juncture between that self of which surfaces in all the acts, gestures, 
and movements of my body.716 
 
Precisely, Rodin’s works manifest a phenomenological notion of the self. Their 
meaning does not presuppose ‘foreknowledge’ or ‘premeditation’. The understanding, 
appreciation and pleasure of the works depend on the gesture and motion of the 
bodies of the figures ‘as they externalize themselves’. The surface of the body of the 
figures, is Krauss argues, the boundary between what we take to be internal and 
external, private and public is the place of the meaning of Rodin’s work. The surface 
of his work expresses ‘equally the results of internal and external forces’. That is, 
between forces of anatomy and muscularity and forces that form the figure from the 
outside, from the artist, his process of manipulation of the materials, ‘artifice’, his act 
of making.717 ‘It is on the surface of the work that the two senses of process 
coincide—there the externalization of gesture meets with the imprint of the artist’s act 
as he shapes the work’.718 Over and over again Rodin compels the viewer to concede 
and acknowledge the work as a result of a development, a process that gave form to 
figures, ‘an act that has shaped the figure over time’.719 
 
The Earth and the Moon work does not provoke the viewer to read the work in terms 
of a story. The absence of a story is replaced however by a narrative process of 
understanding and experiencing the work. His work gives to the viewer the 
impression of an event which includes the work as a whole, each figure and the 
surface of the work.720  
 
Rodin’s sculptures do not belong to a place but by placing his sculptures in nature, on 
the ground, he liberated sculpture from its architectural abutment and brought the 
viewer nearer to the work. Rodin’s figures are not standing or performing, but as 
noted above, ‘they are their gestures’.721 It is through these gestures that his figures 
come to express extreme conditions of feelings, that Rodin overcomes the isolation 
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and homelessness of his figures. In the case The Kiss and The Earth and the Moon the 
isolation of sculpture is overcome by eroticism he gives to the pairs of his figures. An 
eroticism which continually evolves through experiencing the work but never fully 
revealed or externalised. The breaking up of unplaceability and isolation of The Kiss 
and The Earth and the Moon derives from the acknowledgement of the work as the 
result of a process and furthermore from the acknowledgment of the contradiction 
between the external and the private. But is the breaking up of the isolation of Rodin’s 
sculptures fully completed?  
 
The antithesis between the external and the internal forces could be seen as an 
antiphasis between overcoming of homelessness of his work and a verification of its 
autonomy. Rodin’s sculptures are autonomous, they are not erected a social or cultural 
symbols but they refer to themselves, to the process of creation and making.  
But it is this autonomy that keeps them isolated from place. What is special about his 
work is that he manages to break up partly the isolation of his sculptures and at the 
same time to preserve their autonomy. The process of creation that characterises its 
work is what allows both the overcoming of the unplaceability and the preservation of 
the autonomy of his work.  
 
4. 4. The reconstitution of space in sculpture: Giacometti 
 
Rodin’s figures are not diminished by their background, their background becomes 
part of the work. As Danto argues, Rodin’s figures appear as real humans, to be seen 
from any angle. Giacometti’s figures on the other hand differ in both form and 
expression. And this is because they are aimed to be seen not as we see real humans 
but as we see the figures on the surface of a painting.722 Giacometti manages to 
restore the space of sculpture that has been lost in ancient sculpture. A space that as 
Sartre states is both ‘imaginary and indivisible’.723  
Giacometti, Sartre writes, has found the absolute which in the beginning of his career 
based it upon relativity, upon an acknowledgement of the impotence of approaching 
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the absolute truth of human being.724 Giacometti did not aim to capture the absolute 
being of the human but to capture the human as it is in the world. Sartre’s designation 
of the absolute in Giacometti’s work comes close to Heidegger’s notion of aletheia, 
not always revealing but as both revealing and concealment. Giacometti, Sartre 
argues, did not aim to capture the absolute being of the human but to sculpt the human 
in the way it appears, that is from a distance (fig. 21).725  
 
The work of Giacometti appears always in a distance and this is what Sartre names 
the absolute in his work726, an absolute which at the same time contains the relativity 
of the truth of being. Giacometti, Sartre writes, places his figures into an imaginary 
frame, a shelter like a painter which gives to his figures the shelter of the surface and 
encloses them into ‘an absolute distance’.727 Most sculptors left their works to be 
taken by the infinite character of the space. Most sculptors ‘confuse the flaccidness of 
extension with largesse, they put too much in their works, they delight in the fat curve 
of a marble hip, they spread out, thicken, and expand the human gesture’.728 But 
Giacometti acknowledges that in human being there is nothing redundant, that space 
reduces being, for him to sculpt human is to reduce space, to compress it and ‘drain 
off its exteriority’.729 
 
In opposition to the sculptures of Rodin, Giacometti’s sculptures are not to be seen 
from different points of view but, as in a painting, they are to be seen from a certain 
angle except that it does not matter where we choose to stand.730  The angle is created 
through the space that surrounds the work.  In Rodin’s work but also in traditional 
sculptures, the viewer sees and learns about the works as he comes near them and at 
each instant notices new details. The space that surrounds the work of Giacometti 
interrupts the relation between the viewer and the work.731  As Martin argues, the 
viewer becomes aware of the space that surrounds the figures. 
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         Since the attribution of Giacometti’s figures appears to be caused by the invading 
centripetal forces of the encompassing space, and yet there are also powerful 
centrifugal forces, we are made actually aware of the space.732 
 
Does the awareness of the space of sculpture constitute a verification of its 
homelessness? Giacometti’s sculptures appear isolated, Martin argues. They show 
forth ‘the absence of that spatial withness’.733 In opposition to Rodin’s compositions 
where the figures appear to complete and correspond to one another, Giacometti’s 
figures stand alone. Even in works where he presents figures in groups, such as his 
1949 work Three Men Walking (fig. 22), each figure appears isolated and alienated 
from the others. To overcome their homelessness, Giacometti provides them with 
their own space. Giacometti like Rodin gives to his sculptures a part of world in 
which to belong. But Giacometti, in opposition to Rodin, gives to his figures a world, 
a shelter that is not part of them but something external to them. They overcome their 
homelessness because they occupy their own location, their own place. Like 
traditional sculptures Giacometti’s sculptures bring forth place but this place is neither 
a public nor a social one but belongs to the sculptures themselves. The meaning of 
Giacometti’s sculptures does not exist in the work itself but derives from its relation 
to the place and space that the sculptures own/occupy whether they stand, sit or walk. 
 
The distance does not reduce the figures to parts or figures. ‘Everything except 
matter:  twenty paces one thinks one sees, but one does not observe the tedious desert 
of adipose tissue; it is suggested, outlined, meant, but not given’. Giacometti 
compressed space only through distance.734 We do not approach the sculptures of 
Giacometti, but, as Sartre writes, ‘these statues only permit themselves to be seen 
from a respectful distance’, although ‘everything is there’.735 Giacometti’s sculptures 
stay distant even when someone comes closer, even when someone touches them.736 
We do not discover or see something new. They remain like remote shades of human 
figures. 
But how can the same work remain unaltered viewed from a distance or close-up? 
These two views do differ, Sartre writes. What we see when we come closer to the 
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work is the object as mere matter, ‘the block of plaster’, but from a distance we see 
the work, ‘the imaginary figure’.737 As we move closer to the work, the work does not 
appear bigger but its qualities are expanded. The sculptures of Giacometti ‘are wholly 
and all at once what they are’.738 The details of the surface of the sculpture and the 
materiality of the work do not carry a meaning. The meaning of the work comes only 
through the work as a whole, the idea of the work. The idea, Danto writes, ‘possesses 
such immediate translucidity, the idea alone is at one stroke all that it is’.739 Through 
this idea Giacometti gives his own solution to the problem of the unity of the parts of 
the human body and achieves this by suppressing multiplicity. We do not observe the 
human body but it appears through the materiality of the work, the plaster or the 
bronze. His figures appear ‘totally and at once’, a mere presence.740 For Danto this 
perspective remained him throughout his career, in his works of paintings, drawings 
and sculptures.  
Giacometti wanted to reach closer to the appearance of the human being, ‘deeper than 
what heads look like’. He was interested in how a head looks when someone is 
looking at somewhere or something. For Giacometti for three thousands years 
‘sculpture modelled only corpses’. Some sculptures ‘were laid out to sleep on tombs, 
sometimes they were seated on curule chairs, they were also perched on horses. These 
frozen forms contain within themselves an infinite dispersion’. It is through our 
imagination that these forms obtain motion and life ‘to the eternal collapse of matter’. 
As Sartre remarks, Giacometti as well as his contemporaries wanted to prove that 
sculpture is possible. The question that Giacometti set out to solve was how he could 
sculpt a human and not petrify him.741 As Danto reports, Giacometti said that while he 
was drawing a girl he suddenly realized that her eyes and specifically her gaze was 
the only thing alive on her. ‘One does want to sculpt a living person, but what makes 
him alive is without a doubt his gaze. Not the imitation of eyes, but really and truly a 
gaze.’742As Danto remarks, ‘his tireless effort was to bring clay to life. Nothing but 
life was art in his view’. 
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Giacometti manages to show to us the human as ‘already seen’, as the human appears, 
not merely as the human appears to him but ‘as a foreign language we try to learn is 
already spoken’.743 He creates his figures at the right human distance and each work 
shows to us the humans that we are, ‘the being whose essence is to exist for others’.744 
Giacometti wanted, Danto argues, to create ‘the human body as if it were almost 
purely a soul’.745 He wanted to create a figure in which the viewer does no longer sees 
the work as a material thing. As Sartre writes, ‘the figure places itself in the unreal, 
since its relation to you no longer depends on your relation to the block of plaster: art 
is liberated’.746 
According to Sartre, Giacometti gives 
sensible expression to this pure presence, to this gift of the self. To this 
instantaneous coming forth, that Giacometti resorts to elongation. The original 
movement of creation, that movement without duration, without parts, and so well 
imagined by these long, gracile limbs, traverses their Greco-like bodies, and raises 
them towards heaven.747 
 
This is the figure of the human, the true beginning and absolute resource of gesture. In 
opposition to traditional sculptors who sculpted the human body lost but lost being 
through ‘an infinity of appearances’ Giacometti gave to matter the one and real unity 
of the human that is, ‘the unity of the Act’.748  
 
Giacometti’s art externalizes the veiled truths of reality ‘in strange and wonderful 
objects’ a physical reality which ‘dreams disclosed’. Giacometti writes, ‘for many 
years I have executed only sculptures that have presented themselves to my mind 
entirely completed’.749 But after some years Giacometti altered his view on art and its 
relation between a work of art and an object. An everyday object as a mere thing does 
not present any vision or part of reality. If an object breaks then its use is cancelled 
and then ‘it is nothing at all’. But if a work of art breaks or is damaged it still exists as 
long as it brings forth the vision that it meant to present.750  
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In Heidegger’s terms, an object, equipment must be perfect and complete in itself in 
order to function for its specific purpose. But for Heidegger the equipment reveals 
part of reality. The pair of shoes of the peasant woman encloses her world, her 
everyday activities. However this world and reality cannot be revealed, they are 
forgotten through the use of the equipment. When the equipment breaks and its 
function is cancelled, its truth comes forth. It is the authenticity of art and its self-
sufficiency of art and not its formal condition that allows its truth, its reality to be 
present. As Giacometti remarks, in opposition to an object which is perfect and 
complete in itself, a work of art could never be perfect and complete because it 
presents an angle on reality, a specific vision.751  
 
But Giacometti did not seek to present a part of the world. The part of reality that 
Giacometti aims to present is the reality of human being. Giacometti, as we have seen, 
wanted to reach deeper than the image of things and to reach the true being of the 
human. The lack of gestures, the mass and volume of his figures, abstract from them 
their ability to bring forth, like traditional sculpture, place. In opposition to traditional 
sculpture, Giacometti’s sculptures cannot generate place or have a symbolical 
meaning about the meaning of a place but instead they themselves own and preserve 
their own place and space. The figures of Giacometti make us aware of the place that 
his sculptures occupy but also the space that evolves through them. As Martin 
remarks, ‘since the attribution of Giacometti’s figures appears to be caused by the 
invading centripetal forces of the encompassing space, and yet there are also powerful 
centrifugal forces, we are made actually aware of the space’.752  
 
The awareness of their own space could be seen as their homelessness and isolation 
but on the other hand it could be turned to be an awareness of their independence and 
freedom. Giacometti creates a place, a world for his figures to stand as subjects. The 
being that he presents is not the one that is in the world, but the being ‘which-lies-
before’ and collects everything into it. Giacometti figures verify the metaphysical 
concept of being in modernity. It is only when the human stays a subject, that his 
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tasks and achievements ‘have any meaning’.753 Heidegger argues, in modernity the 
human as a subject is free.754 And if the human is truly a subject he has the chance to 
slip into individualism, to enter as Heidegger put it, ‘into the aberration of 
subjectivism in the sense of individualism.’755  
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III. Heidegger and metaphysics in art: the religious dimension of the work of Barnett 
Newman  
 
Art … has a fundamental catalytic function, which is to effect sublimation by all its 
means of expression. It should aim to lead by constant points of reference towards 
that total exaltation in which, unaware of self, the individual will identify with an 
immediate, rare, vast and perfect truth. If a work of art achieves this even for an 
instant, it has fulfilled its purpose.756 
 
Introduction 
 
Barnett Newman’s work Onement 1 (fig. 23) made in 1948 marks the beginning of his 
exploration of the repetition of vertical lines, or zips as Newman calls them, referring 
perhaps to the sound of the tape when it is pulled away. For Newman, the zips are not 
colored lines, or stripes, but ‘color planes’.757 The mark of abstract expressionism is 
the gesture of the repetition.758 Abstract expressionist art succeeded in isolating 
expression through repetition of abstract shapes that appear to deny any reference to 
the world and its objects. However, expression in Newman’s work is designated, not 
by a personal ‘calligraphy of gestures’ as in the work of Pollock and De Kooning, but 
with an impersonal ‘typography of the vertical’.759 Both series of Newman’s work 
The Stations of the Cross and Here consist of variations of vertical lines. The viewer, 
according to Calas, is driven on the one hand to detect differences in repetition but on 
the other hand to decipher the expression. However, both works are linked with the 
symbol of the cross and are considered to express ‘a religious narrative’.760 But what 
is the meaning of the symbol of the cross in the work of Newman? Furthermore, how 
is the religious dimension of the work of Newman to be understood in relation to 
modernity?  
 
The third part of the thesis examines more closely the way modern art, and 
particularly the work of abstract expressionist artist Barnett Newman, is to be 
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understood through Heidegger’s philosophy of art. As we have seen in the previous 
part Heidegger accepts that art after the death of art could be seen as genuine 
happenings of truth. According Heidegger the artist of modernity challenges the 
defined limits of art and proposes an art that challenges the metaphysical conception 
of traditional art. Following Heidegger’s position on the metaphysics of art as well as 
his approach to art in modernity I suggest that both symbolism and the religious 
dimension of Newman’s work are to be understood as a kind of non-metaphysical art. 
 
The starting point for this study is Heidegger’s discussion on the Western metaphysics 
of being. For Heidegger the oblivion of the true nature of being is what characterizes 
Western philosophy since Plato, as well as medieval theology and art since the Middle 
Ages. Based upon the misunderstanding of being in Western philosophy, theology 
and art are as such metaphysical. The aim of the fifth chapter of the thesis is to present 
and examine the matter of truth in art in relation to philosophy and theology. Art for 
Heidegger not only confirms the same presuppositions of the true world but from this 
respect art as the sensuous seems superior to the Platonic and Christian truth. Thus, art 
that surpasses metaphysics in modernity could be seen as a genuine happening of 
truth.  
 
The study concentrates on the way art in modernity could be seen as a genuine 
bringing forth of truth. As has been seen in chapter three, Heidegger criticizes art that 
follows Platonism and aims either to represent the world as aesthetically beautiful and 
pleasant or to symbolise a Platonic idea through the image of the world and its 
objects. For Heidegger these two kinds of art are metaphysical and as such they are 
distanced from the genuine art that Heidegger is interested in finding. A work of art 
must firstly overcome symbolism, secondly representation and thirdly allow dwelling, 
that is the realization of the true being of the human ‘here and now, in this—natural—
world’.761  
 
This chapter aims firstly to examine Heidegger’s thinking on the validity of symbolic 
and representational art, considering also Byzantine art and the work of Giotto, 
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examples that could be seen as valid forms of art. The investigation is developed 
through the matter of the validity of modern non-representation and abstract art. 
 
Heidegger’s discussion of modern art focuses on the work of particular artists such as 
Cézanne and Klee, whom he considered to be genuine establishers of the holy. To 
recap, initially we see the work of Klee as non-figurative; but then objects, figures, 
and nature slowly appear. Abstract forms begin to take shapes, to transform into 
meaningful objects. What on a first inspection appears meaningless subsequently 
takes on meaning, the invisible becomes visible, dwelling happens out of the ground 
of painting.762  Cézanne succeeds in bringing forth the illusion of motion in his work 
not by means of distance, lines or forms but mainly through colour. The colours in his 
work concern the same ‘dimension of color, that dimension which creates—from 
itself to itself—identities, differences, a texture, a materiality, a something’.763 Motion 
in the work of Cézanne derives from the spatiality of colours within which objects 
obtain motion. Things appear to move ‘they began to modulate in the instability’.764 
In his work we are engaged with space and objects at the same time, we look for 
space and what it contains together.765 
 
Young argues that for Heidegger the kind of art that allows dwelling is the non-
representational but not fully abstract art. In abstract art the world, the 
representational objects and figures are entirely lost or ‘disappear’. In contrast, the 
object in a semi-abstract work, even if it fails to prevail onto the scene, is not entirely 
lost. As Young writes, ‘if an artwork is to allow dwelling objects must not 
disappear’.766 For Young, abstract art is valid as long as it encloses a world and 
allows it to happen, to appear. But in fully abstract art there is no subject matter or a 
world. Therefore, fully abstract art cannot be considered as a valid form of art as it 
does not refer to the world or its objects. Young’s argument for the validity of art in 
Heidegger’s philosophy of art stops with fully abstract art and this because abstract 
art is examined in terms of pictorial presentation. But abstract expressionist painting 
and sculpture aims to bring forth an expression not through the defined limits of 
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painting and sculpture, but by engaging the viewer within the space of the work. The 
relation between the work and space or rather the way the work interacts with its 
space/place is what drives the way the viewer will experience and understand the 
work.  
 
The sixth chapter of my thesis proposes an examination on the way abstract art is to be seen 
as a valid form of art in Heidegger’s philosophy of art. This examination follows the 
discussion on metaphysical art and the matter of symbolism and representation in art in 
order to show how the symbol of the cross and the representation of the being is to 
understood in the work of Newman and generally abstract art. This chapter aims to show 
how truth or meaning is to be understood in art in ‘the destitute days of modernity’ and 
whether art can help human surpass his homelessness. The key matter of this chapter is the 
notion of anxiety in Heidegger and the way it brings together an authentic and inauthentic 
understanding of our being. The discussion is developed with an examination of the notion 
of being in Newman’s works The Stations of the Cross and Here and Broken Obelisk. 
 
5. Metaphysics and art 
 
5. 1. Heidegger and metaphysics: philosophy, theology and art 
 
Metaphysics understood either explicitly or implicitly, that is, either as a 
philosophical discipline or as an ‘intuitive stance to reality’, has been created and 
developed according to Heidegger upon a misunderstanding of truth, the ‘oblivion of 
being’, as he calls it.767 The question of the meaning of being, Heidegger writes, 
remained ‘unresolved’ and ‘inadequately formulated’ and as such it has been 
forgotten.768 The ‘oblivion of being’ is the inability or the weakness to understand the 
true nature of being, that is, not its essence but the being in its totality within the 
world.769 We are ‘victims of ‘oblivion of being’’, that is we cannot understand our 
being or the being of others.770 Precisely, it is the inability, or as Bernstein put it, the 
‘failure to think the ontological difference’ between being and beings, the difference 
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between that which is presencing and that which it presence, between unconcealment 
as an event and something that has already been unconcealed.771  
 
However, as Bernstein argues, the same history of being reveals the same process of 
forgetfulness of the true nature of being, of the being as both revealing and 
concealment.772 For Heidegger Dasein is both gathering and self-affection, both 
inauthentic and authentic. ‘Human beings exist in the world, and world is 
temporalized: human-being-in –the world, and the Being of world’.773 Heidegger’s 
thinking about the true nature of being as both revealing and concealment opens up 
‘the possibility of authentic human existence’, a life that the human will not live 
blindly, a life where the human can truly dwell.774 
 
For Heidegger the forgetfulness of the true nature of being is what characterizes 
Western philosophy from Plato up to 19th century German philosophy, medieval 
theology and art since the Middle Ages. Since Plato, Western thinking designates the 
truth, the ‘being-in-itself’ as the supersensuous, a platonic ideal, as that which is 
removed and free from the sensuous. This ‘being-in-itself’ is reduced, Heidegger 
writes, to the ground of a ‘nonbeing, demoted, denigrated, and declared nugatory’,775 
but at the same time it refers always to it.776 The super-sensuous as the true being and 
true world is that which is ‘fixed’ and ‘constant’. But this metaphysical conception of 
being and world, even if it is considered to be absolute and definite, is only partially 
so since it relies on mere appearance, and as Heidegger states is to be considered ‘an 
error’.777 Western philosophy, Heidegger argues, is not a genuine thinking about the 
truth of being but rather a philosophizing which takes the form of an ‘onto-
theology’.778  Philosophy, Heidegger states, aims to reveal the general nature of the 
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world of the ‘being of beings’, that is an ‘ontology’ of being, but as Young writes, 
not ‘as an end in itself but rather as the basis for an inference to a being of such a 
nature as to provide the ultimate explanation for the manifest character of beings’, 
that is, a ‘theology’.779  
 
In addition, theology, as Heidegger writes, from its early stage ‘fell under the spell of 
‘metaphysics’’.780  Medieval theology based in this conception of being and world 
denoted a god of an onto-theology. The misinterpretation of the ‘Other of being’ of 
platonic philosophy ‘as another being, as the hidden, supernatural cause of natural 
beings’ in Western theology affected, according to Young, ‘the abolition of the Other 
of beings’, and became not simply meta-physics but metaphysics.781 For Heidegger 
Western theology did not seek merely to understand and interpret what lies after the 
physical and the empirical of this world, but it quested for a suprasensuous world, an 
infinite world/space that exists into and out of the universe. It places the 
understanding of human existence not in this world and earth but in an after life 
space.  
 
The world in Platonic thinking and Christian theology is not the present and true 
world. The real, sensuous world that in Platonism is ‘the world of semblance and 
errancy, the realm of error’ for Heidegger is ‘the true world’. The sensuous, the 
‘sense-semblant’, as Heidegger calls it, ‘is the very element of art’.782  The present 
world, ‘the real and only true word’ is the world in which art could be ‘at home’.783 
Thus, art not only confirms the same presuppositions of the true world784 but from 
this respect art as the sensuous seems superior to the Platonic and Christian truth. 
The sensuous, Heidegger argues in his reading of Nietzsche, is higher and ‘more in 
being’ than the supersensous.785 Hence, art, as sensuous, is higher than truth and 
more genuine from the supersensuous.786 
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For Heidegger the supersensuous ‘lures life away from invigorating sensuality’, it 
weakens the true values and forces of life and life itself.787 When humans seek the 
supersensuous, then negatives values such as ‘submission, capitulation, pity, 
mortification, and abasement’ are turned into positive merits  And those humans with 
these negative merits are seen as peoples of God and true beings and those with ‘all 
creative heightening and all pride in self-subsistent life’ are considered to be 
rebellious and sinful.788 Art is the place where we could ‘not perish from such 
supersensuous ‘truth,’’ and the supersensuous; art ‘does not vitiate life to the point of 
general debility and ultimate collapse’.789 
 
For Heidegger both art and truth are important for reality.790 The question regarding 
beings and being implies or comes together with the question about the ‘essence of 
truth’. As Heidegger put it, ‘the question will arise as to how both are united in 
essence and yet are foreign to one another, and ‘where,’ in what domain, they 
somehow come together, and what that domain itself ‘is’’.791 Precisely, the question 
of being, truth and art are ‘inserted’ one into the other.792 The matter of being and 
truth comes together because truth a priori is the space of being.793 As Heidegger 
writes in his account of ‘Art and Space’, ‘art is the bringing-into-the-work of truth, 
and truth is the unconcealment of Being’.794 Art is the place of truth and being.795  
 
As we have seen in chapter three for Heidegger art reveals the way things and 
humans are. The temple, Heidegger writes, ‘gives to things their look and to men 
their outlook’.796 The temple reveals to the historical community in which it is 
placed, their gods and the fate of humans.797  This revealing is the preserving of art 
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and stays open as long as gods have not fled, as long as the sculpture of god is the 
god himself.798 In ancient Greece art rose to its ultimate height as truth revealing. Art 
presented gods, and set the dialogue between divine and human fate, bringing it ‘to 
radiance’.799 The human was the preserver of art which for them was the holy itself, 
that which would mark their lives, fate and destiny.  
 
In modernity art is no longer the place of truth, it does not constitute part of our 
experience and understanding of ourselves and of the world. Art does not present or 
symbolise the absolute and divine for humans.800 Art in modernity became 
metaphysical and metaphysical art, according to Heidegger, cannot be the place of 
truth and thus it cannot allow humans to truly dwell. Heidegger’s thinking of the 
relation of modernity and art put Heidegger into a search for an art that could 
overcome aesthetics and metaphysics. And if art after the end of art is possible, if art 
could be something more than an object of aesthetics or a metaphysical 
representation, the task of the philosopher, Bernstein argues, is to return to art ‘the 
transformation of ‘cognition’ that could make it possible’.801 
 
Heidegger’s view on art as the place of truth and his designation of art in modernity 
fits with Adorno’s position on the truth of art of modernity. Firstly, for Adorno art in 
modernity needs to be a place of truth.  In the realm of late capitalism philosophy and 
art ‘has lost most of its emancipatory functions’; therefore the aim of the authentic 
work of art is ‘to stand in and defend the tower of truth’. Adorno does not see art and 
philosophy as identical but rather as inseparable areas, and places of truth.802 
Secondly, for Adorno the truth of art is always a negative truth, art does not give a 
positive account of what truth is, rather it tells us what we lack. The negative truth of 
art could be seen in Heidegger as the problem of modernity in a post-religious era. Art 
cannot assert or replace in a positive manner the loss of gods, the lost religion of the 
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past but it can acknowledge this loss and create a space within which we could 
become aware of that need for truth and dwelling. 
 
5. 2. The two aspects of metaphysical art 
 
Western art, Heidegger argues, following Platonism aims to symbolise a Platonic 
idea through the image of the world and its objects and to idealise and represent the 
world and its objects as aesthetically beautiful and pleasant. Christian tradition alters 
art’s function and meaning. Tragedy lost its cultural significance and poetry became 
a humanistic message.803 Post-Christian art replaced the cultic meaning of traditional 
art with aesthetic value based on artistic canons and techniques.  
 
Heidegger’s conclusion that Western art is as such metaphysical is based on two 
kinds of art, or arguments as Young calls them, that refer firstly to the symbolic 
(supernaturalistic or Christian) art and secondly to the representational (naturalistic 
or post-Christian) art. These two kinds of art are distanced from the kind of genuine 
art that Heidegger is interested in finding. Heidegger’s aim is to deconstruct this 
metaphysical approach to art in terms of a symbolic or aesthetically pleasant 
image.804 His aim is to find an art that could be placed in opposition to metaphysics 
or, as Young put it, an art that ‘provides an antidote to metaphysics’ and furthermore 
to re-appropriate the sublime and the holy of the destitute times of modernity.805 
Thus for a work of art to be considered as genuine art and a truly happening of truth 
firstly it must overcome metaphysics (that is, symbolism and representation) and 
secondly it must allow dwelling, that is the realization of the true being of the human 
here and now in this world’.806  
 
Heidegger’s criticism of symbolic, supersensuous or supernaturalistic art, as Young 
calls it, refers to the art of traditional Christianity which thematises the metaphysics 
(‘not the meta-physics’).807 This kind of art includes religious images, legends, myths, 
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metaphors and similes.808  The supernaturalistic art of Christianity is the art that 
following Platonism distinguishes the idea and form into the natural/‘sensuous’ and 
supernatural/suprasensuous/metaphysical realm. The sensuous is what is presented 
directly to us, while the non-sensuous is presented in an indirect way. The non-
sensuous is the ‘suprasensuous’, that is, the supernatural. Art in traditional 
Christianity aims to bring forth through the image of the sensible world and its objects 
a supernatural, Platonic realm, a world which cannot be seen or experienced.809 
Heidegger’s criticism does not refer to mere symbolism but to the symbolic or 
transcendental of a metaphysical and supernatural realm. An art of traditional 
Christianity aims to bring forth a supernatural realm, a world beyond the sensible and 
the natural.810 
 
Genuine dwelling, Heidegger remarks, ‘falls into oblivion’.811 Dwelling is represented 
not in this world but in the eternal ‘only as a post-human possibility’.812  The human 
no longer understands himself in terms of his past or present but in terms of his future, 
of the eternal.813 Human life is seen as a stage that finds fulfilment only after death. 
The being of the human becomes, Roberts says, ‘future oriented’ because it is being 
towards death.814 Heidegger designates death from the standpoint of Dasein and he 
does not aim to rebut claims about the after life. He examines death not so much as a 
possibility or actuality but the way Dasein is related to this possibility, a possibility 
that is ‘ever-constant precisely because death is certain’.815 
 
For Heidegger to think of human existence in a non-metaphysical way we have to 
place it among the fourfold, among earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The mortals 
are the humans, and ‘they are called mortals because they can die’, because they are 
aware of their mortality.816  As Heidegger put it, ‘only man dies, and indeed 
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continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities’.817‘In 
anxiety’ as he states, ‘one cannot dwell’. Mortals belong to the fourfold by dwelling, 
that is, by preserving the fourfold ‘in its essential being’.818 Humans dwell only when 
‘they receive the sky as sky’, ‘they await the divinities as divinities’, ‘they initiate 
their own nature—their being capable of death as death—into the use and practice of 
this capacity, so that there may be a good death’.819  
 
For Heidegger Dasein is not designated as in the Christian tradition in terms of 
eternal after-death existence, but includes all three stages of human life: past, present 
and future. Dasein in Heidegger is not an infinite but a mortal being. His notion of 
Dasein is based on the union of the ‘three dimensions of temporality’. As Roberts 
notes, temporality in Heidegger ‘is disclosed by decision, the resoluteness in the face 
of death which accepts and assumes the fallenness, the thrownness of human being 
into finitude’.820 Temporality is to be understood ‘as the future past’ and is based on 
the acceptance of human mortality. It is only through ‘the future past’ that Dasein 
can pass to the present of here and now and move towards authentic existence.821 
That is, the notion of Dasein lies upon the acceptance of our finitude nature of the 
fact that the future and past can only belong to the present of human life or rather 
fate. The resoluteness toward death is what converts inauthenticity into authenticity, 
existence into fate.822  
 
The result of the infinite existence that Christian art gives to being ‘is the 
disenchantment of the cosmos’.823 The world presented by Christian art is the world 
that suppresses the possibility of there being a holy world, a world of dwelling. This 
is because symbolic art, as the form of Christian art, aims to go beyond what is 
intelligible and ‘ungraspable’ to make it ‘grasped’ and conceptualised. As Young 
writes, it can be seen as a ‘conceptually tamed solution to an intellectual problem’.824 
For Heidegger in the Christian tradition the distance between god and mortal is 
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reduced. ‘Since the mystery is the element in which alone the holy is to be found, the 
consequence of this is that ‘God can, for representational thinking, lose all that is 
exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance’’.825 God has now lost his 
exaltation and holiness and mortals have lost their ability to dwell in this natural 
world.  
 
As we have seen the second type of art that Heidegger rejects as a genuine happening 
of truth is the representational or naturalistic art. For a work of art to allow dwelling it 
must present the fourfold and divine not as representing but as a thematising. 
Therefore, a work of art must avert supernaturalism but without regressing into 
representation.826 In opposition to symbolic art, representational art does not concern 
the suprasensuous but the sensuous. Specifically, the argument of representational art 
applies, Young argues, to post-Christian (or the non-Christian art), the post-
supernaturalistic art.827   
 
With representational art Heidegger refers to the kind of art that idealizes objects of 
reality, and represents the world and its objects as aesthetically beautiful and pleasant. 
The horizon of representational art is, Young writes, ‘exclusively, of natural beings’. 
Representation and mimesis concern the sensuous, the perceptible. Thus 
representational art cannot be about a ‘supernatural world’.828 Representational or 
naturalistic art is the art that represents and imitates the world. But Heidegger does 
not reject representational art in its whole. Ancient Greek sculpture that Heidegger 
considers as a genuine form of art is grounded upon representation. However, what 
matters in representational art, Young argues, is not whether the task of this art is to 
represent the world and its objects but the fact that it confirms a metaphysical 
conception of the world in the ground of naturalism.829 In Dutch painting for example 
the representation of a scene or an event creates the impression that there is something 
behind it which could be continued on and on. Representation is putting us in this 
sense in an imaginary, a supernatural place. But for Heidegger the representation of 
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the world as a supernatural or an infinite space is a metaphysical one. He was looking 
for a presentation of the world as it appears a revealing in relation to earth and the 
things in the world.  (For a discussion on Dutch painting in relation to Giotto painting 
The Raising of Lazarus see p. 164-166). 
 
Heidegger appears to distinguish symbolism from representation. But are symbolic 
and representational art always clearly distinguished or are they to be seen as two 
dimensions or elements of the same work as well? The move from the symbolic to 
representational art is not to be understood as strictly a chronological or historical 
shift. As we have seen Heidegger identifies symbolism with Christian art and 
representationism with post-Christian art. But symbolic art could be examined in 
terms of beauty and representation. Analogously, representational art could be 
examined in terms of symbolism and religion. Kant, Bernstein suggests, conceives 
representation in a symbolic manner.830 Representation might be said to happen in a 
symbolic manner in Heidegger. However, Heidegger’s task is to designate the 
metaphysics in both forms of art and specifically the structures that allow the viewer 
transcendence of what he sees as a metaphysical meaning. The symbolic in art 
becomes equivalent to the invisible, the metaphysical, but representation is to be 
understood only as the idealization of the visible world, the meta-physical.  
  
For Heidegger, representational and symbolic art cannot overcome metaphysics.831 
Representational art aims to confine, represent, and conceptualize the mystery and 
thus destroys what is to be honoured; it converts the ‘unknown and unknowable into 
the natured and known’.832 According to Young, the anti-metaphysical art is the art 
that does not merely overcome symbolism and naturalism but rather is placed 
between supernaturalism and naturalism. Genuine art is the art that thematises rather 
than symbolises the Other of the natural world and does not present ‘something other 
than natural beings’.833 It is the art that brings to presence the world, thematises the 
mystery and the ‘holiness of the world’.834  As Young writes, genuine art ‘discloses 
our world as a holy place, a place in which, first, we are absolutely (unconditionally) 
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‘safe’, and, second, in which the things in the midst of which we find ourselves are 
disclosed as holy things, things to be adored and cared for’.835 As Young continues, 
the art that thematises, the ‘other side of world’ and does not present it as ‘a ‘highest’ 
member of the world’, ‘thematises the Other of manifest beings without falling into 
the self-defeating trap of turning it into another, occult being’.836  
 
5. 3. The validity of Christian art and post-Christian art 
 
Heidegger’s criticism of Christian art and his rejection of it as a genuine form of art 
seems to follow old aesthetic and theological interpretations of Christian art. These 
interpretations, such as German aesthetics, do not consider all forms of Christian art 
but rather concentrate on Renaissance, Northern and Gothic art. In German aesthetics 
Christian art was usually interpreted as an art that aims to symbolise through the 
image of the finite, the physical and present world, the infinite, and the metaphysical 
world.837 It was chiefly the German philosophers of idealism who formulated the 
primary aims of Christian aesthetics. Michelis argues that Schelling has said 
characteristically that if classical art aimed at the inclusion of the infinite in the finite, 
Christian art sought to achieve the reverse; that is, ‘to make the finite an allegory of 
the infinite’.838 According to Michelis, features of expressionism, such as the illusion 
of infinite space, ‘upward flights’ and other characteristics that appear in Christian art, 
mark specifically the Renaissance, Nothern Gothic art but not Byzantine art. Even if 
these characteristics are found sometimes in Byzantine art, they are used in a different 
form and purpose.839  
 
Could Byzantine art be considered as a non-metaphysical art and thus as the kind of 
art that Heidegger designates as genuine art? 
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The historical and theological interpretation of Christian art focuses on the 
understanding of symbols and excludes the importance as well as the function of their 
artistic value.840  The artistic and symbolic status of Byzantine art is often 
misunderstood especially when it is not examined as a whole or when its position 
within the church is not considered. Byzantine art is often examined in terms of 
theological doctrines that misinterpret its aesthetic values and artistic questions.  
According to Michelis, ‘the historical and religious analysis of an art’s symbols 
(unless these are artistically self-sufficient) does not attribute artistic value to 
them’.841 Michelis continues, ‘Christian art has not provided purely religious symbols, 
intelligible only to the initiated, but forms capable of moving any spectator, not by the 
degree of sanctity accorded to them but by their purely aesthetic appeal’.842 The icon 
is not to be seen merely as a religious symbol but it aims to be seen in a double way, 
as a purely religious symbol and as ‘a purely religious work of art’.843 
 
For Michelis aesthetic appeal refers to the notion of the sublime in Greek classical art. 
The sublime is to be understood in Heidegger’s terms as the unity that arts bring 
between humans, as mortals and gods, as the divine and holy which is enclosed in the 
work of art and revealed through it by the community.844 As Michelis argues the 
sublime of Greek classical art is what characterises Byzantine art and in particular 
painting, architecture and music.845  In this line of thinking, Xenakis argues in favour 
of modern art through an examination of the bonds between ancient Greek and 
Byzantine music. The key for understanding music, Xenakis argues, is its pre-
Christian origins and ‘its subsequent development’.846 ‘The structure of the music of 
Ancient Greece, and then that of Byzantine music which has best preserved it while 
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developing it, and has done so with greater fidelity than its sister, occidental 
plainchant.’847 
 
For Michelis what has been preserved and developed in Byzantine art and Christian 
art in general is the sublime of ancient Greek art. The sublime accords with ‘the spirit 
of Christian art’. The Greeks ‘perceived’ it and preserved it in Byzantine art. The 
Romantics, as Michelis remarks, ‘revealed anew the feeling of the Sublime’, were 
able to value and ‘revive’ medieval Christian art, whereas Renaissance artists, for 
whom the ideal was to be found in the beautiful, ‘condemned it.’848 For Michelis, the 
sublime dimension in Christian art was appreciated by Medieval Christian art but was 
replaced in Renaissance art by the ideal of the beautiful.849 In Byzantine art the refusal 
of the artist to imitate the external, physical ‘self-sufficient, consistent, and 
harmonious’ world, Michelis remarks, seems to be a rejection of ‘that which denies 
the spiritual’.850  
 
In Byzantine art the rejection of the physical external world is not expressed through 
an elimination of imitation. Like ancient Greek art, Byzantine art did not reject the use 
of imitation. The way Byzantine artists imitated the world and its objects drove them 
to a more realistic (non idealistic) result than that seen in later movements in which 
the artists focused ‘their attention on portraiture’ in painting and sculpture. Christian 
art ‘combated its realism with expressivism’ in order to give, according to Michelis, 
to its figures a ‘characteristic beauty’ in the way classical art opposed idealism to 
realism, to render ‘abstract beauty’.851 
 
In the Byzantine church the predominant figures are painted to be seen from a 
distance. On the one hand, the pictures which are placed higher they are made the 
larger. On other hand, the most important figures of the representation are enlarged in 
size in relation with the setting and the surrounding figures following in this way the 
ancient Greek tradition of sculptural representations. In particularly, as Michelis 
indicates,  
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the Byzantine artist, in placing his more prominent figures higher and therefore 
proportionately enlarging them, reverses the scale of optical diminution and 
surpasses it, in order to preserve the essential scale of values, appropriate to his 
figures. Thus, the Almighty is drawn on the scale of God. This indeed is in keeping 
with the Greek tradition, which placed in the ancient temple an over-size statue of 
the god.852 
 
The Renaissance and Baroque artist created realistic and representational works of art 
which were to be viewed from a single point of view. When the viewer moves from 
this specific standpoint, realism and representation appear deformed and unnatural.853 
Byzantine pictures, on the other hand, seem unnatural from every standpoint and this 
is because they do not intend to appear realistic from a specific vantage point.854 
 
In early Christian art the unnatural position of the figures and variations of size do not 
signify the orientation of the perspective but has a symbolic meaning, as the larger the 
figures are the more important they are.855 The Byzantine artist acknowledges that the 
height and curved background deforms the representation. He uses techniques that 
allow him to overcome the problem not of the representation of the figures but of the 
way the figures are going to be viewed in the church.856 The same can be said for the 
compositions of figures sitting in a circle. That is, the artist must achieve an overall 
view of the scene and at the same time preserve the analogies of the bodies of the 
figures. As Michelis argues, 
 
if finally we concede that the point of vision coincides perpendicularly with the 
center of the circle, then we would have an almost geometric projection of the 
bodies. Their heads would appear to rest directly on their shoulders, they would be 
practically trunkless and only their feet would emerge, unless they were lying flat in 
a circle. And indeed, here the seated figures frontally presented are lying supine in a 
circle forming a rosette. 857  
 
The artist thus proceeds to a schematic composition of the figures which functions in 
a decorative manner. For Michelis this composition does not aim to give to the viewer 
a specific perspective or a metaphysical message. Rather, the purpose of the 
                                                
852 Ibid., p. 41. 
853 Ibid., p. 42. 
854 Ibid. 
855 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
856 Ibid., p. 42. 
857 Ibid., p. 34. 
  
163 
geometric pattern of the picture is to draw the viewer’s attention to the picture and 
ultimately to its content and meaning.858 
 
In Byzantine art figures are placed in frontal positions with the exception of evil 
figures such as those depicting Judas, which appear in profile (fig. 24). In large 
Byzantine paintings the figures are drawn in a three-quarter profile within a curved 
surface or dome. The aim is to appear ‘that they face one another as they 
communicate through the physical space where their movements meet. There is no 
depth behind the picture plane. Fictitious space was superfluous in the Byzantine 
painting’.859  In Byzantine painting the figures are placed in a ‘real space’ in front of 
the viewer, who turns from a spectator to a participant.860  
 
Demus, Michelis states, sees the gold background of such paintings as an empty 
surface; not as something aimed to signify infinite depth, but something that ‘is left 
empty.’861 In opposition to Demus, Michelis suggests that the space is not fictitious 
but aims to avoid the reproduction of a direct, naturalistic space in favour of an 
indirect space.862 
 
Now surely if the spectator’s impression is that the figures move only in the real 
space in front of the icon, this would have the effect of making the church seem like 
a cage, in which the figures are imprisoned. In point of fact, neither Byzantine 
painting nor mosaic (with its monochrome background utterly bereft of a 
landscape) is devoid of fictitious space. Both must inevitably place their 
representations somewhere in space, and if they do not reproduce this space 
naturalistically (i.e., directly), they suggest it indirectly. In Byzantine painting and 
mosaic, the figures themselves do so through their gestures, their difference in 
scale, their gradation of tones, and variety of colors. Even their monochrome gold 
background with its scintillation gives the impression of ethereal, celestial space 
and diffused light, in which heavenly beings hover. And in thus trans-porting the 
imagination, Byzantine mosaic and painting, far from encaging the figures in the 
church, seem in fact to push back its very walls in an ideal plan.863 
 
The space of the picture or of the mosaic seems to suggest an expansion of a fictitious 
space ‘which unfolds both in front of and behind the picture; so that the figure, in 
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moving towards the spectator, increases the depth behind it’ (fig. 25).864 Byzantine art 
like ancient Greek art does not allow or provoke the viewer to transit to a 
metaphysical or illusionary place. The viewer-spectator communicates with the 
painting through the external, physical space.865 It is this physical place that represents 
the holiness of the world and allows the viewer to be part of it. 
 
As Danto remarks, in the Christian tradition holy objects are mysterious objects in 
the sense that they often lack physical properties that would distinguish them from 
ordinary objects, such as the holy water from ordinary water, or the fragment from a 
tomb of a saint from any piece of masonary, or  a saint’s relic from ‘a mere 
knucklebone’. Holiness in these instances comes through what Danto calls ‘a natural 
metaphor’, through a convention that has been invented and learned.866  
 
The depiction of holiness in Byzantine art evolved through a number of techniques 
which allowed the artist firstly to overcome the problem of perspective and secondly 
to communicate with the viewer in the physical space of the church. Even though 
Renaissance art is often seen to stand in opposition to Byzantine art as it tends to 
seek the transition of the viewer to a metaphysical and illusory space, there are 
examples that resist this tendency. One of these examples is according to Danto the 
work of Giotto di Bondore, The Raising of Lazarus (fig. 26). The depiction of the 
miracle takes place not in the painting or the representation of an illusory space but 
beyond the painting, through communication with the viewer. 
 
According to Danto, Giotto manages to represent the holy through a series of 
‘conventional signs’.867 In contrast to common Christian art paintings, in the work of 
Giotto, just like in Byzantine art, the scene of the miracle of Christ is in the 
foreground, is something you see, it does not give the impression of the unfinished or 
endless. In the scene there is no behind.868  This is different to Dutch painting, for 
example, where looking at it ‘we know that there is something on the other side of the 
hill, that if we could magically enter the paintings and walk along the road, we would 
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never end in blackness’. Giotto, on the other hand, is interested in depicting the way 
the objects and the world appear to someone that is ‘wholly coincident with the 
action’. He is not interested in capturing in the sense of imitating the way the objects 
and the world really are or their qualities ‘in excess of those that happen to fit the 
action’.869 In Giotto there is never something other than what we see. The key of the 
depiction of the miracle of the rising of Lazarus is the woman holding her nose. The 
miracle is not depicted through the rise of Lazarus but through ‘the fact that Lazarus 
is raised’.870 The stench ‘appeals to the mind rather than the senses, stands closer to 
words than to perceptual stimuli’.871 
 
The halo in the representation of Christian art is in the world of painting but not in 
the visual, real world. The halo designates holiness by being invisible to sight in the 
way smell designates the miracle in the work of Giotto. Stench cannot be represented 
in a direct manner.872 As Danto writes, odour as motion in painting cannot be 
depicted in a direct way.873 
 
In the Christian tradition usually this miracle is depicted by portraying Lazarus either 
as being assisted, carried out by others, or sitting in his coffin. As Danto remarks, the 
logical order is first to remove the fetters and then to walk. However this order is 
reversed in the Bible where Christ ‘cried with a loud voice, Lazarus come forth. And 
he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with graveclothes’.874 And this is 
precisely what Giotto presents, that is, Lazarus tight bound unable to even place his 
hands together to pray. The holy in Giotto’s painting and the representation of the 
miracle do not derive either from the symbols of the halo or the representation of the 
Christ or through reading the biblical story in the work, but by presenting Lazarus 
standing by himself with tight fetters on his body. Lazarus is ‘simply there’, with no 
explanation of how he got there.875 The miracle is presented in its more direct way, 
mysterious and holy.  
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Byzantine art as well as the naturalistic work of Giotto could be seen as examples of 
the non-metaphysical art that Heidegger was looking for. Even if Byzantine art falls 
into the area of Christian art it does not function as a symbolic art. On the other hand, 
the art of Giotto but also a great part of the work of other artist such as El Greco’s 
paintings, which as in Giotto’s work hold a strong reference to Byzantine pictures and 
the ancient Greek tradition of art, as well as to Michelangelo’s Slaves. Even if these 
works can be seen as examples of what Heidegger calls as naturalist or 
representational art they do not represent the world as an ideal, beautiful and pleasant 
place but manage to capture the holiness and mystery by presenting the world as it 
appears. 
 
But still the holiness in these works derives through conventions that are learned. It is 
due to previous knowledge that the viewer can identify the scenes and the figures both 
in Byzantine and the representational art of Giotto. In contrast, in abstract art and 
especially in abstract expressionist art there are no direct references to the world and 
its object. Could abstract expressionist art be seen as a representation of a religious 
content or in Heidegger terms, of the holiness of the world?  
 
6. The religious dimension in the work of Barnett Newman.  
 
6. 1. The symbol of the cross in the work of Barnett Newman 
 
For Calas, the work of Newman expresses in an abstract manner that ‘the Being is an 
‘all in the now’’.876 The series of paintings of The Stations of the Cross (fig. 27) is 
comprised of fourteen paintings which Newman began in 1958 and completed in 
1966.  ‘The means’ as Danto remarks ‘could not be more simple’, black and white 
colour on canvas, which becomes his third colour.877 However, it was not until he 
started the fourth painting of this series that he related the subject matter to the 
passion of the cross. Newman states that the work does not aim to represent the series 
of events from the traditional representation of The Stations of the Cross, even if his 
theme and number of the stations imply the walk of Christ, Via Dolorosa, as well as 
the traditional paintings of The Stations of the Cross. His aim is to reveal god’s human 
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cry on the cross, the instant when Christ cried out ‘God, why have you forsaken me?’, 
‘Lema sabachthani?’, which is the subtitle Newman gives to the work. The last words 
of Christ have been interpreted by Christian tradition as the ‘outcry’ of the human 
who is both mortal and immortal, of the man who is ‘in the Now and in Eternity and 
never all in the here’.878  
 
Newman writes in the programme of the first exhibition of The Stations of the Cross, 
on the question Lema?: 
 
             this question that has no answer has been with us so long –since Jesus –since 
Abraham – since Adam –the original question. Lema? To what purpose –is the 
unanswerable question of human suffering. The first pilgrims walked the Via 
Dolorosa to identify themselves with the original moment, not to reduce it to a 
pious legend; nor even to worship the story of one man’s agony, but to stand 
witness to the story of each man’s agony: the agony that is the single, constant, 
unrelenting, willed—world without end.879   
 
Malpas argues  that in this version of The Stations of the Cross there is no answer to 
the question ‘lema?’ This lema is an eternal question, a question of meaning brought 
in the event of truth, in the ereignis.880 The road along Via Dolorosa is presented in 
the work in a symbolic manner; not as the passion of Christ but rather as the agony of 
every human. Newman’s The Stations of the Cross represent not the stages towards 
immortality but the stages of human life in this world. 
 
Newman’s The Stations of the Cross like his series of sculptures Here I (fig. 28), II 
(fig. 29) and III (fig. 30), consist of variations of vertical lines and are considered to 
express ‘a religious narrative’.881 Newman produces only six sculptures Here I, II and 
III and three identical versions of the Broken Obelisk. In his series of sculptures Here 
I, II and III he follows the same pattern of the variations of the placements of zips 
where they become concrete and three-dimensional. In this series of works the 
interplay between the repetition of the vertical lines and the plane of the canvas of his 
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painting becomes an interplay between the repetition of the concrete zips and the 
space between and around them. Here I is comprised by two verticals zips made out 
of wood, plaster, and bronze. With Robert Murray’s assistance, Newman casts in 
1950 a sculpture entitled Here I (To Marcia), for collector Marcia Weisman, who had 
impelled him to make the work. In 1965 he makes Here II comprised by three metal 
verticals and in 1965 to 1966 he makes Here III, comprised by a single stainless steel 
vertical. This work has rounded corners and a slightly reflective surface and is placed 
upon a pyramidal base that looks like it is floating off the floor, which gives to the 
work a monumental status. In Here I the two zips are different from each other. The 
artless and almost primitive form of the first zip and the geometrical form of the 
second zip create an antithesis which does not lead us to a coherent meaning but sends 
us back to the work itself. In Here II, Newman presents to the viewer a mere triple 
repetition of the same object on three separate pedestals.  
 
Even if the vertical lines in these works refer to the symbol of the cross they 
represent, according to Calas, ‘acephalous crosses since no transversal bars limit their 
upward thrust’.882 But in Newman’s work ‘crosses are crossless’.883 The cross 
functions not only as a symbol of now and eternity, of mortality and immortality, but 
also as a symbol of God, of the human who is both mortal and immortal, of the man 
who is ‘in the Now and in Eternity and all in the here’.884 Calas continues, the cross 
symbolises that we are ‘never all in the here’ and that ‘the now is part of eternity’.885 
Newman’s works are to be seen, Calas argues, as an existential gesture or statement 
that we are ‘‘all in the now’’.  Newman recognises the crucified not as the immortal 
but as the mortal, as the ‘man who was crucified’.886 Calas writes: 
 
                Barnett Newman identifies himself with the agony of a compassionate man who 
was crucified, not with the transfiguration of a mortal being. Acephalous crosses 
are for those who have been cut off from the hope of immortality. In the Now man 
is alone. His cry for help cannot reach the Above, for there is no above and no 
beyond. Man is alone in the Now.887 
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As Malpas writes, Newman’s crosses ‘stand witness to the story of each man’s 
agony: the agony that is the single, constant, unrelenting, willed – world without 
end’. 888Newman presents in his work the homelessness of the modern world. He 
presents the world as an unsafe place in the absence of god. But can mortals truly 
dwell in a world that, as Heidegger put it, there is a ‘lack of houses’? ‘What is the 
state of dwelling’ in modernity?889  Can humans surpass metaphysics in modernity? 
Heidegger writes: 
 
However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses 
remains, the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real 
plight of dwelling lies in, that the mortals ever search a new for the nature of 
dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. 890  
 
So does people’s ‘homelessness’ come from the fact that the human thinks of the true 
dwelling as a need? But still, as Heidegger denotes, when the human thinks of his 
homelessness then it is no more a misery. ‘It is the sole summons that calls mortals 
into their dwelling’.891 Mortals could allow dwelling, they could bring it ‘to the 
fullness of its nature’ only if ‘they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of 
dwelling’.892   
 
For Calas, Newman’s work is a thinking of our homelessness but at the same time a 
verification of the metaphysical nature of being. Calas considers the work of Newman 
to be closer to the kind of non-symbolic and non-metaphysical art. But does Calas 
sees Newman’s work to surpass metaphysics thinking? Or is Calas thinking of the 
human in Newman’s work as itself bound to a metaphysical conception of being?  
 
For Calas, Newman sees no hope in mortality but the agony of the human to live 
alone and in the now of mortality. He suggests that Newman aims to overcome the 
metaphysical and Christian theological concept of being and human life where it 
expands to the eternal. This eternal is understood as the non-being, as nothing, in 
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ancient metaphysics as ‘unformed matter, matter which cannot take form as an image 
(as a spectacle)’.893  According to Heidegger, the meaning of nothing in Christian 
theology continues to be in opposition to being but in the sense of an absence. As 
Heidegger remarks, ‘Christian dogma denies the truth of the proposition ex nihilo 
nihil fit and thereby bestows on the nothing a transformed significance, the sense of 
the complete absence of beings apart from God’.894 The world in Plato and 
Christianity is not the present world. The present world, ‘the genuinely real and only 
true world’ is, as has been noted above, for Heidegger, the only world that art could 
be ‘at home’.895 The world of Christian art is the world that suppresses, in order to be 
a holy, this world, a place of dwelling.896  
 
But if genuine dwelling in Christian theology refers to the possibility of an after-life, 
for Newman dwelling is not possible at all, because he presents a world where the god 
or gods are absent and the human is alone.897 The being that Calas sees in Newman’s 
work is still ‘future oriented’, a being oriented towards death as nothing, an absolute 
absence and emptiness. This negative approach to being is for Heidegger a 
verification of the metaphysical conception of being. Thus, even if Newman attempts 
to surpass the eternality of the being of Christian theology and orient it in the now and 
here, his conception of the human remains within the frames of the metaphysical 
thinking of modern age. In this metaphysical thinking the world becomes an unsafe 
place and therefore cannot be ‘a ‘home’’.898And homelessness, as has been seen 
above, is the primary destitution of modernity.899 
 
But in modernity, Heidegger states, the gods and god have left and there is no longer 
any place for them to return. For Heidegger the absence of god or Nietzsche’s 
statement ‘God is dead’ are to be understood not as a critique of the Christian attitude 
but as a verification of humanity’s forgetfulness of his genuine dwelling. Genuine 
dwelling does not presuppose religious places, churches or cathedrals or religious 
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beliefs and attitudes. These places and attitudes can no longer give power to human 
dwelling; ‘Christianity (not necessarily Christian faith) has contributed most to the 
withdrawal of the holy by becoming onto-theo-logic and a worldly-cultural 
power’.900  The human can only dwell in the divine but in modernity the human ‘is so 
obfuscated that the absence of the divine is not even discerned’.901  
 
Rilke in his works Duino Elegies and Sonnets to Orpheus realizes this destitution of 
his age and the human’s forgetfulness of his dwelling and his authentic existence. 
For Rilke, Heidegger remarks, the time is destitute not merely because ‘God is dead’ 
but because humans are not aware and even not capable of being aware of their 
mortality.902 ‘Mortals’, as Heidegger put it, ‘have not yet come into ownership of 
their own nature’.903  The metaphysical conception of death for Heidegger impedes 
the human from being at home in the world and within things.904 
 
Both Newman and Rilke appear to experience the metaphysical state of human being 
in modernity and the destitution of modernity. But Newman in opposition to Rilke 
does not acknowledge the absence of the holiness of God but of God itself. Newman 
seems to deny the possibility of the return of gods. Newman, even if he acknowledges 
the mortality of the human, does not accept it.  In Heidegger words, he does not 
‘come into ownership’ of the human’s nature. Thus, the acknowledgement of the 
absence of gods and the awareness of our mortality in Newman’s work could be taken 
to be a positive thing, a step towards the overcoming of our inauthentic existence. On 
the other hand the acknowledgment of the absence of gods and the loss of our 
authentic existence becomes in Newman’s work what Adorno calls a negative 
expression of the truth in art. Thus the aim of art in modernity becomes to this way of 
thinking the acknowledgement of our homelessness, of our metaphysical and 
inauthentic state. Even if art cannot lead us completely to authentic existence, the 
awareness of our inauthenticity could bring us closer to the state of authenticity. How 
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could the denial of mortality and hence the feeling anxiety take out humans from 
homelessness and inauthentic existence? 
 
6. 1. 2. Modernity and homelessness 
 
For Heidegger, Western man and especially modern man is ‘uprooted and homeless’ 
because he experiences his mortality.905 The task of experiencing the measure of life 
brings us closer to the question of death, bringing ‘the unsettling experience of 
anxiety’.906 Anxiety is an experience of the homelessness of western humans. Anxiety 
and uncanniness do not refer to specific things that we might fear but derives from 
‘nothing and nowhere’.907 The feeling of anxiety and terror come when we take death 
as an absolute nothing, an empty or negative nothing.908  
 
Can the human in modernity come into ownership of his own nature? Could art in 
modernity bring the human closer to his own nature and allow him to dwell? How is 
this homelesseness to be understood in Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
understanding of art? Is there a possibility for the human in modernity to be at home?  
 
For Heidegger, the relationship between the human and world is not to be understood 
as a relationship between the human and a collection of objects external to ourselves. 
As Svenaeus writes, ‘the world indeed being nothing other than a cultural, 
intersubjective meaning-structure, lived in by us and, ultimately, a mode of 
ourselves’.909 The world and its objects are not external to us, nevertheless they are 
‘constitutive for the being of Dasein’.910 Thus, the human as Da-sein, as ‘being-there’ 
and ‘being-in-the-world’ constitutes a unity with the world and not a relationship of 
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subject and object.911 ‘Being-in-the-world’ as Macquarrie puts it, is not ‘a spatial but 
an existential relation’ of human and the world.912 
 
For Heidegger, the notion of Da-sein reveals that unhomelikeness and uncanniness are 
part of human existence.913 The ‘Da’ indicates the finitude and contingency of human 
being, an awareness of mortality of human being. The human is not in its simple 
mortality but in the fact that he acknowledges that he will die. It reveals that the 
human is ‘thrown into a world that pre-exists it and which it does not choose, and yet 
which fundamentally constitutes it as the being it is’.914 The world as the physical 
space contains the human’s body but as such this environment ‘is inherently 
meaningless’.  Furthermore, Dasein, includes also the notion of as Being (Sein), 
which indicates that Being seeks to provide meaning to its life. The Being ‘is 
reflective and plans or projects its life into the future’. This interplay between 
mortality and meaning that characterizes Dasein takes place because Dasein aims to 
find meaning in life and world but cannot because, as Edgar writes, ‘there is no 
intrinsic meaning to be found’.915 ‘Meaning must be bestowed upon its existence, not 
discovered.916 
 
For Heidegger, the human being is unfamiliar with people and objects in the world 
and constantly tries to make sense of them. This effort to understand life and the 
world is enhanced by his wonder at that which he does not understand. However, the 
feeling of wonder could be transformed into a threat or terror when he confronts 
something ‘too unfamiliar or uncontrollable’. This understanding does not lead 
always into the feeling of terror but it could be ‘attuned’ in joy, boredom and sorrow. 
As Svenaeus remarks, ‘it will always be attuned in some way’. This attunement of the 
                                                
911 Ibid. ‘Human understanding is, consequently, for Heidegger, always being-there (Da-sein) in the 
sense of being-in-the-world. The hyphens indicate that Dasein and world are thought as a unity and not 
as subject and object.’ Andrew Edgar, ‘The Uncanny, Alienation and Strangeness:  The Entwining of 
Political and Medical Metaphor’. 
912 John Macquarrie, An Existential Theology, Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann, (S. C. M. 
Press: London, 1955), p. 14. 
913 Edgar, ‘The Uncanny, Alienation and Strangeness:  The Entwining of Political and Medical 
Metaphor’. 
914 Ibid. 
915 Ibid. 
916 Ibid. 
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life situation illustrates the significance of things in life and why, Svenaeus writes, 
‘we are open to the world as a possibility for ourselves’.917 
 
According to Heidegger, to be in the world does not imply having a sense of 
belonging in this world. For Heidegger we are human beings when we are born to 
homelessness.918 That is, homelesssnesss is an a priori condition of human existence 
and is understood in the sense ‘of unhomelike being-in-the-world’.919 The notion of 
‘being-in-the-world’ or otherwise of ‘being-at-home’ is at the same time ‘a not-being-
quite at- home in this world’.920According to Heidegger we belong to the world in the 
sense that ‘we are in the world’ and the world and its objects take meaning through 
our lives, actions and projects.921 Things in the world obtain their meaning as long as 
they belong to ‘a lifeworld of human projects’.922  Unhomelikeness and uncanniness 
unveil that our existence does not have a meaning in itself. Our existence ‘is only 
given  meaning through the being-in-the-world’.923 
 
The awareness of our life and the world of our actions, tasks and communication 
always runs through a homelessness in the sense that even if this world and life are 
mine they are also simultaneously not mine, as I do not have the total knowledge and 
control of my life and world. But as Svenaeus remarks, ‘this is not a deficit’ but a 
required phenomenon; ‘I am delivered to the world (geworfen) with other people and 
being together with them (Mitdasein) is a part of my own being’. Even if this world I 
live in is first of all and primarily mine in the sense that it is not an objective world of 
physics, this subjectivity also applies to everyone else, and so ‘to this very ‘mineness’ 
also belongs otherness’. 924 
  
                                                
917 Fredrik Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, in Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 1, (2000), pp. 3-16, (p. 8). 
918 The notion of homelessness in Freud, according to Svenaeus, ‘is conceptualized in terms of 
processes at work in our minds beyond conscious control. No one will ever fully know himself, since 
the mind is an opaque region – and necessarily so. This traumatic, a priori homelessness in itself does 
not make us ill – rather, it makes us human. If the unhomelikeness becomes too obtrusive, however, we 
will end up in illness’. Svenaeus, ‘The Body Uncanny – Further Steps Towards a Phenomenology of 
Illness’, p.125.  
919 Ibid. 
920 Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p. 7. 
921 Svenaeus, ‘The Body Uncanny – Further Steps Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p.126. 
922 Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p. 8. 
923 Ibid. 
924 Ibid., p. 7. 
  
175 
The context of contexts, or world, in which we live our lives as thrown projects, is 
the total possibility of our life—our hopes, wishes, dreams, plans, etc. but the full 
possibilities of life always stand in the shadow of our death as our ‘ownmost’ 
possibility, as the ineluctable horizon of all our projects. 925  
 
In these instances where everything ceases to be significant and taken for granted, we 
are ‘confronted with world as world, as our thrown project, but the never completely 
buried awareness of the scope of this project, i.e., of our being-toward-death, presses 
upon us’. 926 
 
In anxiety what prevails is human existence; everything in life and world, each project 
appears to be meaningless and empty ‘against the backdrop of a basic 
meaninglessness – a homelessness of life’.927  And then through anxiety the world 
appears ‘as a meaning-structure of human understanding which has no meaning in 
itsefl’ as a collection of objects and projects.928 
 
Death is that which impedes humans from being at home in the world and within 
things.929 The nothing of death cannot be placed in a category such as an event, 
ownership or object, a concrete thing. 930  We cannot even understand death by the 
death of someone else because being on this side we always lose its right sense.931 
Anxiety does not come through the uncertainty of death but on the contrary, Svenaeus 
remarks, it comes through ‘a certainty’…about our own death, about the fact ‘that I 
will die and that nobody else can die in my place’.932 And this death is part of this life 
and it does not come ‘after life’, but a death within life itself. It is the ‘finitude’ of our 
existence and what gives its giving it its ‘basic character of unhomelikeness’.933 
 
6. 1. 3. The overcoming of homelessness in ‘the destitute days of modernity’ 
 
For Heidegger we can overcome, Svenaeus remarks, the negative feeling of 
homelessness. The future is always open for us; ‘there is always something more to 
                                                
925 Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger; p. 102.  
926 Ibid., pp. 102-103.  
927 Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p. 8. 
928 Ibid. 
929 Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger; p. 103.  
930 Ibid.  
931 Ibid. 
932 Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p. 8. 
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come in the future, something that I live towards and that I do not yet know’.934 For 
Heidegger, this possibility reveals ‘the openness of life’ and gives homelessness a 
positive tone.  
 
Yet, according to Svenaeus, the openness towards one’s future is not to be taken as an 
absolute certainty. Part of this openness is due to the uncertainty, which provokes 
anxiety, that one’s next moment could be one’s last. The future is not for ever, I am 
certainly going to die and living towards my death I am constantly dying, ‘I am dying 
in every moment in the sense of being towards my own death’.935 
                                   
However, it is through anxiety that we come closer to the understanding of our 
existence. Heidegger’s notion of anxiety and homelessness does not concern only the 
way we live but existence itself. According to Svenaeus, the ‘call of anxiety’ 
concerns the self, it ‘rises in yourself, from yourself, as a reminder of the 
uncanniness of existence’.936 When anxiety arises in humans it awakes and attunes 
‘an authentic understanding’.937 This anxiety arises ‘through a call of conscience’, 
that is the call that comes from being on our own, and the only message that it brings 
according to Svenaeus is ‘this basic homelessness’. It is a reminder, ‘an uncanny 
call’ of our own finite existence. ‘To listen to this call and not flee from its message 
of a basic uncanniness is a ‘wanting to have conscience’, it is ‘authentic thinking 
about death’’. 938 As Svenaeus writes,  ‘the basic Unheimlichkeit of existence – my a 
priori homelessness in my world – is something which…emerges most clearly in the 
experience of existential anxiety leading to authentic, individual understanding’.939 
The authentic understanding is not an absolute one and complete in itself but for 
Heidegger it comes together with homelessness and inauthenticity. For Heidegger the 
notions of authenticity and inauthenticity are two modes of understanding with each 
one complement the other. They should not be taken as two different ways of living 
                                                
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid., p. 9.  
936 Ibid., p. 8. ‘In Heidegger’s outline in Sein und Zeit human beings are awakened to the basic 
homelessness of being-in-the-world by a phenomenon that has a long history in philosophy and 
theology: the call of conscience (der Ruf des Gewissens)’. Ibid., p. 9.  
937 There are two aspects of anxiety, the trauma of homelessness which makes possible authenticity. On 
the other hand anxiety could turned to be pathological and this if it controls the way one’s way of 
living, ‘of one’s whole being-in-the-world, engaging too much of one’s everyday understanding’. Ibid., 
pp. .9-10. 
938 Ibid., p. 8.  
939 Svenaeus, ‘The Body Uncanny – Further Steps Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p.126. 
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but as two means of knowledge, the philosophical and the ‘unreflected’, ‘everyday 
understanding’.940  
 
The trauma of homelessness makes possible authenticity. But anxiety here must 
control one’s way of living, ‘of one’s whole being-in-the-world’ or engage 
excessively someone’s ‘everyday understanding’.941Authentic anxiety as the 
complete withdrawal from all our everyday understanding and activities lasts only 
for a moment.942 
 
Suddenly, the head of the hammer flies off, and the tool can no longer be used for 
striking nails. The activity is now interrupted, and we are forced to focus upon the 
hammer, to become conscious of it as a broken tool which must be repaired or 
replaced, if we are to be able to go on building the house. 943 
 
Only when an activity breaks down we can grasp the hammer as a tool and not a mere 
thing. This resembles what happens in authentic understanding. Breakdowns of an 
activity bring out the possibility of coming closer to the truth of the world and its 
objects; ‘to explicate parts of the world-structure as tools’.944 Furthermore, it is 
through this moment of authenticity that the human could come closer to the measures 
of his finite life. The call of our finitude could bring us from inauthentic to an 
authentic conception of life as existence and of death as nothing.945  
 
In particular, overcoming homelessness and opening up the possibility for the human 
being to come closer to his true being and dwelling presupposes an overcoming of the 
metaphysical and inauthentic way of thinking of his existence. The nothing, according 
to Heidegger, indicates a presence and not a mere absence or lack of beings. As he 
writes, ‘if, however, the Nothing is obviously not a being, we cannot at all say that it 
‘is’. Nevertheless, ‘there is given’ the Nothing’.946  
 
                                                
940 Ibid., p. 129. 
941 Svenaeus, ‘Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, pp. 8-10. 
942 Svenaeus, ‘The Body Uncanny – Further Steps Towards a Phenomenology of Illness’, p.129. 
943 Ibid., p. 129. 
944 ‘Authentic anxiety seems to mean a breakdown of all ordinary understanding and activity. Is this not 
equivalent to the defective transcendence (failure to relate to the world) of the ill way of being in the 
world? Is it not in a way similar to a total lack of transcendence (death, coma)? This would indeed be 
true if the authentic anxiety lasted for a long time, but according to Heidegger it does not.’ Ibid.  
945 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, p. 45.  
946 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, p. 45.  
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Perhaps it is one of the greatest of human errors to believe oneself always secure 
before the Nothing so long as being can be encountered and dealt with and retained. 
Perhaps the predominance of this error is a main reason for blindness vis-à-vis the 
Nothing, which cannot affect beings, and least of all when beings become more and 
more ‘existant’ [seiender].947 
 
To overcome metaphysics, the nothing is no longer to be understood in a negative 
way but rather in a positive way as the nothing of ‘‘plenitude’… undoubtedly 
‘something’’.948 This nothing, Young suggests, is not to be understood as an 
ontological but as an epistemological nothing, as ‘being beyond our ultimate 
standards of intelligibility; ‘nothing (comprehensible) to us’’, the mystery.949 As Hass 
and Maraldo argue, it presupposes ‘a step ‘back’ to that positive privative’ that is, to 
the thinking of Being as un-concealment.950 To know the mystery, it must be 
presented not merely as revealing but both as revealing and concealment.951 However, 
in the destitute days of modernity the mystery does not manifest itself as both 
concealment and un-concealment but it is concealed and ‘somehow appears’.952  This 
partial appearing leaves open the possibility for authenticity, for the human to 
genuinely dwell. For Svenaeus it is anxiety that can stimulate authenticity. 953  In 
modernity works of art should stimulate anxiety, in order to make us aware of our 
inauthenticity. In this sense art remains one of the places that dwelling could happen 
in the destitute days of modernity.  
 
For Young, abstract art is valid when it encloses, thematises a world and allows it to 
appear. Fully abstract art, as Young contends, is not a valid form of art as it does not 
thematises the world or its objects.954 But this thematising of the world that Young is 
                                                
947 Ibid.  
948 As Young remarks, the shift form the notion of nothing as emptiness to nothing as ‘plenitude’ is 
what characterizes Heidegger’s philosophy as well. It is in his later thinking that Heidegger, Young 
argues, develops his understanding of the nothing in a positive way. Young, op. cit., p. 132. 
949 Ibid.  
950 Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, p. 104.  
951 Ibid., p. 107.  
952 Ibid.  
953 As Young argues, the art that allows this possibility is the art that overcomes metaphysics, the art 
that allows the experience of the world as a holy rather than as an unsafe place; in anxiety the human 
cannot truly dwell. ‘Anti-metaphysical’ art is the art that liberates us from metaphysics and thus allows 
us to dwell. Young, op. cit., pp. 126-132. See the discussion by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo in 
The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, p. 104. 
954 Even if Fóti appears to reject like Young abstract expressionism as the kind of modern art that could 
be consider as art of genius in the ground of Heidegger’s thinking of art he leaves however this 
question of its meaning open. For Fóti the challenge of abstract expressionism art or in general the 
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looking to find in fully abstract art is taken in terms of pictorial presentation. In 
abstract expressionist art there is no a priori a subject matter or a world. The 
happening of the world that Heidegger discusses in semi-abstract art is, in abstract 
expressionist art, not captured within the work but comes in relation to its space. The 
validity of abstract expressionist art cannot be understood in pictorial terms of 
representation or abstraction but in spatial terms, on the way the work occupies a 
place, and its relation with the viewer.  
 
As Biro indicates, Heidegger does not speak about the ‘radically formal abstract art 
of modernism’. 955 Abstraction, Biro argues, is in Heidegger’s philosophy ‘almost an 
absent term’. In so far as Heidegger uses the term, it refers to the process where an 
experience or phenomenon alters into an object.956  Heidegger’s turn on modern, 
abstract art that could stand beyond the metaphysics of symbolism and 
representationalism aims, according to Fóti, ‘to reveal the pure gathering-emplacing 
dynamics of space’.957  
 
As we have seen in chapter three, art, for Heidegger, encloses world and then allows 
it to happen, to appear. Art is a place in the sense that it articulates a place and makes 
it available.958 But in abstract expressionist art there is no a priori a world. The 
happening of the world that Heidegger discusses in semi-abstract art is, in abstract 
expressionist art, not captured within the work but comes in relation to its space. The 
validity of abstract expressionist art cannot be understood in pictorial terms of 
representation or abstraction but in spatial terms, on the way the work occupies a 
place, and its relation with the viewer.  
 
A fully abstract work of art is not without a content or subject matter.  Painting 
through abstraction presents, according to Danto, a content free of pictorial 
boundaries. As Danto writes,  
 
                                                                                                                                       
emblematic art is linked with the matter of the death of the painting but historically it remains open. 
Fóti, op. cit., p. 350. 
955 Biro, Matthew, Anselm Kiefer and the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 151. 
956 Ibid., p. 150. 
957 Fóti, op. cit., p. 340. 
958 Ibid., p. 346.  
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          from the beginning, abstraction was believed by its inventors to be invested with a 
spiritual reality. It was as though Newman had hit upon a way of being a painter 
without violating the Second Commandment, which prohibits images.959 
 
The work of Newman is not to be seen as lacking a subject-matter. It needs the 
subject-matter because, as he states, the absence of a subject-matter makes the 
painting ‘ornamental’.960 For Newman decorative arts, although beautiful, fail to 
communicate ideas.961 
 
6. 2. The representation of the line in the work of Barnett Newman 
 
For Newman the art of the past is designated in terms of the Platonic ideal, the Greek 
‘invention of beauty’.962  The aim of the artist was to make beautiful works, 
aesthetically pleasing pictures and sculptures. Art is placed in the ground of 
aesthetics, of subjective taste and becomes, in Heidegger terms, meta-physical. 
The influence of the Platonic ideal reaches its highest level with the art of the 
Renaissance. The artist of the renaissance aims to capture a Christian Absolute in 
terms of the Greek ideal of beauty.963 As Newman states, ‘instead of making 
cathedrals out of Christ, man, or ‘life’… [t]he image we produce is the self-evident 
one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be understood by anyone who will look 
at it without the nostalgic glasses of history’.964 The aim of the European artist is not 
to imitate or represent the world in terms of beauty but to reveal it through lines and 
colours. But still, as abstract as the work might be, the lines imply landscape, figures 
and objects. As Newman remarks about the work of Mondrian, horizontal lines are to 
be seen as the earth and vertical lines as what ‘stands and grow’ on earth.965 
 
The line is either a thing or its imitation, Merleau-Ponty remarks.966  The lines in 
modern European art appear to transcend the objects in the sense that they do not 
                                                
959 Danto, ‘Barnett Newman and the Heroic Sublime’. 
960 Lyotard, op. cit., p. 132. 
961Newman refers specifically to Islamic art as decorative and thus empty of subject matter art.  
However, Newman’s rejection of decorative art is developed into a criticism of some abstract works of 
art which he considers, through the elimination of the subject matter, force the work into a ‘mere 
arabesque’, a mere decoration. Glaser, op. cit., p. 416.  
962 Malpas, op. cit., p. 203. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Ibid.  
965 Glaser, op. cit., p. 418. 
966 Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 143. 
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follow the real lines of everyday objects, they do not imitate the visible but in Klee’s 
words, they render the visible.967 It is what sustains the thing and allows it to become 
visible. The lines draw our attention to identify the things, being ‘always between or 
behind’ the things, but at the same time ‘they themselves are not things’.968  The lines 
designate the things but the things are that which, as Merleau- Ponty put it, ‘‘form 
themselves’ from themselves’, become visible throughout the two dimensional scene 
of the canvas.969 As Merleau-Ponty writes: ‘neither the contour of the apple nor the 
border between field and meadow is in this place or that, that they are always on the 
near or the far side of the point we look at’. 970 Merleau-Ponty continues,  
 
it is a certain disequilibrium contrived within the indifference of the white paper; it 
is a certain hollow opened up within the in-itself, a certain constitutive emptiness—
an emptiness which, as Moore’s statues show decisively, sustains the supposed 
positivity of things.971   
 
Making its way in space, [the line] nevertheless corrodes prosaic space and its 
partes extra partes; it develops a way of extending itself actively into that space 
which sub-tends the spatiality of a thing quite as much as that of a man or an apple 
tree. 972  
 
If the line in art is to be understood in terms of geometry it will then be comprehended 
not, as in classical geometry, as if imposed on a empty background but rather as in 
modern geometry, as ‘the restriction, segregation, or modulation of a pregiven 
spatiality’.973 Painting makes us see objects in the way we see the real everyday 
objects but most importantly we see in it an ‘empty space’. Depth becomes the third 
dimension of painting.974 The paradox regarding the third dimension which is the 
missing dimension in painting is that, Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘we are [as Cartesians] 
always on the hither side of depth, or beyond. It is never the case that things really are 
one behind the other’. 975 Depth in painting becomes then ‘an illusion of an 
illusion’.976 In a representational or presentational painting we see, as Danto argues, 
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973 Ibid., p. 144. 
974 Ibid., p. 133. 
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through the surface of the picture, in the same way that we see through a window. The 
space of the picture is a virtual space that deploys objects, scenes, motion and time.977 
 
In sculpture the line plays a decisive role not only in the way it will sustain the object 
or the figure but also in the way we will see the work. The line in sculpture is always 
ideational, its dimension is represented through the subject matter and the boundaries 
of the work.  In modern sculpture the line is not broken in favour of the form of the 
figure as in traditional sculpture but is either constant and sturdy or conspicuously 
broken and detached. The represented figure or object is never the immediate figure 
or object, but takes form and meaning by the way it is sustained by the lines.978  
 
Painting and sculpture search not only the external movements, Merleau-Ponty writes, 
‘but for its secret ciphers, of which there are some still more subtle’.979 Motion and 
stasis derive, or in Heidegger terms, appear, happen, from the way the line is drawn, 
carved or moulded. From the way each part of the body, the arms, the head and feet 
are taken each one at a different moment, ‘transition and duration’ arises on canvas, in 
stone, or bronze.980   
 
But in this sense a picture or a sculpture is not an object in its own right, but is 
understood by terms of what it represents. It is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘something 
other than itself’.981 It is for Heidegger a metaphysical kind of art, an art that does not 
present in the sense of thematise the world and its object but it turns them into 
something else, into the known and aesthetically appealed. The viewer is placed in a 
pictorial space, an imaginary place and he is called to observe, to examine and 
interpret the formal properties of the work in terms of aesthetic concepts and ideals.  
 
For Newman, even if European artists attempted to destroy the past ‘rhetoric of 
beauty’, they failed to overcome aesthetics. The ‘cult of beauty’ not only did not stop 
in the Renaissance but continued to characterise modern art and to influence 
                                                
977 Danto, ‘Barnett Newman and the Heroic Sublime’. 
978 Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., pp. 143-145. 
979 Ibid., p. 145. 
980 Ibid. 
981 Ibid., p. 143. 
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movements particularly from impressionism to cubism.982 Modern European art 
remains aesthetic in its process and purpose, as Malpas argues, it remains within the 
framework of Renaissance imagery of the world and its object. 983 The 
experimentation and innovation in new forms and materials is still placed within a 
context of a platonic ‘pure plasticity’ of classical and romantic art.984 
 
6. 2. 1. The subject matter in abstract expressionist art 
 
Abstract expressionist artists, on the other hand, create a work that does not enclose or 
represent the world and its objects. Specifically, they aim to isolate an expression 
through mere abstract shapes, colours and lines that appear to deny any reference to 
the physical world. 
 
What abstract expressionism aims to do is to distance painting from picture and the 
picturesque and bring it closer to the condition of the painting as an object in itself, as 
an object that represents or presents merely itself. 985 The aim is to ‘separate painting 
from what it is not’ to push painting away from the transcendental, the imaginary and 
the narrative.986 Abstract expressionist art engages the viewer on its own terms, as 
Danto writes, without any mediation; we do not see or rather ‘we are not supposed to 
see’ through the painting.987  The canvas of the painting is no longer the ground for an 
imaginary projection or988 a means for the representation of a meaning or a world but 
is to be seen, as Biro suggest, as a ‘record of the artist’s dialogue’ with his 
materials.989  
 
                                                
982 Malpas, op. cit., p. 203. 
983 Ibid. But even when it appears to deny any reference to the world ‘for an empty world of geometric 
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Newman states that the Europeans are ‘concerned with the transcendence of objects’ 
whereas the Americans aimed to move beyond the representation of the world and its 
objects and to capture ‘the transcendental experience’.990 That is, to bring forth an 
experience, an expression, through the same materiality of painting or sculpture, 
through colour and line. The materiality of the work, the canvas and the paint become, 
according to Krauss, an emblem, a sign, the signature of the artist. These emblems, 
Krauss suggests, do not exist independently of its audience as in traditional and 
modern European works of art 991  Representation in art does not address someone 
specifically or a particular audience. The emblem in abstract expressionist art 
confronts the viewer and takes meaning only when understood in relation to a viewer 
or a ‘receiver’.992 The viewer, as opposed to a passive observer, is now aware of his 
own ‘creative input into the viewing experience’.993  
 
More so, through aesthetic experience the unity of the work, its creator, and the 
viewer becomes manifest. The manifestation is to take place in a material world, the 
place in which the work is placed or exhibited becomes, as Ingarden writes, ‘the 
background and displaced itself in the shape of the ontological foundation of the work 
of art’.994 Ingarden’s proposal of a re-definition of aesthetics and aesthetic experience 
is grounded in the process of the shaping of the work of art which as such is not 
exhausted in the process of the creation of the work, in the experience of the artist. 
The work of art ‘discharges itself in a certain active bodily behaviour during which 
the physical ontological foundation of the work of art is shaped’.995 The viewer ‘being 
temporarily disposed to the reception and recreation of the work itself, is also not only 
activity, but in a certain sense at least creative’.996 
 
But how does the abstract expressionist artist manage to bring the viewer into the 
creative process of his work?  
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Abstract expressionism’s mark is the gesture of the repetition.997 In Pollock it is the 
gesture of the spilt paint or the repetition of brush or finger spin in oil paint (fig. 31). 
Seeing his work up close the viewer uncovers the process of his painting. He gets 
‘absorbed’, Mussman writes, with the way the pools of dried paint are formed and the 
way some colors are mixed with others.998 However, seeing his work from a distance 
the viewer is taken in by the repetition of signs and colors. Even though in this optical 
field there are not represented objects or figures, the repeated abstract lines create an 
illusion of a three-dimensional space.999 Through this space, the viewer individually 
could proceed into a process of understanding these lines and marks as represented 
objects or figures.1000 
 
Through the materiality of the work, techniques and the large scale of paintings and 
sculptures, abstract expressionists created a language that concerns existence and the 
self.  Through a succession of abstract gestures Pollock and De Kooning succeeded in 
bringing forth ‘individual subjectivity’ and reflecting the subconscious of the self.1001 
However, existence in Newman’s work is designated, not by a personal ‘handwriting 
of gestures’ as in the work of Pollock and De Kooning, but with an impersonal 
‘typography of the vertical’.1002 Newman’s work manages through an impersonal 
‘typography of the vertical’ to bring forth the consciousness of the self.1003 Newman, 
‘through the repetition of stereotypes’, succeeds in creating an objective language that 
manifests the being of consciousness.1004  His aim is to capture an instant of ‘total 
reality’, to bring forth, Glaser argues, ‘the ‘absolute Being’ of consciousness’.1005 The 
now of consciousness emerges through the totally non-representational forms that 
approach the primitive and archaic. With this turn towards the primitive and archaic, 
Newman aims not to bring forth the original self, the absolute consciousness, but to 
discover what consciousness can and cannot put together.1006  
                                                
997 Toby Mussman, ‘Literalness and the Infinite’, in Minimal Art: A critical Anthology, ed. Gregory 
Battcock, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc, 1968), pp. 242-245. 
998 Mussman,op. cit, pp. 242-245. 
999 Biro, op. cit., p. 183. 
1000 For Mussman ‘hand-manipulated’ art is still designated by anthropomorphism. Mussman, op. cit., 
p. 248. 
1001 Calas, op. cit., pp. 109-115, (p. 115). 
1002 Ibid.  
1003 Ibid.  
1004 Ibid., and Glaser, op. cit., p. 418. 
1005 Glaser, op. cit., p. 418. 
1006 Malpas, op. cit., pp. 205-126. 
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For Newman the vertical lines, or zips, are not colored lines, or stripes, but ‘color 
planes’.1007 The zips in his work do not form a pictorial space or an atmosphere. Each 
zip expanding from the bottom to the top of the painting ‘is on the surface and on the 
same space as we are. As Danto remarks, painting and viewer coexist in the same 
reality’.1008 And this precisely is Newman’s aim, that is, to make his works, ‘objects 
in their own right’, to engage  the viewer directly with the work by means of the same 
work as an object in itself.1009  
 
6. 2. 2. The representation of the self in the work of Barnett Newman  
 
Irrespective of the particular angle from which we see Newman’s works we see the 
same object or image, but as such do not carry any elements that could lead us to a 
meaning. Newman cancels the narrative reading of his work with a process of 
repetition that tells nothing other than its own being.1010 As Krauss writes, ‘repetition 
forces a self-conscious account of process to usurp attention from the object’s role in 
the overall narration’.1011 Newman’s works appear empty. But even if they do not 
represent anything and any reference to the world appears absent, his works do not 
lack meaning.  The emptiness of his work is not to be taken as an absolute 
nothingness but as a spatial element that collects the things together, in a present time 
and place.1012 Meaning does not exist in the work but happens ‘in the process of 
experience itself’1013  
 
The repetition in Newman’s paintings is manifested through the zips, the way they are 
drawn and their position on canvas, the colour of the canvas and the canvas itself, 
which in some works becomes his third colour. Thus, the antithesis between colours 
and lines becomes a vehicle for the viewer to generate meaning. In Newman’s work 
the meaning derives from both observing the differences in repetition of the vertical 
                                                
1007 Danto, ‘Barnett Newman and the Heroic Sublime’. 
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, p. 20.  
1011 Ibid., p. 35. 
1012 Fóti, op. cit.,  p. 340. 
1013 Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, p. 30. 
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lines, the zips and deciphering the expression.1014 Colours and lines become 
metaphors or symbols of feelings or emotions, of progression and stasis. In Newman’s 
work Abraham (fig. 32), the black colour zip becomes a symbol of Abraham’s fear, 
terror and anxiety confronting the unknown.1015 The hidden two white vertical lines 
bring the viewer closer to the process of Newman’s creation of this painting.1016 
Coming closer to the work the black is revealed as being imposed upon the white 
lines to indicate ‘an altogether different order of things—that there is as much 
difference between the two states of the painting, say, as between Abraham’s 
willingness to sacrifice Isaac’ or, as Bois suggest, as in Kierkegaard’s text, 
Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia.1017 Newman’s works Abraham and The Stations 
of the Cross represent two biblical stories of human sacrifice. Newman appears to 
read Christ’s passion with Abraham’s faith and belief. ‘Abraham and Jesus are two 
singular figures understood not from the point of view of God’s project, but from that 
of Man—of a questioning Man; they are two distinct figures of a relationship to the 
absolute’.1018 
 
In his work The Stations of the Cross the relations among the variations of the 
repetitions and the antithesis among the zips, their background and the space that 
surrounds them, drive us to see the work as a process or climax, as an expression of ‘a 
religious narrative’.1019 In The Stations of the Cross meaning is developed through 
moving from Station One to Station Fourteen and by enhancing our understanding of 
each work and its relation with the other works.1020 We see the repetition of colours 
but also encounter the contrast between the white and black, narrow and broad areas, 
strong and weak lines, paint and raw canvas. In some works the strong site is towards 
the left, in others towards the right. In some works the lines are hazy while in others 
they are clearly distinguished.  The first paintings in this series have both black and 
white vertical lines. In the Ninth Station, the black vertical lines are replaced by three 
white lines upon plain canvas. This theme continues to the Tenth and Eleventh Station 
                                                
1014 Calas, op. cit., p. 115. 
1015 Bois, op. cit., pp. 17-18.  
1016 Ibid. 
1017 Ibid. 
1018 See Professor Jean-Daniel Causse’s approach to the relationship between Jesus and Abraham, 
footnote 17, Ibid., p. 14.  
1019 Danto, ‘Barnett Newman and the Heroic Sublime’. 
1020 Ibid.  
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but changes by the intense black of the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Station. Next, in 
the Fourteenth Station, black suddenly disappears. 
 
          Then, all at once, Twelfth Station is dramatically black, as is the Thirteenth Station. 
And then, in the Fourteenth Station, black again abruptly disappears. There is a 
strip of raw canvas at the left, and the rest is white, as if Christ yielded up the ghost 
as St. Matthew narrates it. The work demonstrates how it is possible for essentially 
abstract paintings to create a religious narrative.1021 
 
As Calas writes, ‘black is set against white, black and white confront us with the 
dullness of raw canvas. Black lifts the raw canvas to the purity of white’.1022  But is it 
light that the artist wants us to see?1023 Could the antithesis between black and white 
be seen as a metaphor of that between light and darkness, day and night, life and 
death?  As Calas suggests it is not the illusion of light that Newman is trying to 
capture. Everything in his work is reduced ‘to an immediacy felt in the tension 
between lines and planes, raw canvas and/or white and black surfaces, or twilight 
zones of gray’.1024 The artist, Calas writes, cannot ‘bring forth’ light through mere 
colour. The impressionist artist was the first to manage to ‘isolate light’ and the 
abstract expressionist artist the first to ‘isolate existence’.1025 The impressionist artist 
brings forth the impression of light by presenting not the landscape or scene but the 
effect of the passage of time on the landscape and scene. The abstract expressionist 
artist brings forth existence by allowing the effect of space and time itself to come 
forth in relation to the viewer. 
 
Newman’s aim was to create an art that could express abstract concepts such as time 
duration and a kinaesthetic motion. As Glaser argues, Newman wanted to create with 
his work ‘a concrete experience, a concrete point of view which could create an 
awareness, or ‘insight’ or ‘revelation’ of one’s relationship to oneself and the 
world’.1026 Specifically, according to Danto, Heidegger’s discussion of human beings 
as Dasein, that is, as ‘being there’, is partly the intended experience of Newman’s 
works; ‘that our thereness is implied by the scale of the paintings themselves.’1027 In 
                                                
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Calas, op. cit., p. 114. 
1023 Ibid. 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 Ibid., p. 115. 
1026 Glaser, op. cit., p. 418. 
1027 Danto, ‘Barnett Newman and the Heroic Sublime’. 
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Newman’s work you acknowledge that you are there and furthermore you become 
aware of yourself and ‘of your own scale’.1028  
 
Newman, as we have seen, sees our scale as mortals in an era without gods. For 
Newman even if the human must acknowledge his mortality and his homelessness he 
passes through the feeling of anxiety. Anxiety is inherent in the acknowledgement of 
the scale of the human in modernity and of its homeless condition that his work brings 
forth.  
 
But as we have seen anxiety is the step towards the overcoming of the human’s 
homelessness and thus inauthenticity. It is through anxiety that human can awake an 
authenticity and hence can come closer to the understanding of its being and of its 
existence. Authentic anxiety can remind to the human its finitude existence. 
The aim of Newman’s work is to demonstrate the here and now of the human and 
precisely to isolate the moment, the ‘instant’ which this awareness arrives.1029 This 
moment could be seen as the moment that authentic anxiety lasts as the withdrawal of 
the human from all its everyday activities, the moment that authenticity lasts.  
 
In each work Newman projects a different aspect of being and its relation with the 
world. In The Stations of the Cross the being is presented through a process of 
repetition of lines and colours, as a climax towards authenticity. In his series of the 
Here Newman plays with the matter of the visible and invisible, of present and 
absence and of reflection. Furthermore in his sculpture the Broken Obelisk the being 
comes forth as a gesture, a creation. 
 
6. 2. 3. The deconstruction of subjectivity in the work of Barnett Newman  
 
For Biro, the meaning of abstract expressionist art, or otherwise what its ‘abstract’ 
forms ‘represent’, comes by the projection of the various aspects of Being, ‘by the 
decentering or deconstruction of subjectivity’.1030 According to Biro, the 
deconstruction of subjectivity becomes a process which includes ‘the projection and 
                                                
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Lyotard, op. cit., p. 331. 
1030 Biro, p. 189. 
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destabilization of subjectivity’ in order to ‘produce an indecidable play of multiple 
forms of subjectivity’.1031  
 
The deconstruction and destabilization of subjectivity could be seen as the 
representation of Newman’s work and in particular his sculptures Here and Broken 
Obelisk. In Here I and II, subjectivity is presented partially and incompletely, either as 
difference, or identity, as visible and invisible but never as the complete image of the 
self or of the being.1032 The zips in Here I and II function in a dual manner, as the 
work itself and as the framing, the surrounding of other zips in between. The zips 
function in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, as the dimensions of the invisible, they do not 
merely bring forth the invisible, but reproduce it out of absence. 
 
As Merleau-Ponty argues seeing an object does not presuppose seeing its effects. He 
writes, ‘the visible in the profane sense forgets its premises; it rests upon a total 
visibility which is to be recreated and which liberates the phantoms captive in it’.1033 
What Newman manages to do is to allow duplications in the sense of reflection. The 
duplications or reflections of the zips are the unreal things. They are impressions, or 
‘ghosts’ as Merleau-Ponty put it, which have merely a ‘visual existence’ but at the 
same time they are real effects. 1034 Thus, in the world we have two individual external 
things which related to each other by causality: the real thing itself and its reflection 
‘which happens to have an ordered correspondence with the real thing’.1035 What is 
visible is designated by the invisible, by that ‘which it makes present as a certain 
absence’.1036  But in Here III the single zip appears as merely present. It does not 
allow the production of something else beyond itself as an external thing but its 
slightly reflective surface reflects or represents merely a sense of its surrounding, of 
light and shadow, a sense of duration, or in Lyotard’s words, of a ‘minimal 
occurrence’.1037 
 
                                                
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Ulf Strohmayer, ‘Belonging: Spaces of Meandering Desire’, in Space and Social Theory: 
Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity, ed. by Georges Benko and Ulf Strohmayer (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), pp. 162-185, (p. 171).  
1033 Merleau-Ponty,op. cit., p. 128. 
1034 Ibid., pp. 129-131. 
1035 Ibid., p. 131. 
1036 Ibid. 
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In Broken Obelisk the notion of being comes not through the repetition of the symbol 
pyramid but as a gesture, Newman’s gesture to signify creation. As Strohmayer writes 
in his essay, ‘Belonging: Spaces of Meandering Desire’, ‘to reflect is to see: oneself; 
is to experience contradiction in experiencing experience—a mesmerism of repetitive 
representation. When God made Adam, Michelangelo figured, he touched him. A 
gesture. No repetition.’1038  
 
Broken Obelisk is a monumental sculpture more than twenty-five feet tall. Newman 
designs the sculpture in 1963-64 and in 1967 makes three identical editions that are 
displayed in Houston, in the Museum of Modern Art in New York, and on the campus 
of the University of Washington in Seattle. Broken Obelisk is dedicated to Martin 
Luther King after his death and stands, Polcari suggests, as an ‘antiwar 
monumentalization’.1039 It expresses, Polcari continues, the period after the World 
War II and symbolizes ‘the triumph of life over death and the human spirit over 
suffering’.1040  The sculpture is made from six thousands pounds of Corten steel, a 
material that is designed to rust. Newman brings in two symbolic monumental objects 
a pyramid and an obelisk, two symbols that related traditionally with the 
memoralization of human life after death. The sculpture, however, represents a 
reversed obelisk or a zip where the top is broken and placed upon a pyramidal base. 
This unity of two opposite cultural symbols, the pyramid, a symbol of death, and the 
Obelisk, a pantheistic symbol of immortality and eternity, is not to be seen merely as 
a representation of the matter of rebirth or as a struggle of life and death.1041 Newman 
in this work brings Egyptian and classical geometry together. But he de-emphasise the 
prominent status of the pyramid, which now functions both as the work and as the 
base, and the illusion of the infinite extension of the traditional obelisk which is now 
both upside down and broken. He thus overcomes, the static geometrical perfection of 
these symbols thus interrupting their metaphysical significance.1042  
                                                
1038 Strohmayer, op. cit., p. 167. 
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What attracts the viewer’s attention and creates, in Polcari’s words, ‘a dramatic 
central focus in the sculpture’ is the point of the unity of the two symbols.1043 This 
unity of the reverse obelisk and the pyramid becomes a metaphor of a fulfilled event. 
It becomes Newman’s gesture to capture or represent the finitude of the human’s 
existence, the past, present and future of the human’s fate. For Heidegger it is 
precisely the gesture, the hand of drawing or writing, the hand of carving and 
sculpturing is what reveals to us the hidden aspect of the truth of things.1044 
 
Newman seems to acknowledge the impossibility of presenting the absolute identity 
of being. What he manages to do however is to reveal some aspects of the being as 
both authentic and inauthentic existence of the human in modernity. As Strohmayer 
remarks,  
  
the question is not so much whether or not there is an absolute (identity) –for even 
if there were, its non placeable characteristics would not be ours to name –, but how 
we handle the slippery yet fundamental materiality of whatever remains….All we 
can do [then] is to show how the other side looks from our point of view.1045 
 
Newman by acknowledging and projecting our inathenticity and homelessness shows 
us the authentic side of being. In Adorno’s terms Newman projects a negative truth, it 
shows us what we lack. The truth of Newman’s work cannot replace this lack but by 
revealing it signifies its important and our need for truth. 
 
The negativity of the work of Newman is connected with the notion of abstraction in 
his work and modern art in general. Even if abstraction is developed in modern art as 
a contradiction to representation it can not be entirely separated from representation. 
                                                                                                                                       
prismatic body. Newman actually uses the golden ratio for this work. ‘With the help of two special 
similar isosceles triangles we see that the apex of the pyramid divides the total height according to the 
golden ratio’. Gert F. Bär, ‘Aspects of Geometry and Art’, in Journal for Geometry and Graphics, Vol. 
8 (2004), No. 2, p. 233. 
1043 Polcari, op. cit., p. 54.  
1044 Fóti, op. cit., p. 344. A gesture is what brings together the world and vision, the world, hand and 
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Newman’s task to overcomes aesthetics and representation of the world leads him to 
an art whose meaning comes forth in the ‘revelation of one’s relationship to oneself 
and the world’.1046 Yet this revelation remains within the realm of aesthetics and 
representational but in a negative manner. According to Biro, it is a negativity that is 
essential for the understanding of both abstraction in art and modern art in its 
whole.1047  As he writes,  
 
this negativity is that aspect of the modern art work that has the potential to stop or 
arrest the spectator’s contemplation – to suggest, in other words, that acts of 
interpretation have limits and that art, like reality as a whole, also resists attempts 
to give it definite meanings.1048 
 
But the negativity of modern art is essential to the concept of modern art. This is 
because, Biro remarks, this negativity ‘is the source of its autonomy vis-à-vis the 
spectator’.1049 Therefore, as much abstract modern art intents to be abstract it is 
‘always interpretatively recuperated’ meaning that, it is always understood in terms 
of representation, as Biro puts it, it is ‘treated as representing something’.1050 
Regardless of the negativity of abstraction, the meaning of abstract art will always be 
placed within the limits of representation, ‘abstraction will always ultimately be 
recuperated by representation’.1051 As Biro writes, ‘no matter how ‘other’ a work of 
art may first appear, no matter how far outside of the conventional structures of 
‘making sense’ it initially stands, it ultimately becomes representational’.1052  
 
For Biro representation is not the mimesis or the idealization of the world and its 
objects but the reference or in Heideggerian terms the thematisation of the world and 
its objects. Abstract art does not imitate the world but allows it appear, it makes 
visible the hidden aspects of things. In painting the world appears as partial, enclosed 
into the two dimensions of its surface. Looking it from a distance we reveal what 
appears to be missing, ‘what profane vision believes to be invisible’.1053 In contrast 
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to painting sculpture manages to create a concrete view of the world, to come closer 
to the way things are, to the way they appear to us and to the relation of the human 
and the world. Its meaning and truth do not become visible merely through its 
materiality or three-dimensionality but also in its relation with place and space. 
Sculpture does not necessarily require to be seen from a distance in order to see what 
is missing. In order to see the other aspect of being of sculpture presupposes to 
acknowledge its space. In the work of Giacometti distance becomes part of its 
representation. 
 
Conclusion: The representation of the holy in modernity 
 
Newman’s work represents subjectivity and ‘the heroic-tragic subject of existentialist 
thought’.1054 The religious dimension of Newman’s work derives from the 
acknowledgement of our scale as human beings, in Heidegger’s terms the awareness 
and thinking of our mortality in the here and now and the thinking of our being in 
relation to the realm that lies beyond us, as the realm of the mystical. And for 
Heidegger the mystical is the place in which ‘the holy is to be found’. 
 
Sculpture and art in general in modernity does not enclose and represent the world as 
a holy but as a destitute world in which gods are absent and the human is homeless. 
But the acknowledgement and thinking of the modern condition of world and of the 
human is what reveals the other side of truth, the one that is missing from the modern 
era. ‘As soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. 
Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals 
into their dwelling’.1055  
 
Art’s failure to reveal the holiness of the world or, as Bernstein argues, art’s ‘lack of 
cognitive power’ and its exclusion from truth becomes its ‘source of power’ its 
‘negative cognition’.1056 As  Bernstein writes:  
 
                                                                                                                                       
existence of the world upon painting becomes possible thanks to the limitation of the tactile. Merleau-
Ponty, op. cit., p. 127. 
1054 Fóti, op. cit., p. 348. 
1055 Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, p. 159. 
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      Modern art works, works of genius, thrive on their own essential impossibility, on 
their failure to be works of great art, to disclose a world; and they can do no other, 
for that is where art is. Hence through them we come to experience the sense of 
the periphery as a periphery, and thus the meaning of the sway in the centre. The 
art work solicits in remembrance and anticipation of a power, a potentiality of 
art…This potentiality when treated as present actuality—the presumptive truth—
claim of the work—conceals the actual meaning of the work, its work of 
remembrance and anticipation. When this work is accomplished the present is 
brought to presence in its specificity; the impossibility of great art is the historical 
fate of art under the sway of technology. 1057  
 
Art in modernity is aware of its death and its failure to be the kind of art that it was in the 
past, but it seeks ‘a potentiality of art’. This potentiality is what conceals its own individual 
meaning or truth, for Adorno, a negative truth and for Heidegger a metaphysical truth. 
Even if the modern age is the age that forgets true being, art could still enclose the event of 
truth, providing the possibility of coming closer to it. As Malpas writes, ‘if a work of art 
can hold within itself the minimal instance of an event, it retains something that is 
irreducible to speculative comprehension’. 1058  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1057 Ibid., p. 135.  
1058 The event of the truth of the art of avant-garde ‘holds out against the constant threat of art’s being 
reduced entirely to the laws of technological innovation and the marketplace’. Malpas,op. cit., p. 127. 
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Conclusion  
 
The development of modern sculpture could be seen as a process towards the 
liberation of art from aesthetics cannons and techniques that kept sculpture petrified 
into a beautiful form. The modern sculptor aims to reach deeper the appearances of 
the world and his objects and to come closer to the truth of beings and of world. Each 
artist with his work seeks to reveal another aspect of this truth. Rodin aims to bring 
forth the expressivity and feeling of human being. Brancusi aims to present the core 
of things, Picasso with his construction their structure and furthermore Duchamp to 
make us rethink the essence of art and its boundaries with reality itself. Giacometti 
aims to capture the finitude of the human existence and the way the human’s image 
appears to others. Barnett Newman aims to capture the same condition of the human’s 
finitude nature, to present the anxiety and agony of the human in a world in which he 
is alone.  
 
Modern sculpture and modern art seeks through abstraction to project the being of the 
human and world. But abstraction cannot surpass the limits of aesthetics and 
representation. Abstraction in modernity becomes a kind of negative representation. 
But it is this negativity of modern art that places it within the realm of art and 
furthermore allows the viewer to experience it and understand it.  Due to this 
negativity modern art in Heidegger philosophy of art could be seen as a valid form of 
art, as an art that averts the metaphysics of symbolism and representation and 
furthermore could be seen as a mode of truth of being and world in the post religious 
era of modernity. 
 
The homelessness and ‘unplaceability’ which characterises modern sculpture is its 
acknowledgment of the homelessness of the human in modernity an era without gods. 
Sculpture in modernity cannot as traditional sculpture immortalize gods but to isolate 
an aspect of the human’s nature in the destitution of modernity. Modern sculpture and 
modern art represent the metaphysical condition of modernity, they reveal the truths 
that have passed into oblivion but also the position and freedoms of the human in 
modernity as a subject.  
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